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- "page_number": "25",
- "document_number": "424",
- "date": "11/08/21",
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- "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 424 Filed 11/08/21 Page 25 of 41\nnot reliable. The article that Dr. Dietz relies on—in fact “nearly verbatim” (Ex. A at 7)—was intended as a research agenda to explain the (undoubted) instances of false accusations, not to provide a roadmap for establishing the falsity of any allegation. (See Ex. C at 98 (“Part of the focus of the present paper, then, is to bring attention to the dearth of psychological literature investigating correlates and causal mechanisms of false allegations of sexual assault and to propose a model specifying the major causal pathways to false allegations. These pathways are intended as a model for further empirical investigation.”) (emphasis added)). Indeed, the authors were emphatic that their article not be misused as a simplistic means of “determining the accuracy of specific accusations.” (Ex. C at 98 (“[A] legitimate concern about enumerating such pathways is the misuse of psychological diagnoses in determining the accuracy of specific accusations.”)).\n\nFinally, even to the extent that Dr. Dietz’s opinions on any of these “pathways” offers any expertise that is truly beyond the ken of the jury, there is no justification for allowing him to offer these opinions in the abstract without any fit to the facts of the case. At a minimum, unless and until there is any evidence creating a predicate for the relevance of any of these mental disorders, it is simply irrelevant—and highly prejudicial—for a psychiatric expert to enumerate a number of mental disorders and conjecture that they could cause unreliable testimony. See, e.g., LVL XIII Brands, Inc., 209 F. Supp. 3d at 642 (finding testimony fails Daubert’s “fit” requirement where there is a lack of “record foundation”).8 Thus even if, contrary to the arguments above, the Court believed some of the opinions on these “pathways” could under some circumstances be helpful to the jury, the Court should defer on the admissibility of such opinions until the evidence at trial\n\n8 Of course, to the extent a witness’s mental condition is relevant, it should not be simply the subject of lay diagnosis by the jury, as Dr. Dietz’s notice seems to suggest.\n21\nDOJ-OGR-00006236",
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- "content": "not reliable. The article that Dr. Dietz relies on—in fact “nearly verbatim” (Ex. A at 7)—was intended as a research agenda to explain the (undoubted) instances of false accusations, not to provide a roadmap for establishing the falsity of any allegation. (See Ex. C at 98 (“Part of the focus of the present paper, then, is to bring attention to the dearth of psychological literature investigating correlates and causal mechanisms of false allegations of sexual assault and to propose a model specifying the major causal pathways to false allegations. These pathways are intended as a model for further empirical investigation.”) (emphasis added)). Indeed, the authors were emphatic that their article not be misused as a simplistic means of “determining the accuracy of specific accusations.” (Ex. C at 98 (“[A] legitimate concern about enumerating such pathways is the misuse of psychological diagnoses in determining the accuracy of specific accusations.”)).",
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- "content": "Finally, even to the extent that Dr. Dietz’s opinions on any of these “pathways” offers any expertise that is truly beyond the ken of the jury, there is no justification for allowing him to offer these opinions in the abstract without any fit to the facts of the case. At a minimum, unless and until there is any evidence creating a predicate for the relevance of any of these mental disorders, it is simply irrelevant—and highly prejudicial—for a psychiatric expert to enumerate a number of mental disorders and conjecture that they could cause unreliable testimony. See, e.g., LVL XIII Brands, Inc., 209 F. Supp. 3d at 642 (finding testimony fails Daubert’s “fit” requirement where there is a lack of “record foundation”).8 Thus even if, contrary to the arguments above, the Court believed some of the opinions on these “pathways” could under some circumstances be helpful to the jury, the Court should defer on the admissibility of such opinions until the evidence at trial",
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- "content": "8 Of course, to the extent a witness’s mental condition is relevant, it should not be simply the subject of lay diagnosis by the jury, as Dr. Dietz’s notice seems to suggest.",
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- "people": [
- "Dr. Dietz"
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- "organizations": [
- "LVL XIII Brands, Inc."
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- "dates": [
- "11/08/21"
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- "reference_numbers": [
- "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
- "Document 424",
- "Ex. A at 7",
- "Ex. C at 98",
- "209 F. Supp. 3d at 642",
- "DOJ-OGR-00006236"
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- "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case, with a formal tone and legal language. There are no visible redactions or damage to the document."
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