DOJ-OGR-00005182.json 3.6 KB

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  1. {
  2. "document_metadata": {
  3. "page_number": "4",
  4. "document_number": "338",
  5. "date": "10/12/21",
  6. "document_type": "court document",
  7. "has_handwriting": true,
  8. "has_stamps": false
  9. },
  10. "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 338 Filed 10/12/21 Page 4 of 22\n\nThe legislative history of §3283 goes far beyond Congress raising the limitation period, and actually originates from the 1986 Sexual Abuse Act.\n\nThis Court's findings are patently wrong. For example, §3283 doesn't say \"conduct involved\" (brackets in opinion), its \"offense involving.\" In Davis (see brief) the Supreme Court found the latter most probably requires a statutory elements inquiry.\nThere is also no reason to use Bridges (offense involving fraud) to difference Bridges (offense involving fraud), because in fact the legislative history of §3283 does show the narrow purpose of §3283. Furthermore, Morgan (cited from Maxwell's brief) is highly relevant, regard less whether venue is the subject. Why would that have relevance?\nSection 3283's \"no other statute of limitation shall preclude ...\" is not intended to extend prior versions of §3283; that is in fact ridiculous. §3283 superceeds other statutes of limitations. See brief.\n\nThe truth (not that the government would have any respect for truth) is §3283 is for sexual assault and other enclave offenses. §3299 covers sex related offenses. See Toussie V.\n\n4\nDOJ-OGR-00005182",
  11. "text_blocks": [
  12. {
  13. "type": "printed",
  14. "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 338 Filed 10/12/21 Page 4 of 22",
  15. "position": "header"
  16. },
  17. {
  18. "type": "handwritten",
  19. "content": "The legislative history of §3283 goes far beyond Congress raising the limitation period, and actually originates from the 1986 Sexual Abuse Act.\n\nThis Court's findings are patently wrong. For example, §3283 doesn't say \"conduct involved\" (brackets in opinion), its \"offense involving.\" In Davis (see brief) the Supreme Court found the latter most probably requires a statutory elements inquiry.\nThere is also no reason to use Bridges (offense involving fraud) to difference Bridges (offense involving fraud), because in fact the legislative history of §3283 does show the narrow purpose of §3283. Furthermore, Morgan (cited from Maxwell's brief) is highly relevant, regard less whether venue is the subject. Why would that have relevance?\nSection 3283's \"no other statute of limitation shall preclude ...\" is not intended to extend prior versions of §3283; that is in fact ridiculous. §3283 superceeds other statutes of limitations. See brief.\n\nThe truth (not that the government would have any respect for truth) is §3283 is for sexual assault and other enclave offenses. §3299 covers sex related offenses. See Toussie V.",
  20. "position": "main body"
  21. },
  22. {
  23. "type": "handwritten",
  24. "content": "4",
  25. "position": "footer"
  26. },
  27. {
  28. "type": "printed",
  29. "content": "DOJ-OGR-00005182",
  30. "position": "footer"
  31. }
  32. ],
  33. "entities": {
  34. "people": [],
  35. "organizations": [
  36. "Supreme Court"
  37. ],
  38. "locations": [],
  39. "dates": [
  40. "1986",
  41. "10/12/21"
  42. ],
  43. "reference_numbers": [
  44. "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
  45. "338",
  46. "§3283",
  47. "§3299",
  48. "DOJ-OGR-00005182"
  49. ]
  50. },
  51. "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing with handwritten notes. The content discusses legal arguments related to §3283 and its application to sexual assault and other offenses. The document is from a legal case (1:20-cr-00330-PAE) and is part of a larger filing (Document 338)."
  52. }