mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES004/DOJ-OGR-00011364.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "2",
    "document_number": "723",
    "date": "07/12/22",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 723 Filed 07/12/22 Page 2 of 13\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan December 16, 2021 Page 2\nvery basis of the charges in this case. Id. But Eva, Michelle, and Kelly will all testify they were not involved in and cannot “confirm” the group sexualized massages. Their testimony contradicts Jane’s testimony, and it is relevant, material, and exculpatory. Finally, the details of the group sexualized messages, which form the very basis of the charges in this case, are not collateral matters. They are what this case is about.\n\nARGUMENT\n“Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause . . . , or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.” Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)); see U.S. Const. amends. V, VI. A court violates a defendant’s right to present a defense when it excludes competent and reliable evidence that is central to the defense. See Crane, 476 U.S. at 690. The exclusion of such evidence “deprives a defendant of the basic right to have the prosecutor’s case encounter and ‘survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing.’” Id. at 690–91 (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984)).\nThe Constitution also affords Ms. Maxwell the right to confront her accusers. U.S. amend. VI; Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 231 (1988). “[A] criminal defendant states a violation of the Confrontation Clause by showing that [she] was prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness, and thereby ‘to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors . . . could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.’” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680 (1986) (quoting Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318 (1974)). “Cross-examination is the principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of [her]\nDOJ-OGR-00011364",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 723 Filed 07/12/22 Page 2 of 13",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The Honorable Alison J. Nathan December 16, 2021 Page 2",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "very basis of the charges in this case. Id. But Eva, Michelle, and Kelly will all testify they were not involved in and cannot “confirm” the group sexualized massages. Their testimony contradicts Jane’s testimony, and it is relevant, material, and exculpatory. Finally, the details of the group sexualized messages, which form the very basis of the charges in this case, are not collateral matters. They are what this case is about.",
      "position": "body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "ARGUMENT",
      "position": "body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "“Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause . . . , or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.” Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)); see U.S. Const. amends. V, VI. A court violates a defendant’s right to present a defense when it excludes competent and reliable evidence that is central to the defense. See Crane, 476 U.S. at 690. The exclusion of such evidence “deprives a defendant of the basic right to have the prosecutor’s case encounter and ‘survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing.’” Id. at 690–91 (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984)).",
      "position": "body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The Constitution also affords Ms. Maxwell the right to confront her accusers. U.S. amend. VI; Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 231 (1988). “[A] criminal defendant states a violation of the Confrontation Clause by showing that [she] was prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness, and thereby ‘to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors . . . could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.’” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680 (1986) (quoting Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318 (1974)). “Cross-examination is the principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of [her]",
      "position": "body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00011364",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Alison J. Nathan",
      "Eva",
      "Michelle",
      "Kelly",
      "Jane",
      "Ms. Maxwell"
    ],
    "organizations": [],
    "locations": [
      "Kentucky",
      "Alaska",
      "Delaware"
    ],
    "dates": [
      "December 16, 2021",
      "07/12/22",
      "1986",
      "1984",
      "1988",
      "1974"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 723",
      "DOJ-OGR-00011364"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text is mostly printed, with no visible handwriting or stamps. The document is well-formatted and legible."
}