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- {
- "document_metadata": {
- "page_number": "8",
- "document_number": "134",
- "date": "02/04/21",
- "document_type": "court document",
- "has_handwriting": false,
- "has_stamps": false
- },
- "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 134 Filed 02/04/21 Page 8 of 23\n\nGiuffre, a public figure required to prove actual malice, had an uphill battle—even she was constrained to acknowledge that many of her public statements were false. Using a time-honored if unfortunate litigation tactic, her lawyers at Boies Schiller therefore sought to turn the lawsuit into a proxy prosecution of Epstein. Not surprisingly, discovery in the case was bitter, hard-fought, and wide-ranging. It spanned more than a year and included large document productions, many responses to interrogatories, and thirty-some depositions, including depositions of Giuffre and Maxwell as well as several third parties. See Brown v. Maxwell, 929 F.3d 41, 46, 51 (2d Cir. 2019) (explaining that discovery was “hard-fought” and “extensive” and noting that the court file, which includes only some of the documents created during discovery, totals in the “thousands of pages”).\n\nGiuffre sought and obtained a wide variety of private and confidential information about Maxwell and others, including information about financial and sexual matters. Brown, 929 F.3d at 48 n.22. Given the intimate and highly confidential nature of the discovery exchanged between the parties, the district court entered a stipulated Protective Order. See Ex. A. The Protective Order included a mechanism for one party to challenge another party’s confidentiality designation (such a challenge never occurred) and provided that it did not apply to any information or material disclosed at trial. (Because the case settled before trial, that sole exception to the Protective Order was never triggered.)\n\nNotably, Boies Schiller sought to add a “law enforcement” exception to the Protective Order, doubtless because the firm was eager to enlist the government in its campaign against Maxwell. In particular, Boies Schiller proposed to include a provision stating that “CONFIDENTIAL information shall not be disclosed or used for any purpose except the preparation and trial of this case and any related matter, including but not limited to, investigations by law enforcement.” Ex. B ¶ 1(a)(4) (emphasis supplied). Maxwell flatly rejected\n\n3\n\nDOJ-OGR-00002355",
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- "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 134 Filed 02/04/21 Page 8 of 23",
- "position": "header"
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- "type": "printed",
- "content": "Giuffre, a public figure required to prove actual malice, had an uphill battle—even she was constrained to acknowledge that many of her public statements were false. Using a time-honored if unfortunate litigation tactic, her lawyers at Boies Schiller therefore sought to turn the lawsuit into a proxy prosecution of Epstein. Not surprisingly, discovery in the case was bitter, hard-fought, and wide-ranging. It spanned more than a year and included large document productions, many responses to interrogatories, and thirty-some depositions, including depositions of Giuffre and Maxwell as well as several third parties. See Brown v. Maxwell, 929 F.3d 41, 46, 51 (2d Cir. 2019) (explaining that discovery was “hard-fought” and “extensive” and noting that the court file, which includes only some of the documents created during discovery, totals in the “thousands of pages”).",
- "position": "main body"
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- {
- "type": "printed",
- "content": "Giuffre sought and obtained a wide variety of private and confidential information about Maxwell and others, including information about financial and sexual matters. Brown, 929 F.3d at 48 n.22. Given the intimate and highly confidential nature of the discovery exchanged between the parties, the district court entered a stipulated Protective Order. See Ex. A. The Protective Order included a mechanism for one party to challenge another party’s confidentiality designation (such a challenge never occurred) and provided that it did not apply to any information or material disclosed at trial. (Because the case settled before trial, that sole exception to the Protective Order was never triggered.)",
- "position": "main body"
- },
- {
- "type": "printed",
- "content": "Notably, Boies Schiller sought to add a “law enforcement” exception to the Protective Order, doubtless because the firm was eager to enlist the government in its campaign against Maxwell. In particular, Boies Schiller proposed to include a provision stating that “CONFIDENTIAL information shall not be disclosed or used for any purpose except the preparation and trial of this case and any related matter, including but not limited to, investigations by law enforcement.” Ex. B ¶ 1(a)(4) (emphasis supplied). Maxwell flatly rejected",
- "position": "main body"
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- "type": "printed",
- "content": "3",
- "position": "footer"
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- {
- "type": "printed",
- "content": "DOJ-OGR-00002355",
- "position": "footer"
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- ],
- "entities": {
- "people": [
- "Giuffre",
- "Epstein",
- "Maxwell"
- ],
- "organizations": [
- "Boies Schiller"
- ],
- "locations": [],
- "dates": [
- "02/04/21",
- "2019"
- ],
- "reference_numbers": [
- "1:20-cr-00330-AJN",
- "Document 134",
- "929 F.3d 41",
- "DOJ-OGR-00002355"
- ]
- },
- "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a case involving Giuffre and Maxwell. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes. The document is page 8 of 23."
- }
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