mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES004/DOJ-OGR-00009149.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "30",
    "document_number": "615",
    "date": "02/24/22",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 615 Filed 02/24/22 Page 30 of 49 serve as jurors in such cases, the defendant would have cited case law that actually supports that proposition. Finally, the defendant also argues that bias should be implied because she alleges that Juror 50 has repeatedly lied. (Def. Mem. at 35-36 (citing Daugerdas, 867 F. Supp. 2d at 472)). As discussed in greater detail above, the record does not support this, and, as a result, this is a far cry from the extreme circumstances in Daugerdas, where Judge Pauley concluded after a hearing that the juror \"created a totally fictitious persona in her drive to get on the jury\" and was \"a pathological liar who does not know the difference between truth and lie.\" Id. at 473, 475. The record also does not support the defendant's attempt to compare Juror 50 to Juror 55, who was dismissed for cause As noted above, there is no evidence that Juror 50 . Moreover, the defendant's analogy misunderstands the nature of the current inquiry, in which the Court must consider the hypothetical question whether, if the juror had truthfully answered the relevant question, the Court would have struck him for cause. See Stewart, 433 F.3d at 304. But here, in a post-verdict posture, In sum, the defendant has failed to establish implied bias. 28 DOJ-OGR-00009149",
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      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 615 Filed 02/24/22 Page 30 of 49",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "serve as jurors in such cases, the defendant would have cited case law that actually supports that proposition. Finally, the defendant also argues that bias should be implied because she alleges that Juror 50 has repeatedly lied. (Def. Mem. at 35-36 (citing Daugerdas, 867 F. Supp. 2d at 472)). As discussed in greater detail above, the record does not support this, and, as a result, this is a far cry from the extreme circumstances in Daugerdas, where Judge Pauley concluded after a hearing that the juror \"created a totally fictitious persona in her drive to get on the jury\" and was \"a pathological liar who does not know the difference between truth and lie.\" Id. at 473, 475. The record also does not support the defendant's attempt to compare Juror 50 to Juror 55, who was dismissed for cause",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "As noted above, there is no evidence that Juror 50 . Moreover, the defendant's analogy misunderstands the nature of the current inquiry, in which the Court must consider the hypothetical question whether, if the juror had truthfully answered the relevant question, the Court would have struck him for cause. See Stewart, 433 F.3d at 304. But here, in a post-verdict posture,",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "In sum, the defendant has failed to establish implied bias.",
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      "content": "28",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00009149",
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  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Judge Pauley"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Court"
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    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "02/24/22"
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    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 615",
      "DOJ-OGR-00009149"
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  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing with some redacted text. The redactions are likely due to sensitive information being removed."
}