mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES001/DOJ-OGR-00002593.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "21",
    "document_number": "142",
    "date": "02/04/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
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  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 142 Filed 02/04/21 Page 21 of 38\n\nContrary to the government's position here, courts applying these traditional contract principles to non-prosecution agreements have recognized that third parties who claim immunity in such agreements have standing to enforce their rights as third-party beneficiaries, even where they have not been expressly named in the non-prosecution agreement. See, e.g., United States v. CFW Const. Co., 583 F. Supp. 197, 203 (D.S.C.) (\"an intended third party beneficiary of a contract may enforce its provisions as against the promisor . . . if the Government, in negotiating the aforementioned plea agreements, 'promised' that there would be no prosecution against [the third party] for antitrust violations arising in any jurisdiction, the promise must be enforced\") (emphasis in original), aff'd, 749 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1984).\n\nTwo cases in particular illustrate the infirmity in the government's argument. In United States v. Florida West Int'l Airways, Inc., 853 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (S.D. Fla. 2012), the government, following a plea agreement with a foreign air cargo provider that immunized certain classes of the provider's employees and related corporations, indicted a U.S. airline and an individual, both of whom asserted that they were within the scope of employees and corporations covered by the plea agreement. Id. at 1215-16. Following a two-day evidentiary hearing, the court concluded that only the individual was covered by the plea agreement, but flatly rejected the proposition that either party lacked standing to invoke the plea agreement if covered by it—even though the parties were not identified in the plea agreement by name. Id. at 1228-29. Applying Florida law, the court held that \"the signatory parties unmistakably intended to confer immunity on a discrete class of corporations and individuals . . . that could include the Defendants.\" Id. at 1228. The court added:\n\nThe plea agreement unquestionably conferred a direct benefit on a class of individuals: immunity. Moreover, the Plea Agreement evinced an intent to extend this benefit to a definable class of third parties: employees of [the cargo",
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      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 142 Filed 02/04/21 Page 21 of 38",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Contrary to the government's position here, courts applying these traditional contract principles to non-prosecution agreements have recognized that third parties who claim immunity in such agreements have standing to enforce their rights as third-party beneficiaries, even where they have not been expressly named in the non-prosecution agreement. See, e.g., United States v. CFW Const. Co., 583 F. Supp. 197, 203 (D.S.C.) (\"an intended third party beneficiary of a contract may enforce its provisions as against the promisor . . . if the Government, in negotiating the aforementioned plea agreements, 'promised' that there would be no prosecution against [the third party] for antitrust violations arising in any jurisdiction, the promise must be enforced\") (emphasis in original), aff'd, 749 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1984).",
      "position": "main"
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Two cases in particular illustrate the infirmity in the government's argument. In United States v. Florida West Int'l Airways, Inc., 853 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (S.D. Fla. 2012), the government, following a plea agreement with a foreign air cargo provider that immunized certain classes of the provider's employees and related corporations, indicted a U.S. airline and an individual, both of whom asserted that they were within the scope of employees and corporations covered by the plea agreement. Id. at 1215-16. Following a two-day evidentiary hearing, the court concluded that only the individual was covered by the plea agreement, but flatly rejected the proposition that either party lacked standing to invoke the plea agreement if covered by it—even though the parties were not identified in the plea agreement by name. Id. at 1228-29. Applying Florida law, the court held that \"the signatory parties unmistakably intended to confer immunity on a discrete class of corporations and individuals . . . that could include the Defendants.\" Id. at 1228. The court added:",
      "position": "main"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The plea agreement unquestionably conferred a direct benefit on a class of individuals: immunity. Moreover, the Plea Agreement evinced an intent to extend this benefit to a definable class of third parties: employees of [the cargo",
      "position": "main"
    },
    {
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      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00002593",
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  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [],
    "organizations": [
      "CFW Const. Co.",
      "Florida West Int'l Airways, Inc."
    ],
    "locations": [
      "D.S.C.",
      "S.D. Fla.",
      "United States"
    ],
    "dates": [
      "02/04/21",
      "1984",
      "2012"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN",
      "Document 142",
      "583 F. Supp. 197",
      "749 F.2d 33",
      "853 F. Supp. 2d 1209",
      "DOJ-OGR-00002593"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text is mostly printed, with no handwritten annotations or stamps visible. The document is well-formatted and legible."
}