mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES002/DOJ-OGR-00005643.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "19 of 24",
    "document_number": "386",
    "date": "10/29/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 386 Filed 10/29/21 Page 19 of 24\nRather, Rocchio's testimony will serve only to inflame and passions and emotions of the jury, prejudicing Ms. Maxwell, and to distract and mislead the jury from its constitutional obligation of holding the government to its burden of proof. See United States v. Figueroa, 618 F.2d 934, 943 (2d Cir. 1980) (evidence is unfairly prejudicial “when it tends to have some adverse effect upon a defendant beyond tending to prove the fact or issue that justified its admission into evidence. The prejudicial effect may be created by the tendency of the evidence to prove some adverse fact not properly in issue or unfairly to excite emotions against the defendant”). This court should exclude Rocchio's third proffered opinion.\nD. Opinion 4: The presence of other individuals can facilitate the sexual abuse of minors.\nRocchio's fourth opinion—that the presence of other individuals can facilitate the sexual abuse of minors—is not properly admitted as expert opinion. Such an opinion is not based on “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.” Fed. R. Evid. 702. It is “basically . . . [a] general pronouncement[]” that “coincide[s] with common sense.” United States v. Serna, 799 F.2d 842, 850 (2d Cir.1986), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909, 914 n. 5 (2d Cir. 1993). Expert testimony like this is not admissible because it concerns “lay matters which a jury is capable of understanding and deciding without the expert's help.” Andrews v. Metro N. Commuter R. Co., 882 F.2d 705, 708 (2d Cir. 1989). See also United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91, 101 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[T]he district court should not admit testimony that is directed solely to lay matters which a jury is capable of understanding and deciding without the expert's help.” (quotation omitted)).\n14\nDOJ-OGR-00005643",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 386 Filed 10/29/21 Page 19 of 24",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Rather, Rocchio's testimony will serve only to inflame and passions and emotions of the jury, prejudicing Ms. Maxwell, and to distract and mislead the jury from its constitutional obligation of holding the government to its burden of proof. See United States v. Figueroa, 618 F.2d 934, 943 (2d Cir. 1980) (evidence is unfairly prejudicial “when it tends to have some adverse effect upon a defendant beyond tending to prove the fact or issue that justified its admission into evidence. The prejudicial effect may be created by the tendency of the evidence to prove some adverse fact not properly in issue or unfairly to excite emotions against the defendant”). This court should exclude Rocchio's third proffered opinion.",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "D. Opinion 4: The presence of other individuals can facilitate the sexual abuse of minors.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Rocchio's fourth opinion—that the presence of other individuals can facilitate the sexual abuse of minors—is not properly admitted as expert opinion. Such an opinion is not based on “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.” Fed. R. Evid. 702. It is “basically . . . [a] general pronouncement[]” that “coincide[s] with common sense.” United States v. Serna, 799 F.2d 842, 850 (2d Cir.1986), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909, 914 n. 5 (2d Cir. 1993). Expert testimony like this is not admissible because it concerns “lay matters which a jury is capable of understanding and deciding without the expert's help.” Andrews v. Metro N. Commuter R. Co., 882 F.2d 705, 708 (2d Cir. 1989). See also United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91, 101 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[T]he district court should not admit testimony that is directed solely to lay matters which a jury is capable of understanding and deciding without the expert's help.” (quotation omitted)).",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "14",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00005643",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Rocchio",
      "Ms. Maxwell",
      "Figueroa",
      "Serna",
      "DiNapoli",
      "Mulder"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "United States"
    ],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "10/29/21",
      "1980",
      "1986",
      "1993",
      "2001"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 386",
      "DOJ-OGR-00005643"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text is mostly printed, with no handwritten content or stamps visible. The document is well-formatted and legible."
}