mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES004/DOJ-OGR-00009827.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "29",
    "document_number": "643",
    "date": "03/11/22",
    "document_type": "court document",
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  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 643 Filed 03/11/22 Page 29 of 49\ncircumstances will ever recur\"). And the New Hampshire state decision prominently cited by the defendant does not hold that a mandatory presumption of bias applies based on similarity of experiences, but merely finds that the trial court acted within its discretion when it found, after a post-verdict hearing, that the juror's demeanor, actions, and communications before, during, and after trial demonstrated bias. See State v. Ashfar, 196 A.3d 93, 94 (N.H. 2018); see also id. at 98 (noting that \"when called for jury service in another sexual assault case involving an alleged victim who was a minor, Juror 6 acknowledged that he could not sit on that jury due to his feelings about his daughter; and . . . there appears to be little in the way of logical explanation for how he could have differentiated between the two cases.\")\nMoreover, this Court's handling of similarly situated jurors in this case is again relevant to the hypothetical inquiry at issue. See, e.g., Torres, 128 F.3d at 45 (implied bias finding based on \"average man\" test). If it were correct that a juror's experience with sexual abuse required a mandatory presumption of bias in a sexual abuse case, the defense would have sought to strike, and the Court would have struck, the numerous other jurors who reported a history of sexual abuse (or at the very least would have pursued detailed follow-up questioning to establish the particulars of the abuse and the extent of any similarities to the charged conduct). But that is not what happened here: Where jurors indicated a history of sexual abuse or harassment, the Court conducted a targeted follow-up inquiry, focused on whether they can be fair and impartial. And rightly so: It is not the law in this Circuit that a victim of sexual abuse is presumed to be biased.\nOn that score, it bears emphasizing how prevalent sexual abuse is, and how common federal trials involving sex trafficking and child enticement are. If it were the law that survivors of sexual abuse—who make up a significant percentage of the prospective jury pool in any trial—could not\n27\nDOJ-OGR-00009827",
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      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 643 Filed 03/11/22 Page 29 of 49",
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      "content": "circumstances will ever recur\"). And the New Hampshire state decision prominently cited by the defendant does not hold that a mandatory presumption of bias applies based on similarity of experiences, but merely finds that the trial court acted within its discretion when it found, after a post-verdict hearing, that the juror's demeanor, actions, and communications before, during, and after trial demonstrated bias. See State v. Ashfar, 196 A.3d 93, 94 (N.H. 2018); see also id. at 98 (noting that \"when called for jury service in another sexual assault case involving an alleged victim who was a minor, Juror 6 acknowledged that he could not sit on that jury due to his feelings about his daughter; and . . . there appears to be little in the way of logical explanation for how he could have differentiated between the two cases.\")\nMoreover, this Court's handling of similarly situated jurors in this case is again relevant to the hypothetical inquiry at issue. See, e.g., Torres, 128 F.3d at 45 (implied bias finding based on \"average man\" test). If it were correct that a juror's experience with sexual abuse required a mandatory presumption of bias in a sexual abuse case, the defense would have sought to strike, and the Court would have struck, the numerous other jurors who reported a history of sexual abuse (or at the very least would have pursued detailed follow-up questioning to establish the particulars of the abuse and the extent of any similarities to the charged conduct). But that is not what happened here: Where jurors indicated a history of sexual abuse or harassment, the Court conducted a targeted follow-up inquiry, focused on whether they can be fair and impartial. And rightly so: It is not the law in this Circuit that a victim of sexual abuse is presumed to be biased.\nOn that score, it bears emphasizing how prevalent sexual abuse is, and how common federal trials involving sex trafficking and child enticement are. If it were the law that survivors of sexual abuse—who make up a significant percentage of the prospective jury pool in any trial—could not",
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    {
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      "content": "27",
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      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00009827",
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  "entities": {
    "people": [],
    "organizations": [],
    "locations": [
      "New Hampshire"
    ],
    "dates": [
      "03/11/22",
      "2018"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 643",
      "DOJ-OGR-00009827"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text discusses the issue of juror bias in cases involving sexual abuse. The document is well-formatted and free of significant damage or redactions."
}