mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES004/DOJ-OGR-00009209.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "19",
    "document_number": "616",
    "date": "02/24/22",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 616 Filed 02/24/22 Page 19 of 32\nexplained in the motion, the \"deliberateness\" of a prospective juror's \"particular lies [may] evidence[] partiality\"6—think of a juror who deliberately lies because of a desire to sit on a jury and punish one of the parties to the case—but the lack of a deliberately false answer does not prove the absence of partiality.\n\nIn the end, under McDonough, Langford, Stewart and Greer, a deliberately false answer is not required.7\n\nC. Juror No. 50's answers were deliberately false.\n\nEven so, the record more than supports the conclusion that Juror No. 50's answers to Questions 25 and 48 were deliberately false. Juror No. 50 knew he was the victim of a crime. He was a prospective juror in a case where the accused was on trial for alleged sexual misconduct with minors. As the childhood victim of a sex crime, answering questions in a case about a childhood sex crime, there is no plausible explanation for why Juror No. 50 did not answer Question 25, \"Yes.\" The only believable answer is that he knew that answering that question \"Yes\" would lead to further questions like, what was the crime, which would then lead to questions about what happened to him, which would end with his disqualification.\n\n6 Greer, 285 F.3d at 173.\n7 A deliberately false answer by a juror in voir dire is thus neither necessary nor sufficient to entitle a defendant to a new trial. It's not necessary because, if a biased juror actually serves on a jury, structural error occurs, and a new trial is required even if the juror did not provide a deliberately false answer during voir dire. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. at 316; McDonough, 464 U.S. at 556-57 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 557-58 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment); Smith, 455 U.S. at 215-16; id. at 220-24 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Stewart, 433 F.3d at 303; Greer, 285 F.3d at 171-72; Langford, 990 F.2d at 68. And it's not sufficient because a juror may not be biased even if he dishonestly answers a question during voir dire. Greer, 285 F.3d at 173 (\"[A]n analysis of bias is required even if the juror's erroneous response was deliberate.\").\n14",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 616 Filed 02/24/22 Page 19 of 32",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "explained in the motion, the \"deliberateness\" of a prospective juror's \"particular lies [may] evidence[] partiality\"6—think of a juror who deliberately lies because of a desire to sit on a jury and punish one of the parties to the case—but the lack of a deliberately false answer does not prove the absence of partiality.\n\nIn the end, under McDonough, Langford, Stewart and Greer, a deliberately false answer is not required.7",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "C. Juror No. 50's answers were deliberately false.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Even so, the record more than supports the conclusion that Juror No. 50's answers to Questions 25 and 48 were deliberately false. Juror No. 50 knew he was the victim of a crime. He was a prospective juror in a case where the accused was on trial for alleged sexual misconduct with minors. As the childhood victim of a sex crime, answering questions in a case about a childhood sex crime, there is no plausible explanation for why Juror No. 50 did not answer Question 25, \"Yes.\" The only believable answer is that he knew that answering that question \"Yes\" would lead to further questions like, what was the crime, which would then lead to questions about what happened to him, which would end with his disqualification.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "6 Greer, 285 F.3d at 173.\n7 A deliberately false answer by a juror in voir dire is thus neither necessary nor sufficient to entitle a defendant to a new trial. It's not necessary because, if a biased juror actually serves on a jury, structural error occurs, and a new trial is required even if the juror did not provide a deliberately false answer during voir dire. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. at 316; McDonough, 464 U.S. at 556-57 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 557-58 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment); Smith, 455 U.S. at 215-16; id. at 220-24 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Stewart, 433 F.3d at 303; Greer, 285 F.3d at 171-72; Langford, 990 F.2d at 68. And it's not sufficient because a juror may not be biased even if he dishonestly answers a question during voir dire. Greer, 285 F.3d at 173 (\"[A]n analysis of bias is required even if the juror's erroneous response was deliberate.\").",
      "position": "bottom"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "14",
      "position": "footer"
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  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "McDonough",
      "Langford",
      "Stewart",
      "Greer",
      "Blackmun",
      "Brennan",
      "O'Connor"
    ],
    "organizations": [],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "02/24/22"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 616",
      "285 F.3d at 173",
      "528 U.S. at 316",
      "464 U.S. at 556-57",
      "455 U.S. at 215-16",
      "433 F.3d at 303",
      "990 F.2d at 68"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text discusses the deliberateness of a prospective juror's answers and the implications of a juror providing false information during voir dire. The document includes citations to various court cases and legal references."
}