mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES003/DOJ-OGR-00006104.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "38",
    "document_number": "410-1",
    "date": "11/04/21",
    "document_type": "Court Document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 410-1 Filed 11/04/21 Page 38 of 93\n\nCount Six: Sex Trafficking of a Minor - Third Element\n\nThe third element of Count Six which the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that Ms. Maxwell the defendant knew that [Jane Doe-4 pseudonym] the person would be caused to engage in a commercial sex act.\n\nThe term \"commercial sex act\" means \"any sex act, on account of which anything of value is given to or received by any person.\" The thing of value may be money or any other tangible or intangible thing of value that may be given to or received by any person, regardless of whether the person who receives it is the person performing the commercial sex act.\n\nIt is not relevant whether or not [Jane Doe-4 pseudonym] the person was a willing participant in performing commercial sex acts when she was under the age of 18 years old.\n\nConsent by [Jane Doe-4 pseudonym] the person is not a defense to the charge in Count Six of the Indictment if [Jane Doe-4 pseudonym] was under the age of 18 at the time the commercial sex acts took place. It is also not required that the person actually performed a commercial sex act as long as the Government has proved that the defendant recruited, enticed, harbored, transported, provided, or obtained the person for the purpose of engaging in commercial sex acts.\n\nAdapted from Sand, et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions, Instr. 47A-22; 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c)(1) (2000) (defining \"commercial sex act\"); and the charge given by the Hon. Kimba M. Wood in United States v. Almonte, 16 Cr. 670 (KMW). See United States v. Jones, 847 F. App'x 28, 30 (2d Cir. 2021) (summary order) (affirming the use of an instruction drawn from the statute and the Sand treatise); United States v. Corley, 679 F. App'x 1, 7 (2d Cir. 2017) (summary order) (\"[T]he statute does not require that an actual commercial sex act have occurred.\"); United States v. Williams, 529 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2008) (\"Even if the minor had factually consented, that consent would not have been legally valid. In all events, factual consent would not eliminate the potential risks that confronted the child.\" (citations omitted)).\n\nCommented [CE49]: If Jane Doe-4 testifies as expected - i.e., that she engaged in repeated sex acts with Jeffrey Epstein when she was underage - this instruction is unnecessary\n\nCommented [RA(50R49]: GOVERNMENT RESPONSE:\nAs above, although Jane Doe-4 may testify as much, the defense is expected to attack her credibility The jury should not be instructed on the assumption that she will be fully believed This instruction is also a correct statement of the law that may be relevant to the conspiracy instruction, which incorporates these instructions\n\nDOJ-OGR-00006104",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 410-1 Filed 11/04/21 Page 38 of 93",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Count Six: Sex Trafficking of a Minor - Third Element",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The third element of Count Six which the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that Ms. Maxwell the defendant knew that [Jane Doe-4 pseudonym] the person would be caused to engage in a commercial sex act.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The term \"commercial sex act\" means \"any sex act, on account of which anything of value is given to or received by any person.\" The thing of value may be money or any other tangible or intangible thing of value that may be given to or received by any person, regardless of whether the person who receives it is the person performing the commercial sex act.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "It is not relevant whether or not [Jane Doe-4 pseudonym] the person was a willing participant in performing commercial sex acts when she was under the age of 18 years old.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Consent by [Jane Doe-4 pseudonym] the person is not a defense to the charge in Count Six of the Indictment if [Jane Doe-4 pseudonym] was under the age of 18 at the time the commercial sex acts took place. It is also not required that the person actually performed a commercial sex act as long as the Government has proved that the defendant recruited, enticed, harbored, transported, provided, or obtained the person for the purpose of engaging in commercial sex acts.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Adapted from Sand, et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions, Instr. 47A-22; 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c)(1) (2000) (defining \"commercial sex act\"); and the charge given by the Hon. Kimba M. Wood in United States v. Almonte, 16 Cr. 670 (KMW). See United States v. Jones, 847 F. App'x 28, 30 (2d Cir. 2021) (summary order) (affirming the use of an instruction drawn from the statute and the Sand treatise); United States v. Corley, 679 F. App'x 1, 7 (2d Cir. 2017) (summary order) (\"[T]he statute does not require that an actual commercial sex act have occurred.\"); United States v. Williams, 529 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2008) (\"Even if the minor had factually consented, that consent would not have been legally valid. In all events, factual consent would not eliminate the potential risks that confronted the child.\" (citations omitted)).",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "handwritten",
      "content": "Commented [CE49]: If Jane Doe-4 testifies as expected - i.e., that she engaged in repeated sex acts with Jeffrey Epstein when she was underage - this instruction is unnecessary",
      "position": "margin"
    },
    {
      "type": "handwritten",
      "content": "Commented [RA(50R49]: GOVERNMENT RESPONSE: As above, although Jane Doe-4 may testify as much, the defense is expected to attack her credibility The jury should not be instructed on the assumption that she will be fully believed This instruction is also a correct statement of the law that may be relevant to the conspiracy instruction, which incorporates these instructions",
      "position": "margin"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00006104",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Ms. Maxwell",
      "Jane Doe-4",
      "Jeffrey Epstein",
      "Kimba M. Wood"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Department of Justice"
    ],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "11/04/21",
      "2000"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "410-1",
      "16 Cr. 670 (KMW)",
      "DOJ-OGR-00006104"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to the case of Ms. Maxwell, with annotations and comments in the margins. The text is mostly printed, with some handwritten comments. The document is page 38 of 93."
}