mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES008/DOJ-OGR-00020970.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "27",
    "document_number": "653",
    "date": "04/01/22",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 22-1426, Document 58, 02/28/2023, 3475901, Page144 of 221\nA-344\nCase 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 653 Filed 04/01/22 Page 27 of 40\n\nconsidering whether some marginal types of disclosed facts are enough to show inferable bias—\nask about a juror's impartiality and might be persuaded by the force of the juror's assurance.\" Id.\nat 47 n.12. For example, in Torres, the Second Circuit held that the trial court did not abuse its\ndiscretion when it concluded during voir dire that a juror was inferably biased because she had\nengaged in money-structuring activities that were highly similar to the conduct charged in the\ncase. But the Second Circuit made clear that the district court would not have erred if it had kept\nthe juror. Id. at 46-48.\n\nThe Court concludes that Juror 50 is neither impliedly nor inferably biased. First, none\nof the \"extreme situations\" in which the Court must conclusively presume bias as a matter of law\napply here. McCoy, 995 F.3d at 48. Juror 50 was not a victim of the charged crime itself, nor is\nhe related to any of the attorneys, witnesses, victims, or other case participants. See Nix, 275 F.\nSupp. 3d at 451. Thus, the Court would not have granted a hypothetical challenge for cause\nbased on implied bias even if Juror 50 had provided correct answers to the questionnaire.\n\nSecond, Juror 50's personal experience of sexual abuse does not evidence partiality\nsufficient to infer that Juror 50 was biased against the Defendant. The Court need not imagine a\nwholly hypothetical universe for this conclusion. That is because the voir dire provides highly\nrelevant indications of how the parties and Court would have reacted had Juror 50 provided\naccurate answers during jury selection. A review of the voir dire of jurors who responded \"yes\n(self)\" to Question 48 reveals that it is unlikely that the Defendant would have challenged Juror\n50 for cause. It also reveals that the Court would not have granted a for-cause challenge had one\nbeen raised. See McCoy, 995 F.3d at 49.\n\nEight prospective jurors who answered \"yes (self)\" to Question 48 proceeded to voir dire.\nThe Court asked every follow-up question requested by the Defendant with regard to a juror's\n\n27\nDOJ-OGR-00020970",
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      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 22-1426, Document 58, 02/28/2023, 3475901, Page144 of 221",
      "position": "header"
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "A-344",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 653 Filed 04/01/22 Page 27 of 40",
      "position": "header"
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "considering whether some marginal types of disclosed facts are enough to show inferable bias—\nask about a juror's impartiality and might be persuaded by the force of the juror's assurance.\" Id.\nat 47 n.12. For example, in Torres, the Second Circuit held that the trial court did not abuse its\ndiscretion when it concluded during voir dire that a juror was inferably biased because she had\nengaged in money-structuring activities that were highly similar to the conduct charged in the\ncase. But the Second Circuit made clear that the district court would not have erred if it had kept\nthe juror. Id. at 46-48.",
      "position": "body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The Court concludes that Juror 50 is neither impliedly nor inferably biased. First, none\nof the \"extreme situations\" in which the Court must conclusively presume bias as a matter of law\napply here. McCoy, 995 F.3d at 48. Juror 50 was not a victim of the charged crime itself, nor is\nhe related to any of the attorneys, witnesses, victims, or other case participants. See Nix, 275 F.\nSupp. 3d at 451. Thus, the Court would not have granted a hypothetical challenge for cause\nbased on implied bias even if Juror 50 had provided correct answers to the questionnaire.",
      "position": "body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Second, Juror 50's personal experience of sexual abuse does not evidence partiality\nsufficient to infer that Juror 50 was biased against the Defendant. The Court need not imagine a\nwholly hypothetical universe for this conclusion. That is because the voir dire provides highly\nrelevant indications of how the parties and Court would have reacted had Juror 50 provided\naccurate answers during jury selection. A review of the voir dire of jurors who responded \"yes\n(self)\" to Question 48 reveals that it is unlikely that the Defendant would have challenged Juror\n50 for cause. It also reveals that the Court would not have granted a for-cause challenge had one\nbeen raised. See McCoy, 995 F.3d at 49.",
      "position": "body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Eight prospective jurors who answered \"yes (self)\" to Question 48 proceeded to voir dire.\nThe Court asked every follow-up question requested by the Defendant with regard to a juror's",
      "position": "body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "27",
      "position": "footer"
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00020970",
      "position": "footer"
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  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [],
    "organizations": [],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "04/01/22",
      "02/28/2023"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "Case 22-1426",
      "Document 58",
      "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN",
      "Document 653",
      "DOJ-OGR-00020970"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes. The document is well-formatted and legible."
}