mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES004/DOJ-OGR-00010399.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "33",
    "document_number": "657",
    "date": "04/29/22",
    "document_type": "court document",
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  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 657 Filed 04/29/22 Page 33 of 45\n\nconvictions on Counts Two and Four, erroneously implying that such evidence was irrelevant. Dkt. No. 566 at 7 (emphasis added). Thus, in light of the note's ambiguity and the Defendant's failure to propose an accurate response in either the first attempt or the second attempt a day later, the Court's decision to refer the jury back to the legally sound charge was not error and plainly did not result in a constructive amendment to the Indictment.\n\nThe Defendant does not expressly contend that the instructions were legally erroneous— nor could she. As explained above, the charge made clear that the only predicate state law at issue was New York's. Instead, the Defendant objects that the charge was \"stripped of any mention of 'travel to New York.'\" Maxwell Br. at 15. But the Court rejected the Defendant's specific requests that were unnecessary, inaccurate, or would have confused the jury. For example, the Court rejected the Defendant's request to limit the charge to requiring travel from \"Florida to New York,\" as alleged in the \"to wit\" clause of the Indictment, because travel from New Mexico to New York, for example, would also have been sufficient. See Trial Tr. at 2758- 61 (Charging Conference); see also United States v. Little, 828 F. App'x 34, 37-38 (2d Cir. 2020) (summary order) (noting that generally, \"'to wit' clauses do not modify essential elements of the offense\"). The Court also denied the Defendant's request to instruct the jury on law governing the age of consent in New Mexico, the United Kingdom, and Florida. First, the Defendant's proposal oversimplified New Mexico's age of consent law. The Court could not accurately instruct the jury on New Mexico's law without potentially introducing a theory of guilt that the Government had not charged, or resolving a factual question on the use of force for the jury. Trial Tr. at 1712-13; Nov. 23, 2021, Final Pretrial Conference Tr. at 31-38. And second, instructing on state law that the Defendant was not alleged to have violated ran a serious risk of confusing the jury as to the role of that law. Indeed, it was the Defendant's proposal that\n\n33\n\nDOJ-OGR-00010399",
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      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 657 Filed 04/29/22 Page 33 of 45",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "convictions on Counts Two and Four, erroneously implying that such evidence was irrelevant. Dkt. No. 566 at 7 (emphasis added). Thus, in light of the note's ambiguity and the Defendant's failure to propose an accurate response in either the first attempt or the second attempt a day later, the Court's decision to refer the jury back to the legally sound charge was not error and plainly did not result in a constructive amendment to the Indictment.",
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      "content": "The Defendant does not expressly contend that the instructions were legally erroneous— nor could she. As explained above, the charge made clear that the only predicate state law at issue was New York's. Instead, the Defendant objects that the charge was \"stripped of any mention of 'travel to New York.'\" Maxwell Br. at 15. But the Court rejected the Defendant's specific requests that were unnecessary, inaccurate, or would have confused the jury. For example, the Court rejected the Defendant's request to limit the charge to requiring travel from \"Florida to New York,\" as alleged in the \"to wit\" clause of the Indictment, because travel from New Mexico to New York, for example, would also have been sufficient. See Trial Tr. at 2758- 61 (Charging Conference); see also United States v. Little, 828 F. App'x 34, 37-38 (2d Cir. 2020) (summary order) (noting that generally, \"'to wit' clauses do not modify essential elements of the offense\"). The Court also denied the Defendant's request to instruct the jury on law governing the age of consent in New Mexico, the United Kingdom, and Florida. First, the Defendant's proposal oversimplified New Mexico's age of consent law. The Court could not accurately instruct the jury on New Mexico's law without potentially introducing a theory of guilt that the Government had not charged, or resolving a factual question on the use of force for the jury. Trial Tr. at 1712-13; Nov. 23, 2021, Final Pretrial Conference Tr. at 31-38. And second, instructing on state law that the Defendant was not alleged to have violated ran a serious risk of confusing the jury as to the role of that law. Indeed, it was the Defendant's proposal that",
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      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00010399",
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  "entities": {
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    "locations": [
      "New York",
      "Florida",
      "New Mexico",
      "United Kingdom"
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    "dates": [
      "04/29/22",
      "Nov. 23, 2021"
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    "reference_numbers": [
      "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 657",
      "Dkt. No. 566",
      "DOJ-OGR-00010399"
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}