mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES008/DOJ-OGR-00022080.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "18 of 34",
    "document_number": "35",
    "date": "04/24/20",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "and willfully made a false statement. Nor are those excuses relevant to whether Thomas had a criminal agreement with his co-defendant. Indeed, evidence as to a defendant's purportedly innocent motive in a false statement case is irrelevant to the question of intent. See United States v. Washington, 705 F.2d 489, 493-94 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding that proof of a good or innocent motive is not probative of intent where the mens rea is \"knowingly and willfully\"); In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Africa, 552 F.3d 93, 154 n.49 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Washington, 705 F.2d at 493, for \"the irrelevance of a motive to the question of whether conduct is intentional\"); United States v. George, 786 F. Supp. 56, 64 (D.D.C. 1992) (rejecting the defendant's \"context argument\" for why materials could be relevant to the crime charged). For the same reasons, \"other people were doing it\" is not a defense to a false statements or conspiracy charge because the conduct of other BOP employees is irrelevant to each of the foregoing elements. Thomas argues that because he was aware of incidents where BOP employees falsified records and \"their conduct did not lead to their indictment or incarceration,\" evidence of what other BOP employees have done is relevant to his intent. (Mot. 6.) Not so. Whether Thomas believed falsifying records was illegal or was subject to criminal penalties is not relevant to the charges against him. See United States v. Southland Corp., 760 F.2d 1366, 1372 (2d Cir. 1985) (\"Ignorance of the law is no defense to a charge of purposeful and intentional action.\"); United States v. Rosenfield, 469 F.2d 598, 601 n.2 (3d Cir. 1972) (\"As long as the inexcusable intent is present, it is not necessary that the defendant know that his conduct is subject to criminal penalties.\") And in any event, it would be fundamentally inappropriate, and extremely prejudicial, for the jury to consider other individuals not on trial or otherwise relevant to the conduct charged here, in evaluating the guilt or innocence of the defendant. See United States v. Gibbons, 602 F.2d 1044, 1048 (2d Cir. 1979) (approving instruction that jury was not to consider individuals who 13 DOJ-OGR-00022080",
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      "content": "and willfully made a false statement. Nor are those excuses relevant to whether Thomas had a criminal agreement with his co-defendant. Indeed, evidence as to a defendant's purportedly innocent motive in a false statement case is irrelevant to the question of intent. See United States v. Washington, 705 F.2d 489, 493-94 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding that proof of a good or innocent motive is not probative of intent where the mens rea is \"knowingly and willfully\"); In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Africa, 552 F.3d 93, 154 n.49 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Washington, 705 F.2d at 493, for \"the irrelevance of a motive to the question of whether conduct is intentional\"); United States v. George, 786 F. Supp. 56, 64 (D.D.C. 1992) (rejecting the defendant's \"context argument\" for why materials could be relevant to the crime charged).",
      "position": "top"
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    {
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      "content": "For the same reasons, \"other people were doing it\" is not a defense to a false statements or conspiracy charge because the conduct of other BOP employees is irrelevant to each of the foregoing elements. Thomas argues that because he was aware of incidents where BOP employees falsified records and \"their conduct did not lead to their indictment or incarceration,\" evidence of what other BOP employees have done is relevant to his intent. (Mot. 6.) Not so. Whether Thomas believed falsifying records was illegal or was subject to criminal penalties is not relevant to the charges against him. See United States v. Southland Corp., 760 F.2d 1366, 1372 (2d Cir. 1985) (\"Ignorance of the law is no defense to a charge of purposeful and intentional action.\"); United States v. Rosenfield, 469 F.2d 598, 601 n.2 (3d Cir. 1972) (\"As long as the inexcusable intent is present, it is not necessary that the defendant know that his conduct is subject to criminal penalties.\")",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "And in any event, it would be fundamentally inappropriate, and extremely prejudicial, for the jury to consider other individuals not on trial or otherwise relevant to the conduct charged here, in evaluating the guilt or innocence of the defendant. See United States v. Gibbons, 602 F.2d 1044, 1048 (2d Cir. 1979) (approving instruction that jury was not to consider individuals who",
      "position": "middle"
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "13",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00022080",
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  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Thomas"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "BOP"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "Africa",
      "U.S."
    ],
    "dates": [
      "04/24/20"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:19-cr-00830-AT",
      "Document 35",
      "DOJ-OGR-00022080"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes. The document is page 18 of 34."
}