mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES002/DOJ-OGR-00005645.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "21 of 24",
    "document_number": "386",
    "date": "10/29/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 386 Filed 10/29/21 Page 21 of 24\n\nas to explain whatever a victim might do. Rocchio says that nondisclosure, delayed disclosure, and incremental disclosure are “common” and therefore consistent with being sexually abused.\n\nBut since Rocchio does not contend that nondisclosure, delayed disclosure, and incremental disclosure are the inevitable consequence of sexual abuse, then it’s necessarily also true that nondisclosure, delayed disclosure, and incremental disclosure are inconsistent with being sexually abused. Rocchio’s testimony, therefore, adds nothing to the case, because the jury has no means to apply her opinions to the evidence and to determine whether .\n\nRocchio’s opinions about disclosure are not helpful to the jury, and they will serve only to prejudice Ms. Maxwell. Fed. R. Evid. 403. While the government will surely contend that Rocchio will not opine as to the truthfulness of any of the alleged victims in this case, the practical effect of Rocchio’s opinion that “nondisclosure, incremental disclosure, and secrecy are common among victims of sexual abuse” is to suggest to the jury that those who delayed disclosure are telling the truth about the abuse they suffered. Schneider, 2010 WL 3734055, at *6.5 Because a witness’s credibility is solely within the province of the jury to determine, however, Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) bars testimony that a witness is testifying truthfully.\n\nMoreover, Rocchio’s testimony serves to bolster the credibility of the victims, and such bolstering is impermissible. See United States v. Charley, 189 F.3d 1251, 1267 (10th Cir. 1999) (“In general, expert testimony which does nothing but vouch for the credibility of another\n\n5 Of course, the court should not expect Rocchio to disavow the converse of this proposition—that those who immediately disclose alleged abuse are lying. After all,\n\n16\nDOJ-OGR-00005645",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 386 Filed 10/29/21 Page 21 of 24",
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    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "as to explain whatever a victim might do. Rocchio says that nondisclosure, delayed disclosure, and incremental disclosure are “common” and therefore consistent with being sexually abused.\n\nBut since Rocchio does not contend that nondisclosure, delayed disclosure, and incremental disclosure are the inevitable consequence of sexual abuse, then it’s necessarily also true that nondisclosure, delayed disclosure, and incremental disclosure are inconsistent with being sexually abused. Rocchio’s testimony, therefore, adds nothing to the case, because the jury has no means to apply her opinions to the evidence and to determine whether .",
      "position": "top"
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Rocchio’s opinions about disclosure are not helpful to the jury, and they will serve only to prejudice Ms. Maxwell. Fed. R. Evid. 403. While the government will surely contend that Rocchio will not opine as to the truthfulness of any of the alleged victims in this case, the practical effect of Rocchio’s opinion that “nondisclosure, incremental disclosure, and secrecy are common among victims of sexual abuse” is to suggest to the jury that those who delayed disclosure are telling the truth about the abuse they suffered. Schneider, 2010 WL 3734055, at *6.5 Because a witness’s credibility is solely within the province of the jury to determine, however, Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) bars testimony that a witness is testifying truthfully.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Moreover, Rocchio’s testimony serves to bolster the credibility of the victims, and such bolstering is impermissible. See United States v. Charley, 189 F.3d 1251, 1267 (10th Cir. 1999) (“In general, expert testimony which does nothing but vouch for the credibility of another",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "5 Of course, the court should not expect Rocchio to disavow the converse of this proposition—that those who immediately disclose alleged abuse are lying. After all,",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "16",
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    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00005645",
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  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Rocchio",
      "Maxwell"
    ],
    "organizations": [],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "10/29/21"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 386",
      "2010 WL 3734055",
      "189 F.3d 1251",
      "DOJ-OGR-00005645"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to the case United States v. Maxwell. The text discusses the testimony of an expert witness, Rocchio, and its potential impact on the jury. There are redactions in the text, indicating that some information has been withheld."
}