mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES002/DOJ-OGR-00004935.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "12",
    "document_number": "311-4",
    "date": "07/02/21",
    "document_type": "Court Document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 311-4 Filed 07/02/21 Page 12 of 27\nTo Be Filed Under Seal\n\nSecond, the Government argues that Martindell does not apply when \"as here, the protective order is on its face temporary or limited.\" (Gov't Letter Br. at 4.) But the Protective Order in this case is at least arguably not temporary or limited. It would have expired had the case gone to trial, but, as the case settled, it appears to me to bind the parties permanently. It is true that nothing in the Protective Order seems to prevent either Giuffre or Maxwell from making public documents that were designated confidential by that party once the lawsuit is over. However, as to documents designated confidential by the other party, the promise of confidentiality plainly survives termination of the lawsuit—even to the point of requiring that those materials be returned or destroyed.\n\nThird, the Government argues that applying Martindell to its application here \"would risk rendering [Martindell] in even further conflict with the well-reasoned decisions of numerous other Circuits.\" (Gov't Letter Br. at 5 n.3.) Martindell is indeed an outlier; every other Circuit that has considered the clash between protective orders and grand jury subpoenas has questioned its wisdom and has come up with a standard more favorable to the Government's position. See generally Dane L. Steffenson, Are Rule 26(c) Protective Orders Viable Against Grand Juries?, 26 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 183 (1996); 8A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2044.1 (3d ed. Nov. 2018).\nI happen to agree with the other Circuits, but Martindell is the law in this Circuit, and I am not at liberty to ignore it.\n\nThe Government argues that the Court should decline to analyze its request pursuant to Martindell in light of Chemical Bank v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 154 F.R.D. 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).\n\nLike this case, Chemical Bank arose in a somewhat unusual posture: a party to a protective order unilaterally approached the Manhattan District Attorney's Office, \"suggesting that it had evidence of criminal violations relating to the case.\" Id. at 93. The District Attorney then issued",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 311-4 Filed 07/02/21 Page 12 of 27",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "To Be Filed Under Seal",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Second, the Government argues that Martindell does not apply when \"as here, the protective order is on its face temporary or limited.\" (Gov't Letter Br. at 4.) But the Protective Order in this case is at least arguably not temporary or limited. It would have expired had the case gone to trial, but, as the case settled, it appears to me to bind the parties permanently. It is true that nothing in the Protective Order seems to prevent either Giuffre or Maxwell from making public documents that were designated confidential by that party once the lawsuit is over. However, as to documents designated confidential by the other party, the promise of confidentiality plainly survives termination of the lawsuit—even to the point of requiring that those materials be returned or destroyed.",
      "position": "main"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Third, the Government argues that applying Martindell to its application here \"would risk rendering [Martindell] in even further conflict with the well-reasoned decisions of numerous other Circuits.\" (Gov't Letter Br. at 5 n.3.) Martindell is indeed an outlier; every other Circuit that has considered the clash between protective orders and grand jury subpoenas has questioned its wisdom and has come up with a standard more favorable to the Government's position. See generally Dane L. Steffenson, Are Rule 26(c) Protective Orders Viable Against Grand Juries?, 26 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 183 (1996); 8A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2044.1 (3d ed. Nov. 2018).",
      "position": "main"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "I happen to agree with the other Circuits, but Martindell is the law in this Circuit, and I am not at liberty to ignore it.",
      "position": "main"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The Government argues that the Court should decline to analyze its request pursuant to Martindell in light of Chemical Bank v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 154 F.R.D. 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).",
      "position": "main"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Like this case, Chemical Bank arose in a somewhat unusual posture: a party to a protective order unilaterally approached the Manhattan District Attorney's Office, \"suggesting that it had evidence of criminal violations relating to the case.\" Id. at 93. The District Attorney then issued",
      "position": "main"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "11",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "SDNY_GM_00000885 DOJ-OGR-00004935",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Giuffre",
      "Maxwell",
      "Dane L. Steffenson"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Government",
      "Manhattan District Attorney's Office"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "S.D.N.Y."
    ],
    "dates": [
      "07/02/21",
      "1996",
      "Nov. 2018",
      "1994"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "311-4",
      "26 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 183",
      "154 F.R.D. 91"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case, discussing the application of Martindell and the implications of a protective order. The text is mostly printed, with no handwritten content or stamps visible."
}