mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES004/DOJ-OGR-00010741.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "5",
    "document_number": "681-1",
    "date": "06/26/22",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 681-1 Filed 06/26/22 Page 5 of 7\n\nIt is also important to understand that this case has now moved to a different phase than the trial phase, where (of course) the defendant is entitled to a presumption of innocence and is protected by the requirement that the Government must prove guilty by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. But, in determining the “crime victim” issue at sentencing, the relevant standard of proof is the conventional standard for proceedings in criminal cases outside of trial: preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Giraldo-Serna, 118 F.Supp.3d 377, 382 (D.D.C. 2015) (“Purported victims under the CVRA must prove their victim status by a preponderance of the evidence.”) (citing In re McNulty, 597 F.3d 344, 351 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Atl. States Cast Iron Pipe Co., 612 F.Supp.2d 453, 486, 495, 508 (D.N.J. 2009)); see also United States v. Gushlak, 728 F.3d 184, 195 (2d Cir. 2013) (applying preponderance of of the evidence standard to victim restitution issue); United States v. Kim, 988 F.3d 803, 809 (5th Cir. 2021) (same).\n\nAgainst that backdrop, Kate is a “victim” who has a right to speak at sentencing just as she was permitted to testify during the trial. In addition, this Court also possesses broad discretionary power, derived from statute and common law, to hear from Kate in determining the appropriate sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3661; see also United States v. Degenhardt, 405 F.Supp.2d 1341, 1343 (D. Utah 2005) (discussing the court’s discretionary powers to hear from victims).\n\nFederal courts have wide discretion to gather information at sentencing subject to only a few constitutional or statutory restrictions. See United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443,446 (1972) (“[A] judge may appropriately conduct an inquiry [at sentencing] broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it may come.”); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241,247 (explaining that in order to determine an “appropriate sentence” judges need “the fullest information possible concerning the defendant’s life and characteristics.”). The Federal Rules of Evidence do not limit the evidence that the court can\n\n5\n\nDOJ-OGR-00010741",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 681-1 Filed 06/26/22 Page 5 of 7",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "It is also important to understand that this case has now moved to a different phase than the trial phase, where (of course) the defendant is entitled to a presumption of innocence and is protected by the requirement that the Government must prove guilty by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. But, in determining the “crime victim” issue at sentencing, the relevant standard of proof is the conventional standard for proceedings in criminal cases outside of trial: preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Giraldo-Serna, 118 F.Supp.3d 377, 382 (D.D.C. 2015) (“Purported victims under the CVRA must prove their victim status by a preponderance of the evidence.”) (citing In re McNulty, 597 F.3d 344, 351 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Atl. States Cast Iron Pipe Co., 612 F.Supp.2d 453, 486, 495, 508 (D.N.J. 2009)); see also United States v. Gushlak, 728 F.3d 184, 195 (2d Cir. 2013) (applying preponderance of of the evidence standard to victim restitution issue); United States v. Kim, 988 F.3d 803, 809 (5th Cir. 2021) (same).",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Against that backdrop, Kate is a “victim” who has a right to speak at sentencing just as she was permitted to testify during the trial. In addition, this Court also possesses broad discretionary power, derived from statute and common law, to hear from Kate in determining the appropriate sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3661; see also United States v. Degenhardt, 405 F.Supp.2d 1341, 1343 (D. Utah 2005) (discussing the court’s discretionary powers to hear from victims).",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Federal courts have wide discretion to gather information at sentencing subject to only a few constitutional or statutory restrictions. See United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443,446 (1972) (“[A] judge may appropriately conduct an inquiry [at sentencing] broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it may come.”); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241,247 (explaining that in order to determine an “appropriate sentence” judges need “the fullest information possible concerning the defendant’s life and characteristics.”). The Federal Rules of Evidence do not limit the evidence that the court can",
      "position": "bottom"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "5",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00010741",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Kate"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Government",
      "Court"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "D.D.C.",
      "D.N.J.",
      "Utah",
      "New York"
    ],
    "dates": [
      "06/26/22",
      "2015",
      "2010",
      "2009",
      "2013",
      "2021",
      "2005",
      "1972"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "681-1",
      "18 U.S.C. § 3661",
      "DOJ-OGR-00010741"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text is mostly printed, with no handwritten content or stamps visible. The document is well-formatted and legible."
}