DOJ-OGR-00003679.json 5.5 KB

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  1. {
  2. "document_metadata": {
  3. "page_number": "5",
  4. "document_number": "207",
  5. "date": "04/16/21",
  6. "document_type": "court document",
  7. "has_handwriting": false,
  8. "has_stamps": false
  9. },
  10. "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 5 of 34\nits entirety, reads as follows: “the United States also agrees that it will not institute any criminal charges against any potential co-conspirators of Epstein.” Dkt. No. 142-1 at 5. Under Annabi, Salameh, and Gonzalez, a statement that “the United States” agrees not to prosecute implies no restriction on prosecutions in other districts.\nTwo provisions of the NPA refer specifically to prosecution in the Southern District of Florida. The first states that the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida will defer “prosecution in this District” if Epstein complies with the agreement. Dkt. No. 142-1 at 2. The second states that no prosecution “will be instituted in this District, and the charges against Epstein if any, will be dismissed” after he fulfills the agreement’s conditions. Maxwell contends that the lack of similar language in the co-conspirator provision must mean that it lacks any geographical limitation. If anything, that language reflects that the NPA’s scope was expressly limited to the Southern District of Florida. It is not plausible—let alone “affirmatively apparent”, Annabi, 771 F.2d at 672—that the parties intended to drastically expand the agreement’s geographic scope in the single sentence on the prosecution of co-conspirators without clearly so saying.\nWithout an affirmative statement in the NPA’s text, Maxwell turns to its negotiation history. Under Second Circuit precedent she may offer evidence that negotiations of the NPA between the defendant and the prosecutors included a promise to bind other districts. See United States v. Russo, 801 F.2d 624, 626 (2d Cir. 1986). She alleges that officials in the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida sought and obtained approval for the NPA from the Office of the Deputy Attorney General and communicated with attorneys in other districts. Any involvement of attorneys outside the Southern District of Florida appears to have been minimal. Maxwell has already received access to an unusually large amount of information\n5\nDOJ-OGR-00003679",
  11. "text_blocks": [
  12. {
  13. "type": "printed",
  14. "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 5 of 34",
  15. "position": "header"
  16. },
  17. {
  18. "type": "printed",
  19. "content": "its entirety, reads as follows: “the United States also agrees that it will not institute any criminal charges against any potential co-conspirators of Epstein.” Dkt. No. 142-1 at 5. Under Annabi, Salameh, and Gonzalez, a statement that “the United States” agrees not to prosecute implies no restriction on prosecutions in other districts.\nTwo provisions of the NPA refer specifically to prosecution in the Southern District of Florida. The first states that the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida will defer “prosecution in this District” if Epstein complies with the agreement. Dkt. No. 142-1 at 2. The second states that no prosecution “will be instituted in this District, and the charges against Epstein if any, will be dismissed” after he fulfills the agreement’s conditions. Maxwell contends that the lack of similar language in the co-conspirator provision must mean that it lacks any geographical limitation. If anything, that language reflects that the NPA’s scope was expressly limited to the Southern District of Florida. It is not plausible—let alone “affirmatively apparent”, Annabi, 771 F.2d at 672—that the parties intended to drastically expand the agreement’s geographic scope in the single sentence on the prosecution of co-conspirators without clearly so saying.",
  20. "position": "top"
  21. },
  22. {
  23. "type": "printed",
  24. "content": "Without an affirmative statement in the NPA’s text, Maxwell turns to its negotiation history. Under Second Circuit precedent she may offer evidence that negotiations of the NPA between the defendant and the prosecutors included a promise to bind other districts. See United States v. Russo, 801 F.2d 624, 626 (2d Cir. 1986). She alleges that officials in the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida sought and obtained approval for the NPA from the Office of the Deputy Attorney General and communicated with attorneys in other districts. Any involvement of attorneys outside the Southern District of Florida appears to have been minimal. Maxwell has already received access to an unusually large amount of information",
  25. "position": "middle"
  26. },
  27. {
  28. "type": "printed",
  29. "content": "5",
  30. "position": "footer"
  31. },
  32. {
  33. "type": "printed",
  34. "content": "DOJ-OGR-00003679",
  35. "position": "footer"
  36. }
  37. ],
  38. "entities": {
  39. "people": [
  40. "Epstein",
  41. "Maxwell",
  42. "Annabi",
  43. "Salameh",
  44. "Gonzalez",
  45. "Russo"
  46. ],
  47. "organizations": [
  48. "U.S. Attorney's Office",
  49. "Office of the Deputy Attorney General"
  50. ],
  51. "locations": [
  52. "Southern District of Florida"
  53. ],
  54. "dates": [
  55. "04/16/21"
  56. ],
  57. "reference_numbers": [
  58. "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
  59. "Document 207",
  60. "Dkt. No. 142-1",
  61. "DOJ-OGR-00003679"
  62. ]
  63. },
  64. "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to the case of Maxwell, discussing the Non-Prosecution Agreement (NPA) involving Epstein and its implications for other districts."
  65. }