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- {
- "document_metadata": {
- "page_number": "54",
- "document_number": "397",
- "date": "10/29/21",
- "document_type": "court document",
- "has_handwriting": false,
- "has_stamps": false
- },
- "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 397 Filed 10/29/21 Page 54 of 84\n\nwith Epstein. When Minor Victim-3 began having sexual contact with Epstein, she was 17. The issue at trial will be the defendant's knowledge of Epstein's preference for girls under the age of 18. Under federal law, there is a term for individuals under the age of 18: minors. There is nothing inappropriate about using that term at trial.\n\nSimilarly, the phrase \"sexual abuse\" is accurate, and the Government should be permitted to use it. Minor Victim-3 is expected to testify about her experiences with the defendant and Epstein, including that she was sexually abused by Epstein numerous times. Regardless of whether she uses the term \"sexual abuse,\" her testimony will capture her experience—that she was exploited sexually. And it is fair for the Government to argue that those acts were sexual abuse.\n\nThe defense argues that the phrase \"sexual abuse\" is misleading because it suggests to the jury that Epstein engaged in \"criminal sexual activity\" with Minor Victim-3. (Def. Mot. 4 at 14-15). To justify that proposition, the defense cites a single Supreme Court case in which (1) the parties were engaged in the task of statutory interpretation, not argument in a jury address or description of a victim's lived experience, and (2) the Court rejected that proposed definition of \"sexual abuse of a minor\" as \"flatly inconsistent with the definition of sexual abuse contained in th[at] very dictionary.\" Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562, 1569 (2017). Again, the Government is confident that the Court will properly instruct the jury regarding the elements of the crimes in the Indictment.\n\nFinally, there is no basis for an instruction about United Kingdom law. The defense has demonstrated no unfair prejudice that might warrant a limiting instruction, and the defense's proposed instructions would only confuse the jury. The jury will be instructed to consider only\n\n53\n\nDOJ-OGR-00005837",
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- "type": "printed",
- "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 397 Filed 10/29/21 Page 54 of 84",
- "position": "header"
- },
- {
- "type": "printed",
- "content": "with Epstein. When Minor Victim-3 began having sexual contact with Epstein, she was 17. The issue at trial will be the defendant's knowledge of Epstein's preference for girls under the age of 18. Under federal law, there is a term for individuals under the age of 18: minors. There is nothing inappropriate about using that term at trial.\n\nSimilarly, the phrase \"sexual abuse\" is accurate, and the Government should be permitted to use it. Minor Victim-3 is expected to testify about her experiences with the defendant and Epstein, including that she was sexually abused by Epstein numerous times. Regardless of whether she uses the term \"sexual abuse,\" her testimony will capture her experience—that she was exploited sexually. And it is fair for the Government to argue that those acts were sexual abuse.\n\nThe defense argues that the phrase \"sexual abuse\" is misleading because it suggests to the jury that Epstein engaged in \"criminal sexual activity\" with Minor Victim-3. (Def. Mot. 4 at 14-15). To justify that proposition, the defense cites a single Supreme Court case in which (1) the parties were engaged in the task of statutory interpretation, not argument in a jury address or description of a victim's lived experience, and (2) the Court rejected that proposed definition of \"sexual abuse of a minor\" as \"flatly inconsistent with the definition of sexual abuse contained in th[at] very dictionary.\" Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562, 1569 (2017). Again, the Government is confident that the Court will properly instruct the jury regarding the elements of the crimes in the Indictment.\n\nFinally, there is no basis for an instruction about United Kingdom law. The defense has demonstrated no unfair prejudice that might warrant a limiting instruction, and the defense's proposed instructions would only confuse the jury. The jury will be instructed to consider only",
- "position": "main"
- },
- {
- "type": "printed",
- "content": "53",
- "position": "footer"
- },
- {
- "type": "printed",
- "content": "DOJ-OGR-00005837",
- "position": "footer"
- }
- ],
- "entities": {
- "people": [
- "Epstein",
- "Minor Victim-3"
- ],
- "organizations": [
- "Government",
- "Supreme Court"
- ],
- "locations": [
- "United Kingdom"
- ],
- "dates": [
- "10/29/21",
- "2017"
- ],
- "reference_numbers": [
- "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
- "Document 397",
- "137 S. Ct. 1562",
- "DOJ-OGR-00005837"
- ]
- },
- "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case involving Jeffrey Epstein. The text discusses the use of certain terms during the trial and the potential testimony of Minor Victim-3. The document is well-formatted and free of significant damage or redactions."
- }
|