mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES002/DOJ-OGR-00004799.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "15",
    "document_number": "307",
    "date": "06/25/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
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    "has_stamps": false
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  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 307 Filed 06/25/21 Page 15 of 21\n\nAlthough Maxwell relied on Franks in her opening brief, she argues in reply that she need not satisfy that standard. See Dkt. No. 134, at 16; Dkt. No. 285, at 23. However, she provides no explanation for why Franks should not apply. To the extent she offers any alternative framework in her reply, it is that an evidentiary hearing is required whenever any factual issue related to a motion to suppress is in dispute. That formulation is far too broad.\n\nThe Court agrees with the Government (and the suggestion in Maxwell's opening brief) that Franks provides the appropriate standard for whether Maxwell is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on her motion. To be sure, these cases are not identical. Franks dealt with an alleged false statement in a warrant affidavit. This case involves an alleged false statement in a hearing to modify a protective order to allow a grand jury subpoena. Franks involved a claim under the Fourth Amendment, while Maxwell couches hers in the Fifth. But while not identical, these settings are closely analogous. Each involves alleged misstatements to a court that allowed the Government to obtain evidence. Each presents a risk of a defense fishing expedition where no wrongdoing appears on the face of the Government's application. Each requires balancing similar interests—deterrence of deliberate misconduct on the one hand, and suppression of evidence inevitably discovered or obtained through innocent error on the other. The Second Circuit has already extended Franks past its precise factual context to a motion to suppress based on alleged misrepresentations in a wiretap application. See United States v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139, 151 (2d Cir. 2013). The Court concludes that Maxwell must at least meet this standard for a similar claim invoking the Court's inherent authority.\n\nMaxwell must thus make a substantial preliminary showing on each of Franks' requirements to justify an evidentiary hearing. United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 113 (2d Cir. 1998). That is, she must first make a substantial preliminary showing that the Government\n\n15\n\nDOJ-OGR-00004799",
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      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 307 Filed 06/25/21 Page 15 of 21",
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      "content": "Although Maxwell relied on Franks in her opening brief, she argues in reply that she need not satisfy that standard. See Dkt. No. 134, at 16; Dkt. No. 285, at 23. However, she provides no explanation for why Franks should not apply. To the extent she offers any alternative framework in her reply, it is that an evidentiary hearing is required whenever any factual issue related to a motion to suppress is in dispute. That formulation is far too broad.",
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      "content": "The Court agrees with the Government (and the suggestion in Maxwell's opening brief) that Franks provides the appropriate standard for whether Maxwell is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on her motion. To be sure, these cases are not identical. Franks dealt with an alleged false statement in a warrant affidavit. This case involves an alleged false statement in a hearing to modify a protective order to allow a grand jury subpoena. Franks involved a claim under the Fourth Amendment, while Maxwell couches hers in the Fifth. But while not identical, these settings are closely analogous. Each involves alleged misstatements to a court that allowed the Government to obtain evidence. Each presents a risk of a defense fishing expedition where no wrongdoing appears on the face of the Government's application. Each requires balancing similar interests—deterrence of deliberate misconduct on the one hand, and suppression of evidence inevitably discovered or obtained through innocent error on the other. The Second Circuit has already extended Franks past its precise factual context to a motion to suppress based on alleged misrepresentations in a wiretap application. See United States v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139, 151 (2d Cir. 2013). The Court concludes that Maxwell must at least meet this standard for a similar claim invoking the Court's inherent authority.",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Maxwell must thus make a substantial preliminary showing on each of Franks' requirements to justify an evidentiary hearing. United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 113 (2d Cir. 1998). That is, she must first make a substantial preliminary showing that the Government",
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      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00004799",
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  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Maxwell"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Government",
      "Second Circuit",
      "Court"
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    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "06/25/21"
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    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 307",
      "Dkt. No. 134",
      "Dkt. No. 285",
      "719 F.3d 139",
      "152 F.3d 88",
      "DOJ-OGR-00004799"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes. The document is page 15 of 21."
}