mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES004/DOJ-OGR-00010371.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "5",
    "document_number": "657",
    "date": "04/29/22",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 657 Filed 04/29/22 Page 5 of 45\n\nA. Applicable law\n\nThe Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees that no person shall “be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S. Const. amend. V. That guarantee “serves principally as a restraint on courts and prosecutors,” ensuring that a court does not “exceed its legislative authorization by imposing multiple punishments for the same offense.” Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977); see also Morris v. Reynolds, 264 F.3d 38, 48 (2d Cir. 2001). An indictment is multiplicitous, and therefore implicates double jeopardy, “when it charges a single offense as an offense multiple times, in separate counts, when, in law and fact, only one crime has been committed.” Maxwell, 534 F. Supp. 3d at 322 (quoting United States v. Chacko, 169 F.3d 140, 145 (2d Cir. 1999)). “A claim of multiplicity cannot succeed, however, ‘unless the charged offenses are the same in fact and in law.’” United States v. Jones, 482 F.3d 60, 72 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Estrada, 320 F.3d 173, 180 (2d Cir. 2003)).\n\nIf the two offenses at issue are both conspiracies charged under the same statute, then the multiplicity inquiry turns on whether the two conspiracies are the same “in fact,” meaning they involve the same agreement. United States v. Araujo, No. 17-CR-438 (VEC), 2018 WL 3222527, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2018) (citing United States v. Ansaldi, 372 F.3d 118, 124–25 (2d Cir. 2004)); United States v. Gaskin, 364 F.3d 438, 454 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[T]o survive a double jeopardy attack, the government would have to show that the two schemes involved ‘distinct’ agreements.”). Yet “whether the evidence shows a single conspiracy or more than one conspiracy is often not determinable as a matter of law or subject to bright-line formulations.” Jones, 482 F.3d at 72. Rather, the parties agree that the Court’s inquiry is guided by the Second Circuit’s Korfant factors. See, e.g., United States v. Diallo, 507 F. App’x 89, 91 (2d Cir. 2013)\n\n5\nDOJ-OGR-00010371",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 657 Filed 04/29/22 Page 5 of 45",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "A. Applicable law\n\nThe Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees that no person shall “be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S. Const. amend. V. That guarantee “serves principally as a restraint on courts and prosecutors,” ensuring that a court does not “exceed its legislative authorization by imposing multiple punishments for the same offense.” Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977); see also Morris v. Reynolds, 264 F.3d 38, 48 (2d Cir. 2001). An indictment is multiplicitous, and therefore implicates double jeopardy, “when it charges a single offense as an offense multiple times, in separate counts, when, in law and fact, only one crime has been committed.” Maxwell, 534 F. Supp. 3d at 322 (quoting United States v. Chacko, 169 F.3d 140, 145 (2d Cir. 1999)). “A claim of multiplicity cannot succeed, however, ‘unless the charged offenses are the same in fact and in law.’” United States v. Jones, 482 F.3d 60, 72 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Estrada, 320 F.3d 173, 180 (2d Cir. 2003)).\n\nIf the two offenses at issue are both conspiracies charged under the same statute, then the multiplicity inquiry turns on whether the two conspiracies are the same “in fact,” meaning they involve the same agreement. United States v. Araujo, No. 17-CR-438 (VEC), 2018 WL 3222527, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2018) (citing United States v. Ansaldi, 372 F.3d 118, 124–25 (2d Cir. 2004)); United States v. Gaskin, 364 F.3d 438, 454 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[T]o survive a double jeopardy attack, the government would have to show that the two schemes involved ‘distinct’ agreements.”). Yet “whether the evidence shows a single conspiracy or more than one conspiracy is often not determinable as a matter of law or subject to bright-line formulations.” Jones, 482 F.3d at 72. Rather, the parties agree that the Court’s inquiry is guided by the Second Circuit’s Korfant factors. See, e.g., United States v. Diallo, 507 F. App’x 89, 91 (2d Cir. 2013)",
      "position": "main body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "5",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00010371",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Brown",
      "Ohio",
      "Morris",
      "Reynolds",
      "Maxwell",
      "Chacko",
      "Jones",
      "Estrada",
      "Araujo",
      "Ansaldi",
      "Gaskin",
      "Diallo"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "U.S. Const.",
      "U.S.",
      "Second Circuit"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "S.D.N.Y."
    ],
    "dates": [
      "04/29/22",
      "1977",
      "2001",
      "1999",
      "2006",
      "2003",
      "July 2, 2018",
      "2013"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 657",
      "No. 17-CR-438 (VEC)",
      "2018 WL 3222527",
      "DOJ-OGR-00010371"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case, discussing the concept of double jeopardy and multiplicity in the context of conspiracy charges. The text is well-formatted and printed, with no visible handwriting or stamps."
}