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- {
- "document_metadata": {
- "page_number": "3",
- "document_number": "604",
- "date": "02/17/22",
- "document_type": "court document",
- "has_handwriting": false,
- "has_stamps": false
- },
- "full_text": "here, the misstatement concerned an issue so central that it is likely the juror, had he answered accurately, would have been disqualified for cause or disqualified through a peremptory challenge. And the impact to a fair trial from the seating of such a juror is even more threatened when the issue hidden by a potential juror is, as some reports have indicated, raised by that person during deliberations. Requiring proof of willfulness would make the post-trial inquiry too subjective and thereby dilute the obligation to be accurate in the first place. Such a rule could tip the balance in decisions by favoring findings that would avoid the expense and inconvenience of having to retry the case. In our memorandum, we would address analogous areas of the law which we believe will lead this Court to conclude that a finding of willfulness should not be required.\n\n7. High-profile criminal cases, including ones that involve public outcry about unpopular defendants accused of heinous crimes, have been the stage for some of the most important decisions safeguarding the constitutional right to a fair trial. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966) (finding in a second-degree murder case for the alleged bludgeoning death of a pregnant wife that because extensive pre-trial publicity had emphasized evidence and opinions that tended to incriminate the defendant and that ongoing publicity during the trial had revealed matters discussed outside the presence of the jury, the defendant was entitled to a new trial as a result of the “inherently prejudicial publicity which saturated the community….”); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 728 (1961) (finding where there was continued adverse publicity fostering a strong prejudice against defendant who had allegedly confessed to six murders in a small area, which caused two-thirds of the jury to admit before hearing any testimony to possessing a belief in his guilt, that defendant must be retried). These are the cases",
- "text_blocks": [
- {
- "type": "printed",
- "content": "here, the misstatement concerned an issue so central that it is likely the juror, had he answered accurately, would have been disqualified for cause or disqualified through a peremptory challenge. And the impact to a fair trial from the seating of such a juror is even more threatened when the issue hidden by a potential juror is, as some reports have indicated, raised by that person during deliberations. Requiring proof of willfulness would make the post-trial inquiry too subjective and thereby dilute the obligation to be accurate in the first place. Such a rule could tip the balance in decisions by favoring findings that would avoid the expense and inconvenience of having to retry the case. In our memorandum, we would address analogous areas of the law which we believe will lead this Court to conclude that a finding of willfulness should not be required.",
- "position": "top"
- },
- {
- "type": "printed",
- "content": "7. High-profile criminal cases, including ones that involve public outcry about unpopular defendants accused of heinous crimes, have been the stage for some of the most important decisions safeguarding the constitutional right to a fair trial. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966) (finding in a second-degree murder case for the alleged bludgeoning death of a pregnant wife that because extensive pre-trial publicity had emphasized evidence and opinions that tended to incriminate the defendant and that ongoing publicity during the trial had revealed matters discussed outside the presence of the jury, the defendant was entitled to a new trial as a result of the “inherently prejudicial publicity which saturated the community….”); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 728 (1961) (finding where there was continued adverse publicity fostering a strong prejudice against defendant who had allegedly confessed to six murders in a small area, which caused two-thirds of the jury to admit before hearing any testimony to possessing a belief in his guilt, that defendant must be retried). These are the cases",
- "position": "middle"
- }
- ],
- "entities": {
- "people": [],
- "organizations": [],
- "locations": [],
- "dates": [
- "1966",
- "1961",
- "02/17/22"
- ],
- "reference_numbers": [
- "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
- "Document 604",
- "384 U.S. 333",
- "366 U.S. 717",
- "DOJ-OGR-00008968"
- ]
- },
- "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing, likely a memorandum or brief, discussing legal issues related to juror misconduct and the right to a fair trial. The text is printed and there are no visible handwritten notes or stamps. The document is page 3 of 6."
- }
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