mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES002/DOJ-OGR-00004452.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "155",
    "document_number": "293-1",
    "date": "05/25/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
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  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 293-1 Filed 05/25/21 Page 155 of 349\n\nthe prosecutor indicted him on more serious charges. Hayes was thereafter convicted and sentenced under the new indictment. The state court of appeals rejected Hayes's challenge to his conviction, concluding that the prosecutor's decision to indict on more serious charges was a legitimate use of available leverage in the plea-bargaining process. Hayes filed for review of his conviction and sentence in federal court, and although Hayes lost at the district court level, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit concluded that the prosecutor's conduct constituted impermissible vindictive prosecution.\n\nThe Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit's ruling. The Court opined that \"acceptance of the basic legitimacy of plea bargaining necessarily implies rejection of any notion that a guilty plea is involuntary in a constitutional sense simply because it is the end result of the bargaining process.\" Id. at 363. A long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe a crime has been committed, \"the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, rests entirely in his discretion.\" Id. at 364 (emphasis added). The Court explained that selectivity in enforcement of the criminal law is not improper unless based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification. Id.\n\nThese principles were reiterated in Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985), a case involving the government's policy of prosecuting only those individuals who reported themselves as having failed to register with the Selective Service system. The petitioner in Wayte claimed that the self-reported non-registrants were \"vocal\" opponents of the registration program who were being punished for the exercise of their First Amendment rights. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, stating that the government has \"broad discretion\" in deciding whom to prosecute, and that the limits of that discretion are reached only when the prosecutor's decision is based on an unjustifiable standard. Id. at 607–08. Because the passive enforcement policy was not intended to have a discriminatory effect, the claim of selective prosecution failed.\n\nIn Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976), the Supreme Court considered whether a state prosecutor acting within the scope of his duties could be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of the defendant's constitutional rights when the defendant alleged that the prosecutor and others had unlawfully conspired to charge and convict him. The Court held that \"in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State's case,\" conduct that is \"intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process,\" the prosecutor enjoyed absolute immunity from a civil suit for damages. Id. at 430–31. In Harrington v. Almy, 977 F.2d 37 (1st Cir. 1992), the court applied Imbler to a challenge to a prosecutor's decision not to prosecute. The court noted that \"given the availability of immunity for the decision to charge, it becomes even more important that symmetrical protection be available for the decision not to charge.\" Id. at 41 (emphasis in original).\n\nFinally, in an analogous area of the law, in Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985), the Supreme Court concluded that an agency's decision not to undertake an enforcement action is not reviewable under the federal Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-706.\n\n2. Plea Agreement Promises of Leniency towards a Third Party\n\nCase law regarding promises made during plea negotiations not to prosecute a third-party arises in two contexts. First, defendants have challenged the voluntariness of the resulting plea",
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      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 293-1 Filed 05/25/21 Page 155 of 349",
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      "type": "printed",
      "content": "the prosecutor indicted him on more serious charges. Hayes was thereafter convicted and sentenced under the new indictment. The state court of appeals rejected Hayes's challenge to his conviction, concluding that the prosecutor's decision to indict on more serious charges was a legitimate use of available leverage in the plea-bargaining process. Hayes filed for review of his conviction and sentence in federal court, and although Hayes lost at the district court level, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit concluded that the prosecutor's conduct constituted impermissible vindictive prosecution.",
      "position": "top"
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    {
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      "content": "The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit's ruling. The Court opined that \"acceptance of the basic legitimacy of plea bargaining necessarily implies rejection of any notion that a guilty plea is involuntary in a constitutional sense simply because it is the end result of the bargaining process.\" Id. at 363. A long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe a crime has been committed, \"the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, rests entirely in his discretion.\" Id. at 364 (emphasis added). The Court explained that selectivity in enforcement of the criminal law is not improper unless based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification. Id.",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "These principles were reiterated in Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985), a case involving the government's policy of prosecuting only those individuals who reported themselves as having failed to register with the Selective Service system. The petitioner in Wayte claimed that the self-reported non-registrants were \"vocal\" opponents of the registration program who were being punished for the exercise of their First Amendment rights. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, stating that the government has \"broad discretion\" in deciding whom to prosecute, and that the limits of that discretion are reached only when the prosecutor's decision is based on an unjustifiable standard. Id. at 607–08. Because the passive enforcement policy was not intended to have a discriminatory effect, the claim of selective prosecution failed.",
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    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "In Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976), the Supreme Court considered whether a state prosecutor acting within the scope of his duties could be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of the defendant's constitutional rights when the defendant alleged that the prosecutor and others had unlawfully conspired to charge and convict him. The Court held that \"in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State's case,\" conduct that is \"intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process,\" the prosecutor enjoyed absolute immunity from a civil suit for damages. Id. at 430–31. In Harrington v. Almy, 977 F.2d 37 (1st Cir. 1992), the court applied Imbler to a challenge to a prosecutor's decision not to prosecute. The court noted that \"given the availability of immunity for the decision to charge, it becomes even more important that symmetrical protection be available for the decision not to charge.\" Id. at 41 (emphasis in original).",
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      "content": "Finally, in an analogous area of the law, in Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985), the Supreme Court concluded that an agency's decision not to undertake an enforcement action is not reviewable under the federal Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-706.",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "2. Plea Agreement Promises of Leniency towards a Third Party",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case law regarding promises made during plea negotiations not to prosecute a third-party arises in two contexts. First, defendants have challenged the voluntariness of the resulting plea",
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    {
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      "content": "128",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00004452",
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  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Hayes",
      "Wayte",
      "Pachtman",
      "Almy",
      "Chaney",
      "Harrington",
      "Imbler",
      "Heckler"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "U.S. Court of Appeals",
      "Supreme Court",
      "Sixth Circuit"
    ],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "1985",
      "1976",
      "1992",
      "05/25/21"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "293-1",
      "470 U.S. 598",
      "424 U.S. 409",
      "977 F.2d 37",
      "470 U.S. 821",
      "5 U.S.C. §§ 500-706",
      "42 U.S.C. § 1983"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing or legal brief, discussing various legal cases and principles related to prosecutorial discretion and plea bargaining. The text is well-formatted and free of significant damage or redactions."
}