mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES003/DOJ-OGR-00006115.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "49",
    "document_number": "410-1",
    "date": "11/04/21",
    "document_type": "Court Document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 410-1 Filed 11/04/21 Page 49 of 93\n\nThe reason for allowing this evidence to be received against the defendant has to do in part with the nature of the crime of conspiracy. A conspiracy is often referred to as a partnership in crime; as in other types of partnerships, when people enter into a conspiracy to accomplish an unlawful end, each and every member becomes an agent for the other conspirators in carrying out the conspiracy.\n\nTherefore, the reasonably foreseeable acts, statements, and omissions of any member of the conspiracy, committed in furtherance of the common purpose of the conspiracy, are deemed under the law to be the acts of all of the members, and all of the members are responsible for such acts, statements, or omissions.\n\nIf you find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a defendant was a member of the conspiracy charged in the Indictment, then any acts done or statements made in furtherance of the conspiracy by a person also found by you to have been a member of the same conspiracy may be considered against that defendant. This is so even if such acts were committed or such statements were made in that defendant's absence, and without the defendant's knowledge.\n\nHowever, before you may consider the acts or statements of a co-conspirator in deciding the guilt of the defendant, you must first determine that the acts were committed or statements were made during the existence, and in furtherance, of the unlawful scheme. If the acts were done or the statements were made by someone whom you do not find to have been a member of the conspiracy, or if they were not in furtherance of the conspiracy, they may not be considered by you in deciding whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty.\n\nAdapted from Sand, et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions, Instrs. 19-4, 19-9; the charge of the Hon. Alison J. Nathan in United States v. Lebedev, 15 Cr. 769 (AJN) and in United States v. Jones, 16 Cr. 533 (AJN); the charge of the Hon. Kimba M. Wood in United States v. Almonte, 16 Cr. 670 (KMW); and the charge of the Hon. Denise L. Cote in United States v. Purcell, 18 Cr. 081\n\nCommented [CE67]: This instruction should be shortened and moved after the elements of conspiracy This is consistent with the Court recent instructions on this issue See United States v. Pizarro, 17 Cr 151 (AJN)\n\nCommented [RA(68R67]: GOVERNMENT RESPONSE: The Government does not object to moving this to after the elements of the conspiracy However, this is the Sand instruction, which offers a more fulsome description of (1) a defendant's liability for \"reasonably foreseeable acts\" committed in furtherance of the conspiracy, and (2) the predicates for the jury to rely on statements under Fed R Evid 801(d)(2)(A) The Government notes that the Court has previously given more detailed instructions than the streamlined Pizarro instruction suggested by the defendant See United States v. Lebedev, 15 Cr 769 (AJN); United States v. Jones, 16 Cr 553 (AJN)\n\nDOJ-OGR-00006115",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 410-1 Filed 11/04/21 Page 49 of 93",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The reason for allowing this evidence to be received against the defendant has to do in part with the nature of the crime of conspiracy. A conspiracy is often referred to as a partnership in crime; as in other types of partnerships, when people enter into a conspiracy to accomplish an unlawful end, each and every member becomes an agent for the other conspirators in carrying out the conspiracy.",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Therefore, the reasonably foreseeable acts, statements, and omissions of any member of the conspiracy, committed in furtherance of the common purpose of the conspiracy, are deemed under the law to be the acts of all of the members, and all of the members are responsible for such acts, statements, or omissions.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "If you find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a defendant was a member of the conspiracy charged in the Indictment, then any acts done or statements made in furtherance of the conspiracy by a person also found by you to have been a member of the same conspiracy may be considered against that defendant. This is so even if such acts were committed or such statements were made in that defendant's absence, and without the defendant's knowledge.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "However, before you may consider the acts or statements of a co-conspirator in deciding the guilt of the defendant, you must first determine that the acts were committed or statements were made during the existence, and in furtherance, of the unlawful scheme. If the acts were done or the statements were made by someone whom you do not find to have been a member of the conspiracy, or if they were not in furtherance of the conspiracy, they may not be considered by you in deciding whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Adapted from Sand, et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions, Instrs. 19-4, 19-9; the charge of the Hon. Alison J. Nathan in United States v. Lebedev, 15 Cr. 769 (AJN) and in United States v. Jones, 16 Cr. 533 (AJN); the charge of the Hon. Kimba M. Wood in United States v. Almonte, 16 Cr. 670 (KMW); and the charge of the Hon. Denise L. Cote in United States v. Purcell, 18 Cr. 081",
      "position": "bottom"
    },
    {
      "type": "handwritten",
      "content": "Commented [CE67]: This instruction should be shortened and moved after the elements of conspiracy This is consistent with the Court recent instructions on this issue See United States v. Pizarro, 17 Cr 151 (AJN)",
      "position": "margin"
    },
    {
      "type": "handwritten",
      "content": "Commented [RA(68R67]: GOVERNMENT RESPONSE: The Government does not object to moving this to after the elements of the conspiracy However, this is the Sand instruction, which offers a more fulsome description of (1) a defendant's liability for \"reasonably foreseeable acts\" committed in furtherance of the conspiracy, and (2) the predicates for the jury to rely on statements under Fed R Evid 801(d)(2)(A) The Government notes that the Court has previously given more detailed instructions than the streamlined Pizarro instruction suggested by the defendant See United States v. Lebedev, 15 Cr 769 (AJN); United States v. Jones, 16 Cr 553 (AJN)",
      "position": "margin"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00006115",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Alison J. Nathan",
      "Kimba M. Wood",
      "Denise L. Cote"
    ],
    "organizations": [],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "11/04/21"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "410-1",
      "15 Cr. 769",
      "16 Cr. 533",
      "16 Cr. 670",
      "18 Cr. 081",
      "17 Cr 151"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court document, specifically a jury instruction, with annotations and comments in the margins. The text is mostly printed, with some handwritten comments. The document is related to a conspiracy case and discusses the liability of defendants for the acts of co-conspirators."
}