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- {
- "document_metadata": {
- "page_number": "70 of 93",
- "document_number": "410-1",
- "date": "11/04/21",
- "document_type": "court document",
- "has_handwriting": false,
- "has_stamps": false
- },
- "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 410-1 Filed 11/04/21 Page 70 of 93 Conscious Avoidance As I have explained, each of the counts charged in the Indictment requires the Government to prove that the defendant acted knowingly, as I have already defined that term. If a person is actually aware of a fact, then she knows that fact. But, in determining whether the defendant acted knowingly, you may also consider whether the defendant deliberately closed her eyes to what otherwise would have been obvious. To be clear, the necessary knowledge on the part of the defendant with respect to any particular charge cannot be established by showing that the defendant was careless, negligent, or foolish. However, one may not willfully and intentionally remain ignorant of a fact material and important to her conduct in order to escape the consequences of criminal law. The law calls this \"conscious avoidance\" or \"willful blindness.\" Thus, if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was aware that there was a high probability a crime was being committed, but that the defendant deliberately and consciously avoided confirming this fact, such as by purposely closing her eyes to it or intentionally failing to investigate it, then you may treat this deliberate avoidance of positive knowledge as the equivalent of knowledge, unless you find that the defendant actually believed that she was not engaged in such unlawful behavior. In other words, a defendant cannot avoid criminal responsibility for her own conduct by \"deliberately closing her eyes,\" or remaining purposefully ignorant of facts which would confirm to her that she was engaged in unlawful conduct. With respect to the conspiracy counts, you must also keep in mind that there is an important difference between knowingly and intentionally participating in a conspiracy - which I just explained to you - and knowing the specific objective of the conspiracy on the other. You 70 DOJ-OGR-00006136 Commented [CE86]: The defense objects to this instruction in its entirety. It is confusing; it lessens the government's constitutional burden of proving knowledge or intent as the case may be; and it unfairly highlights the government's theory of the case Commented [PA87R86]: GOVERNMENT RESPONSE: If the defense's arguments and the Government's proof at trial establish the predicates for conscious avoidance, it is well settled that the Government may proceed on this theory as an alternative way to show the defendant's knowledge, and therefore the Government requests the appropriate charge. See, e.g., United States v. Khalupsky, 5 F 4th 279, 296 (2d Cir. 2021) The Government proposes this language so it is available to the Court in the event such an instruction becomes applicable",
- "text_blocks": [
- {
- "type": "printed",
- "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 410-1 Filed 11/04/21 Page 70 of 93",
- "position": "header"
- },
- {
- "type": "printed",
- "content": "Conscious Avoidance",
- "position": "middle"
- },
- {
- "type": "printed",
- "content": "As I have explained, each of the counts charged in the Indictment requires the Government to prove that the defendant acted knowingly, as I have already defined that term. If a person is actually aware of a fact, then she knows that fact. But, in determining whether the defendant acted knowingly, you may also consider whether the defendant deliberately closed her eyes to what otherwise would have been obvious. To be clear, the necessary knowledge on the part of the defendant with respect to any particular charge cannot be established by showing that the defendant was careless, negligent, or foolish. However, one may not willfully and intentionally remain ignorant of a fact material and important to her conduct in order to escape the consequences of criminal law. The law calls this \"conscious avoidance\" or \"willful blindness.\" Thus, if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was aware that there was a high probability a crime was being committed, but that the defendant deliberately and consciously avoided confirming this fact, such as by purposely closing her eyes to it or intentionally failing to investigate it, then you may treat this deliberate avoidance of positive knowledge as the equivalent of knowledge, unless you find that the defendant actually believed that she was not engaged in such unlawful behavior. In other words, a defendant cannot avoid criminal responsibility for her own conduct by \"deliberately closing her eyes,\" or remaining purposefully ignorant of facts which would confirm to her that she was engaged in unlawful conduct. With respect to the conspiracy counts, you must also keep in mind that there is an important difference between knowingly and intentionally participating in a conspiracy - which I just explained to you - and knowing the specific objective of the conspiracy on the other.",
- "position": "middle"
- },
- {
- "type": "handwritten",
- "content": "[CE86]: The defense objects to this instruction in its entirety. It is confusing; it lessens the government's constitutional burden of proving knowledge or intent as the case may be; and it unfairly highlights the government's theory of the case",
- "position": "margin"
- },
- {
- "type": "handwritten",
- "content": "[PA87R86]: GOVERNMENT RESPONSE: If the defense's arguments and the Government's proof at trial establish the predicates for conscious avoidance, it is well settled that the Government may proceed on this theory as an alternative way to show the defendant's knowledge, and therefore the Government requests the appropriate charge. See, e.g., United States v. Khalupsky, 5 F 4th 279, 296 (2d Cir. 2021) The Government proposes this language so it is available to the Court in the event such an instruction becomes applicable",
- "position": "margin"
- },
- {
- "type": "printed",
- "content": "70",
- "position": "footer"
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- {
- "type": "printed",
- "content": "DOJ-OGR-00006136",
- "position": "footer"
- }
- ],
- "entities": {
- "people": [],
- "organizations": [
- "Government"
- ],
- "locations": [],
- "dates": [
- "11/04/21"
- ],
- "reference_numbers": [
- "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
- "410-1",
- "5 F 4th 279",
- "296 (2d Cir. 2021)",
- "DOJ-OGR-00006136"
- ]
- },
- "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case, with annotations and comments in the margins. The text discusses the concept of 'conscious avoidance' and its relevance to the case."
- }
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