mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES008/DOJ-OGR-00020977.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "34",
    "document_number": "653",
    "date": "04/01/22",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Circuit to affirm the district court's order for a new penalty-phase hearing. Maxwell Br. at 33 (citing Sampson, 724 F.3d at 168). The Defendant next relies on a state court case, State v. Afshar, 196 A.3d 93 (N.H. 2018), in which a court granted a new trial in a child sexual assault case when a juror failed to disclose that a babysitter sexually assaulted him when he was five or six years old. Maxwell Post-Hearing Br. at 5; see also Maxwell Br. at 34. But that juror had previously reported an inability to be impartial in another case involving sexual assault of a minor, and the court concluded that there was \"little in the way of logical explanation for how he could have differentiated between the two cases.\" 196 A.3d at 98. Such is not the case here. Finally, in Burton v. Johnson, the Tenth Circuit concluded that a juror was impliedly biased when she suffered an abusive relationship with her husband that was highly similar to that of the defendant. 948 F.2d 1150, 1158-59 (10th Cir. 1991). However, not only had that juror deliberately lied during voir dire about the experience, but she was also living in that abusive situation during voir dire, the trial itself, and her post-verdict testimony to the court. Id. Conversely, Juror 50 credibly testified that his abuse \"happened so long ago\" that it is not something that he \"think[s] about,\" \"it's not part of who [he is].\" Hearing Tr. at 47. And again, the Court has not found that Juror 50 deliberately lied about his personal history. The Defendant's remaining arguments also fail to alter the Court's conclusion that Juror 50 is not biased. The Defendant contends that Juror 50's post-trial conduct—in particular, his posts on social media and his decision to give interviews using his picture and first name—is \"strong evidence\" of his bias because he was \"not looking to avoid notice,\" but rather to \"soak up his 15 minutes of fame.\" Maxwell Post-Hearing Br. at 10–11. The Court disagrees that this conduct reveals bias. Whether wise or foolish, the fact that a juror may give an interview",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Circuit to affirm the district court's order for a new penalty-phase hearing. Maxwell Br. at 33 (citing Sampson, 724 F.3d at 168). The Defendant next relies on a state court case, State v. Afshar, 196 A.3d 93 (N.H. 2018), in which a court granted a new trial in a child sexual assault case when a juror failed to disclose that a babysitter sexually assaulted him when he was five or six years old. Maxwell Post-Hearing Br. at 5; see also Maxwell Br. at 34. But that juror had previously reported an inability to be impartial in another case involving sexual assault of a minor, and the court concluded that there was \"little in the way of logical explanation for how he could have differentiated between the two cases.\" 196 A.3d at 98. Such is not the case here. Finally, in Burton v. Johnson, the Tenth Circuit concluded that a juror was impliedly biased when she suffered an abusive relationship with her husband that was highly similar to that of the defendant. 948 F.2d 1150, 1158-59 (10th Cir. 1991). However, not only had that juror deliberately lied during voir dire about the experience, but she was also living in that abusive situation during voir dire, the trial itself, and her post-verdict testimony to the court. Id. Conversely, Juror 50 credibly testified that his abuse \"happened so long ago\" that it is not something that he \"think[s] about,\" \"it's not part of who [he is].\" Hearing Tr. at 47. And again, the Court has not found that Juror 50 deliberately lied about his personal history. The Defendant's remaining arguments also fail to alter the Court's conclusion that Juror 50 is not biased. The Defendant contends that Juror 50's post-trial conduct—in particular, his posts on social media and his decision to give interviews using his picture and first name—is \"strong evidence\" of his bias because he was \"not looking to avoid notice,\" but rather to \"soak up his 15 minutes of fame.\" Maxwell Post-Hearing Br. at 10–11. The Court disagrees that this conduct reveals bias. Whether wise or foolish, the fact that a juror may give an interview",
      "position": "main body"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Sampson",
      "Afshar",
      "Johnson",
      "Juror 50"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Tenth Circuit",
      "Court"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "N.H."
    ],
    "dates": [
      "04/01/22",
      "2018",
      "1991"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN",
      "Document 653",
      "Page 34 of 40",
      "Case 22-1426",
      "Document 58",
      "02/28/2023",
      "3475901",
      "Page 151 of 221",
      "A-351"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court transcript or legal brief, discussing the case of a defendant and the potential bias of a juror. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes."
}