mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES008/DOJ-OGR-00020991.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "8",
    "document_number": "657",
    "date": "04/29/22",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 22-1426, Document 58, 02/28/2023, 3475901, Page165 of 221\nA-365\nCase 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 657 Filed 04/29/22 Page 8 of 45\nmet its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the counts are not multiplicitous.\nThe offenses charged and common objectives. Both Counts Three and Five are charged under the same statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371, for conspiracy to commit an offense against the United States. But going beyond this \"general level\" of similarity, the statutory objectives of the two counts differ. Macchia, 35 F.3d at 669. Count Three is a conspiracy to violate § 2423(a) and Count Five a conspiracy to violate § 1591. These differing statutory objectives entail legal differences. Count Three, for example, charges unlawful sexual activity (defined as sexual touching of a minor) while Count Five charges commercial sexual activity with a minor. And each provision defines \"minor\" differently: under seventeen years old for Count Three but under eighteen years old for Count Five. Further, Count Three requires an agreement with intent to transport across state lines, while Count Five's agreement requires only intent of sexual activity that affects interstate commerce. These differences push the first Korfant factor in the Government's favor. See Estrada, 320 F.3d at 182 (distinguishing between a conspiracy to distribute cocaine and one to distribute crack); United States v. Villa, No. 3:12-CR-40 (JBA), 2014 WL 252013, at *4 (D. Conn. Jan. 22, 2014), aff'd, 744 F. App'x 716 (2d Cir. 2018) (summary order) (distinguishing between a § 371 conspiracy to \"commit theft from an interstate shipment and to transport stolen property across state lines\" and one to \"sell stolen property\").\nThe Government, however, errs in suggesting that this factor alone is \"fatal\" to the Defendant's multiplicity claim. Gov. Br. at 29. To the contrary, no single Korfant factor is dominant or dispositive. Macchia, 35 F.3d at 668. And courts in this district have found two conspiracy counts to be the same offense even when they have different statutory objectives because both counts can arise from the same agreement. E.g., Hernandez, 2009 WL 3169226, at\n8\nDOJ-OGR-00020991",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 22-1426, Document 58, 02/28/2023, 3475901, Page165 of 221",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "A-365",
      "position": "header"
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 657 Filed 04/29/22 Page 8 of 45",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "met its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the counts are not multiplicitous.",
      "position": "body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The offenses charged and common objectives. Both Counts Three and Five are charged under the same statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371, for conspiracy to commit an offense against the United States. But going beyond this \"general level\" of similarity, the statutory objectives of the two counts differ. Macchia, 35 F.3d at 669. Count Three is a conspiracy to violate § 2423(a) and Count Five a conspiracy to violate § 1591. These differing statutory objectives entail legal differences. Count Three, for example, charges unlawful sexual activity (defined as sexual touching of a minor) while Count Five charges commercial sexual activity with a minor. And each provision defines \"minor\" differently: under seventeen years old for Count Three but under eighteen years old for Count Five. Further, Count Three requires an agreement with intent to transport across state lines, while Count Five's agreement requires only intent of sexual activity that affects interstate commerce. These differences push the first Korfant factor in the Government's favor. See Estrada, 320 F.3d at 182 (distinguishing between a conspiracy to distribute cocaine and one to distribute crack); United States v. Villa, No. 3:12-CR-40 (JBA), 2014 WL 252013, at *4 (D. Conn. Jan. 22, 2014), aff'd, 744 F. App'x 716 (2d Cir. 2018) (summary order) (distinguishing between a § 371 conspiracy to \"commit theft from an interstate shipment and to transport stolen property across state lines\" and one to \"sell stolen property\").",
      "position": "body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The Government, however, errs in suggesting that this factor alone is \"fatal\" to the Defendant's multiplicity claim. Gov. Br. at 29. To the contrary, no single Korfant factor is dominant or dispositive. Macchia, 35 F.3d at 668. And courts in this district have found two conspiracy counts to be the same offense even when they have different statutory objectives because both counts can arise from the same agreement. E.g., Hernandez, 2009 WL 3169226, at",
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    {
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      "content": "8",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00020991",
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  "entities": {
    "people": [],
    "organizations": [
      "DOJ"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "United States",
      "Connecticut"
    ],
    "dates": [
      "02/28/2023",
      "04/29/22",
      "Jan. 22, 2014"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "Case 22-1426",
      "Document 58",
      "3475901",
      "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN",
      "Document 657",
      "18 U.S.C. § 371",
      "§ 2423(a)",
      "§ 1591",
      "No. 3:12-CR-40 (JBA)",
      "2014 WL 252013",
      "744 F. App'x 716",
      "2009 WL 3169226",
      "DOJ-OGR-00020991"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes. The document is well-formatted and legible."
}