mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES001/DOJ-OGR-00001802.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "2",
    "document_number": "65",
    "date": "10/20/2020",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 65 Filed 10/20/20 Page 2 of 4\n\nPage 2\n\ndefense's position is essentially that once the Government has accused a defendant of participating in a crime with a particular co-conspirator, any time that co-conspirator commits a similar crime without the defendant is somehow exculpatory. The defense cites no authority for such a broad interpretation of Brady, nor is the Government aware of any. To the contrary, the well-established law of this Circuit generally precludes a defendant from offering evidence that a defendant did not participate in criminal conduct on a particular occasion—or of her law-abiding conduct during uncharged periods or uncharged events—to rebut the Government's evidence with respect to the charged crimes or events. See, e.g., United States v. Scarpa, 897 F.2d 63, 70 (2d Cir. 1990) (“A defendant may not seek to establish h[er] innocence . . . through proof of the absence of criminal acts on specific occasions.”); United States v. Chambers, 800 F. App'x 43, 46 (2d Cir. 2020) (“A single occurrence of lawful conduct is 'simply irrelevant' to other occurrences of lawful conduct.”) (quoting United States v. Walker, 191 F.3d 326, 336 (2d Cir. 1999)); United States v. Williams, 205 F.3d 23, 34 (2d Cir. 2000) (“We reject Williams's assertion that the evidence of innocent travel was necessary to rebut the government's allegation that Williams had been involved in other cocaine importations from Jamaica. Although the government did argue that Williams had been involved in other importations, it did not allege that Williams had engaged in drug activity during these particular trips.”); United States v. Fiumano, No. 14 Cr. 518 (JFK), 2016 WL 1629356, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2016) (“The principle is rather elementary. A defendant charged with robbing a bank in Manhattan on April 22 cannot offer as evidence to disprove the charged crime that he did not rob the bank's branches in Brooklyn or the Bronx on April 22 or that he did not rob the Manhattan branch on April 20, 21, 23, and 24, because this evidence is irrelevant to the charge that he robbed the Manhattan bank on April 22.”); United States v. Gambino, 838 F. Supp. 744, 748 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (“Defendants also claim that the Southern District was in possession of exculpatory materials which it did not disclose, namely that Gravano had discussed drug deals with a number of 'captains' in the Gambino crime family, but had no such conversations with John Gambino. Even if the Southern District had knowledge that Gravano had conversations with other captains about specific instances of drug crimes, the fact that Gravano did not have such conversations with Gambino does not make such evidence exculpatory. . . . Since a defendant cannot introduce evidence of innocent behavior on other occasions to prove his innocence, such testimony would not be exculpatory within the requirements of Brady.”).1\n\n1 The implications of the defense's proposed expansion of Brady would be sweeping. There are any number of cases in which a defendant is charged with participating in a criminal conspiracy for a discrete period of time outside of which co-conspirators may have committed similar crimes without that defendant. Such a set of facts is common in, for example, racketeering conspiracies and narcotics conspiracies, in which defendants may conspire with each other for a certain period of time before and after which they commit similar crimes on their own or with others. The fact that a co-conspirator may continue to commit similar crimes after a defendant ceases participation in a charged conspiracy does not somehow exculpate the defendant who did not continue participating in those crimes. See, e.g., United States v. Flaharty, 295 F.3d 182, 192-93 (2d Cir. 2002) (co-conspirators in narcotics case continued to commit crimes without defendant during defendant's incarceration); United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52, 99 (2d Cir. 1999) (co-conspirators in racketeering case continued to commit crimes without defendant after defendant's incarceration).\n\nDOJ-OGR-00001802",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 65 Filed 10/20/20 Page 2 of 4",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "defense's position is essentially that once the Government has accused a defendant of participating in a crime with a particular co-conspirator, any time that co-conspirator commits a similar crime without the defendant is somehow exculpatory. The defense cites no authority for such a broad interpretation of Brady, nor is the Government aware of any. To the contrary, the well-established law of this Circuit generally precludes a defendant from offering evidence that a defendant did not participate in criminal conduct on a particular occasion—or of her law-abiding conduct during uncharged periods or uncharged events—to rebut the Government's evidence with respect to the charged crimes or events. See, e.g., United States v. Scarpa, 897 F.2d 63, 70 (2d Cir. 1990) (“A defendant may not seek to establish h[er] innocence . . . through proof of the absence of criminal acts on specific occasions.”); United States v. Chambers, 800 F. App'x 43, 46 (2d Cir. 2020) (“A single occurrence of lawful conduct is 'simply irrelevant' to other occurrences of lawful conduct.”) (quoting United States v. Walker, 191 F.3d 326, 336 (2d Cir. 1999)); United States v. Williams, 205 F.3d 23, 34 (2d Cir. 2000) (“We reject Williams's assertion that the evidence of innocent travel was necessary to rebut the government's allegation that Williams had been involved in other cocaine importations from Jamaica. Although the government did argue that Williams had been involved in other importations, it did not allege that Williams had engaged in drug activity during these particular trips.”); United States v. Fiumano, No. 14 Cr. 518 (JFK), 2016 WL 1629356, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2016) (“The principle is rather elementary. A defendant charged with robbing a bank in Manhattan on April 22 cannot offer as evidence to disprove the charged crime that he did not rob the bank's branches in Brooklyn or the Bronx on April 22 or that he did not rob the Manhattan branch on April 20, 21, 23, and 24, because this evidence is irrelevant to the charge that he robbed the Manhattan bank on April 22.”); United States v. Gambino, 838 F. Supp. 744, 748 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (“Defendants also claim that the Southern District was in possession of exculpatory materials which it did not disclose, namely that Gravano had discussed drug deals with a number of 'captains' in the Gambino crime family, but had no such conversations with John Gambino. Even if the Southern District had knowledge that Gravano had conversations with other captains about specific instances of drug crimes, the fact that Gravano did not have such conversations with Gambino does not make such evidence exculpatory. . . . Since a defendant cannot introduce evidence of innocent behavior on other occasions to prove his innocence, such testimony would not be exculpatory within the requirements of Brady.”).1",
      "position": "main body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "1 The implications of the defense's proposed expansion of Brady would be sweeping. There are any number of cases in which a defendant is charged with participating in a criminal conspiracy for a discrete period of time outside of which co-conspirators may have committed similar crimes without that defendant. Such a set of facts is common in, for example, racketeering conspiracies and narcotics conspiracies, in which defendants may conspire with each other for a certain period of time before and after which they commit similar crimes on their own or with others. The fact that a co-conspirator may continue to commit similar crimes after a defendant ceases participation in a charged conspiracy does not somehow exculpate the defendant who did not continue participating in those crimes. See, e.g., United States v. Flaharty, 295 F.3d 182, 192-93 (2d Cir. 2002) (co-conspirators in narcotics case continued to commit crimes without defendant during defendant's incarceration); United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52, 99 (2d Cir. 1999) (co-conspirators in racketeering case continued to commit crimes without defendant after defendant's incarceration).",
      "position": "main body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00001802",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Williams",
      "Gravano",
      "John Gambino",
      "Flaharty",
      "Diaz"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Government",
      "Southern District",
      "Gambino crime family"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "Jamaica",
      "Manhattan",
      "Brooklyn",
      "Bronx"
    ],
    "dates": [
      "10/20/2020",
      "April 20",
      "April 21",
      "April 22",
      "April 23",
      "April 24",
      "April 25, 2016"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN",
      "Document 65",
      "14 Cr. 518 (JFK)",
      "DOJ-OGR-00001802"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes. The document is well-formatted and legible."
}