mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES007/DOJ-OGR-00019623.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "16",
    "document_number": "82",
    "date": "10/02/2020",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 20-3061, Document 82, 10/02/2020, 2944267, Page16 of 37\n\n10\n\nThe Supreme Court has made clear that the collateral order exception should be “interpreted . . . with the utmost strictness in criminal cases.” Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S. 794, 799 (1989); accord United States v. Robinson, 473 F.3d 487, 490 (2d Cir. 2007). In over 70 years since Cohen was decided, despite “numerous opportunities” to expand the doctrine, Midland Asphalt, 489 U.S. at 799, the Supreme Court has identified only four types of pretrial orders in criminal cases as satisfying the collateral-order doctrine: an order denying a bond, see Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951); an order denying a motion to dismiss on Double Jeopardy grounds, see Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977); an order denying a motion to dismiss under the Speech or Debate Clause, see Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500 (1979); and an order permitting the forced administration of antipsychotic drugs to render a defendant competent for trial, see Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003). In contrast, the circumstances in which the Supreme Court has “refused to permit interlocutory appeals” in criminal cases have been “far more numerous.” Midland Asphalt, 489 U.S. at 799.\n\nAs to the third Van Cauwenberghe criterion, “[a]n order is effectively unreviewable where the order at issue involves an asserted right the legal and practical value of which would be destroyed if it were not vindicated before trial.” United States v. Punn, 737 F.3d 1, 5 (2d Cir. 2013). “The justification for immediate appeal must . . . be sufficiently strong to overcome the usual benefits of deferring appeal until litigation concludes.” Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 107 (2009). A ruling that is burdensome to a party\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019623",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 20-3061, Document 82, 10/02/2020, 2944267, Page16 of 37",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "10",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The Supreme Court has made clear that the collateral order exception should be “interpreted . . . with the utmost strictness in criminal cases.” Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S. 794, 799 (1989); accord United States v. Robinson, 473 F.3d 487, 490 (2d Cir. 2007). In over 70 years since Cohen was decided, despite “numerous opportunities” to expand the doctrine, Midland Asphalt, 489 U.S. at 799, the Supreme Court has identified only four types of pretrial orders in criminal cases as satisfying the collateral-order doctrine: an order denying a bond, see Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951); an order denying a motion to dismiss on Double Jeopardy grounds, see Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977); an order denying a motion to dismiss under the Speech or Debate Clause, see Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500 (1979); and an order permitting the forced administration of antipsychotic drugs to render a defendant competent for trial, see Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003). In contrast, the circumstances in which the Supreme Court has “refused to permit interlocutory appeals” in criminal cases have been “far more numerous.” Midland Asphalt, 489 U.S. at 799.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "As to the third Van Cauwenberghe criterion, “[a]n order is effectively unreviewable where the order at issue involves an asserted right the legal and practical value of which would be destroyed if it were not vindicated before trial.” United States v. Punn, 737 F.3d 1, 5 (2d Cir. 2013). “The justification for immediate appeal must . . . be sufficiently strong to overcome the usual benefits of deferring appeal until litigation concludes.” Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 107 (2009). A ruling that is burdensome to a party",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00019623",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Boyle",
      "Carpenter",
      "Cohen",
      "Meanor",
      "Robinson"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Supreme Court",
      "United States"
    ],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "10/02/2020",
      "1989",
      "2007",
      "1951",
      "1977",
      "1979",
      "2003",
      "2013",
      "2009"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "20-3061",
      "82",
      "2944267",
      "16",
      "37",
      "489 U.S. 794",
      "473 F.3d 487",
      "342 U.S. 1",
      "431 U.S. 651",
      "442 U.S. 500",
      "539 U.S. 166",
      "737 F.3d 1",
      "558 U.S. 100",
      "DOJ-OGR-00019623"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing, likely from a federal court, discussing the collateral order exception in criminal cases. The text is printed and there are no visible handwritten notes or stamps. The document is paginated, with this page being page 16 of 37."
}