mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES002/DOJ-OGR-00003059.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "125",
    "document_number": "204",
    "date": "04/16/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 125 of 239\nto produce documents, the contents of which are not privileged, where the act of production is, itself, (1) compelled, (2) testimonial, and (3) incriminating.\" In re Three Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Dated Jan. 29, 1999, 191 F.3d 173, 178 (2d Cir. 1999).\nConsistent with these requirements, the privilege only \"prohibits the compelled disclosure of documents when the act of production has independent communicative aspects—such as an admission that the documents exist, that the subject possesses or controls the documents, that the documents are authentic, or that the subject believes the documents are responsive to the subpoena.\" In re Various Grand Jury Subpoenas, 924 F. Supp. 2d 549, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff'd, 579 F. App'x 37 (2d Cir. 2014); see also Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976).\nIt follows that the privilege does not apply when \"[t]he existence and location of the [sought] papers are a foregone conclusion and the [compelled individual] adds little or nothing to the sum total of the Government's information by conceding that he in fact has the papers.\" Id. at 411; see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Oct. 29, 1992, 1 F.3d 87, 93 (2d Cir. 1993); Madanes v. Madanes, 186 F.R.D. 279, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (\"[E]ven if documents contain incriminating information, requiring a person to produce them does not implicate the Fifth Amendment unless the act of production is itself testimonial in nature and incriminating to the person making the disclosure.\")\n\niii. The Fifth Amendment – When Private Action Is Deemed Government Action\nAs discussed above, \"[t]he sole concern of the Fifth Amendment . . . is governmental coercion.\" Connelly, 479 U.S. at 170. \"[T]he Fifth Amendment privilege is not concerned 'with moral and psychological pressures to confess emanating from sources other than official coercion.'\" Id. (quoting Elstad, 470 U.S. at 305). For this reason, even \"[t]he most outrageous coercion.\"\n98\nDOJ-OGR-00003059",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 125 of 239",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "to produce documents, the contents of which are not privileged, where the act of production is, itself, (1) compelled, (2) testimonial, and (3) incriminating.\" In re Three Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Dated Jan. 29, 1999, 191 F.3d 173, 178 (2d Cir. 1999).\nConsistent with these requirements, the privilege only \"prohibits the compelled disclosure of documents when the act of production has independent communicative aspects—such as an admission that the documents exist, that the subject possesses or controls the documents, that the documents are authentic, or that the subject believes the documents are responsive to the subpoena.\" In re Various Grand Jury Subpoenas, 924 F. Supp. 2d 549, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff'd, 579 F. App'x 37 (2d Cir. 2014); see also Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976).\nIt follows that the privilege does not apply when \"[t]he existence and location of the [sought] papers are a foregone conclusion and the [compelled individual] adds little or nothing to the sum total of the Government's information by conceding that he in fact has the papers.\" Id. at 411; see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Oct. 29, 1992, 1 F.3d 87, 93 (2d Cir. 1993); Madanes v. Madanes, 186 F.R.D. 279, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (\"[E]ven if documents contain incriminating information, requiring a person to produce them does not implicate the Fifth Amendment unless the act of production is itself testimonial in nature and incriminating to the person making the disclosure.\")",
      "position": "main"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "iii. The Fifth Amendment – When Private Action Is Deemed Government Action",
      "position": "main"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "As discussed above, \"[t]he sole concern of the Fifth Amendment . . . is governmental coercion.\" Connelly, 479 U.S. at 170. \"[T]he Fifth Amendment privilege is not concerned 'with moral and psychological pressures to confess emanating from sources other than official coercion.'\" Id. (quoting Elstad, 470 U.S. at 305). For this reason, even \"[t]he most outrageous coercion.\"",
      "position": "main"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "98",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00003059",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [],
    "organizations": [
      "United States"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "S.D.N.Y."
    ],
    "dates": [
      "Jan. 29, 1999",
      "04/16/21",
      "Oct. 29, 1992"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 204",
      "191 F.3d 173",
      "924 F. Supp. 2d 549",
      "579 F. App'x 37",
      "425 U.S. 391",
      "1 F.3d 87",
      "186 F.R.D. 279",
      "479 U.S. 170",
      "470 U.S. at 305",
      "DOJ-OGR-00003059"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case, discussing the Fifth Amendment and its application to document production. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes."
}