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- {
- "document_metadata": {
- "page_number": "46",
- "document_number": "398",
- "date": "10/29/21",
- "document_type": "court document",
- "has_handwriting": false,
- "has_stamps": false
- },
- "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 398 Filed 10/29/21 Page 46 of 52 speculating that the accusers have already been found credible by someone, or that their decision is a foregone conclusion. On the other side of the probative-prejudicial scale, the government simultaneously fails to articulate any probative value in use of the term \"victim,\" either in its jury address or otherwise. Cf. State v. Wigg, 889 A.2d 233, 236 (Vt. 2005) (\"the use of the term 'victim' had no inherent probative value\"). Second, the government improperly suggests in response that the stricture on vouching should not apply to the witnesses themselves. Resp. at 79. As explained by numerous cases, having any witness refer to themselves or another witness as a \"victim\" is the very height of improper vouching. Sena, supra; State v. Sperou, 365 Or. 121, 131, 442 P.3d 581, 590 (2019) (\"another witness's description of the complaining witness as a 'victim' conveys an opinion that the complaining witness is telling the truth. That is what the vouching rule is intended to prevent.\"); Wigg, supra. Finally, the government contends that Dr. Rocchio can use the word \"victim\" in reference to \"victims of sexual abuse generally,\" but her use of the term is even more problematic. For the reasons articulated in our Daubert motion and reply, Dr. Rocchio bases her expertise on her therapeutic number of individuals who have self-identified as sexual abuse victims, without any research or investigation as to whether the individuals' self-reports are true. She then intends to draw from her anecdotal and experiential treatment to generalize about all \"victims\" without their ever having been a finding that any of the persons she has provided treatment to were, in fact, \"victims.\" If she is permitted to testify, there is no reason for her to vouch for the credibility of her patients, unless she clarifies each time that she is taking the individual at their word that they were in fact a victim. The danger of confusion to a jury is that anyone treated by Dr. Rochio must have been a victim. As the Wigg court recognized, there will be a \"danger of unfair 40 DOJ-OGR-00006001",
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- "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 398 Filed 10/29/21 Page 46 of 52",
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- {
- "type": "printed",
- "content": "speculating that the accusers have already been found credible by someone, or that their decision is a foregone conclusion. On the other side of the probative-prejudicial scale, the government simultaneously fails to articulate any probative value in use of the term \"victim,\" either in its jury address or otherwise. Cf. State v. Wigg, 889 A.2d 233, 236 (Vt. 2005) (\"the use of the term 'victim' had no inherent probative value\"). Second, the government improperly suggests in response that the stricture on vouching should not apply to the witnesses themselves. Resp. at 79. As explained by numerous cases, having any witness refer to themselves or another witness as a \"victim\" is the very height of improper vouching. Sena, supra; State v. Sperou, 365 Or. 121, 131, 442 P.3d 581, 590 (2019) (\"another witness's description of the complaining witness as a 'victim' conveys an opinion that the complaining witness is telling the truth. That is what the vouching rule is intended to prevent.\"); Wigg, supra. Finally, the government contends that Dr. Rocchio can use the word \"victim\" in reference to \"victims of sexual abuse generally,\" but her use of the term is even more problematic. For the reasons articulated in our Daubert motion and reply, Dr. Rocchio bases her expertise on her therapeutic number of individuals who have self-identified as sexual abuse victims, without any research or investigation as to whether the individuals' self-reports are true. She then intends to draw from her anecdotal and experiential treatment to generalize about all \"victims\" without their ever having been a finding that any of the persons she has provided treatment to were, in fact, \"victims.\" If she is permitted to testify, there is no reason for her to vouch for the credibility of her patients, unless she clarifies each time that she is taking the individual at their word that they were in fact a victim. The danger of confusion to a jury is that anyone treated by Dr. Rochio must have been a victim. As the Wigg court recognized, there will be a \"danger of unfair",
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- "type": "printed",
- "content": "40",
- "position": "footer"
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- {
- "type": "printed",
- "content": "DOJ-OGR-00006001",
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- ],
- "entities": {
- "people": [
- "Dr. Rocchio"
- ],
- "organizations": [
- "DOJ"
- ],
- "locations": [
- "Vt",
- "Or"
- ],
- "dates": [
- "10/29/21",
- "2005",
- "2019"
- ],
- "reference_numbers": [
- "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
- "Document 398",
- "889 A.2d 233",
- "365 Or. 121",
- "442 P.3d 581",
- "DOJ-OGR-00006001"
- ]
- },
- "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case, discussing the use of the term 'victim' in testimony and its potential impact on the jury. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes."
- }
|