mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES002/DOJ-OGR-00005431.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "38",
    "document_number": "380",
    "date": "10/29/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 380 Filed 10/29/21 Page 38 of 54\n\nthe Federal Rules of Evidence contain extensive provisions governing the impeachment of witnesses. Fed. R. Evid. 607-13. Rule 806 also authorizes attacks on the credibility of hearsay declarants, agents, and co-conspirators when those individual's statements have been admitted into evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 806. This rule “effectively treats the hearsay declarant as a witness for impeachment and rehabilitation purposes.” 2 McCormick on Evid. § 324.2 (8th ed.).\n\nFor individuals who are not witnesses and not hearsay declarants, however, none of those rules apply. Instead, those non-witnesses’ “credibility is irrelevant.” United States v. McGowan, 58 F.3d 8, 15-16 (2d Cir. 1995). The Second Circuit has therefore “clearly established . . . the principle that a statement not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted may not be impeached under Rule 806.” United States v. Paulino, 445 F.3d 211, 217 (2d Cir. 2006); see United States v. Dipietro, No. 02 Cr. 1237 (SWK), 2005 WL 1430483, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 17, 2005) (“It has long been the case in the Second Circuit that it is proper to preclude cross-examination of an individual whose statements are not admitted for their truth.”). Even if the individual is a “‘central figure’” in the case, “a district court need not allow impeachment” if the individual's “out-of-court statements were not admitted for their truth.” United States v. Regan, 103 F.3d 1072, 1083 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting McGowan, 58 F.3d at 15-16); see United States v. Perez, No. 05 Cr. 441 (PKL), 2005 WL 2709160, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 2005) (“Because the informant's statements are not hearsay, and because the government will not call the informant as a witness at trial, it follows that defendant may not impeach the credibility of the informant.”).\n\nIn this case, the Government is not planning to call Minor Victim-5 or Minor Victim-6.\n\nTo the extent other witnesses are expected to testify about the activities of Minor Victim-5 and\n\n37\n\nDOJ-OGR-00005431",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 380 Filed 10/29/21 Page 38 of 54",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "the Federal Rules of Evidence contain extensive provisions governing the impeachment of witnesses. Fed. R. Evid. 607-13. Rule 806 also authorizes attacks on the credibility of hearsay declarants, agents, and co-conspirators when those individual's statements have been admitted into evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 806. This rule “effectively treats the hearsay declarant as a witness for impeachment and rehabilitation purposes.” 2 McCormick on Evid. § 324.2 (8th ed.).",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "For individuals who are not witnesses and not hearsay declarants, however, none of those rules apply. Instead, those non-witnesses’ “credibility is irrelevant.” United States v. McGowan, 58 F.3d 8, 15-16 (2d Cir. 1995). The Second Circuit has therefore “clearly established . . . the principle that a statement not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted may not be impeached under Rule 806.” United States v. Paulino, 445 F.3d 211, 217 (2d Cir. 2006); see United States v. Dipietro, No. 02 Cr. 1237 (SWK), 2005 WL 1430483, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 17, 2005) (“It has long been the case in the Second Circuit that it is proper to preclude cross-examination of an individual whose statements are not admitted for their truth.”). Even if the individual is a “‘central figure’” in the case, “a district court need not allow impeachment” if the individual's “out-of-court statements were not admitted for their truth.” United States v. Regan, 103 F.3d 1072, 1083 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting McGowan, 58 F.3d at 15-16); see United States v. Perez, No. 05 Cr. 441 (PKL), 2005 WL 2709160, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 2005) (“Because the informant's statements are not hearsay, and because the government will not call the informant as a witness at trial, it follows that defendant may not impeach the credibility of the informant.”).",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "In this case, the Government is not planning to call Minor Victim-5 or Minor Victim-6.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "To the extent other witnesses are expected to testify about the activities of Minor Victim-5 and",
      "position": "bottom"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "37",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00005431",
      "position": "footer"
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  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [],
    "organizations": [],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "10/29/21",
      "June 17, 2005",
      "Oct. 20, 2005"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 380",
      "02 Cr. 1237 (SWK)",
      "05 Cr. 441 (PKL)"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case, discussing the rules of evidence and impeachment of witnesses. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes. The document is likely a page from a larger filing, as indicated by the page number and document number in the header."
}