mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES003/DOJ-OGR-00006137.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "71",
    "document_number": "410-1",
    "date": "11/04/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 410-1 Filed 11/04/21 Page 71 of 93\n\nmay consider conscious avoidance in deciding whether the defendant knew the objective of a conspiracy, that is, whether she reasonably believed that there was a high probability that a goal of the conspiracy was to commit the crime charged as objects of the conspiracy and took deliberate and conscious action to avoid confirming that fact but participated in the conspiracy anyway. But conscious avoidance cannot be used as a substitute for finding that the defendant knowingly and intentionally joined the conspiracy in the first place. It is logically impossible for a defendant to intend and agree to join a conspiracy if she does not actually know it exists. However, if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly chose to participate in such a joint undertaking, you may consider whether the defendant took deliberate and conscious action to avoid confirming otherwise obvious facts about the purpose of that undertaking.\n\nIn sum, if you find that a defendant believed there was a high probability that a fact was so and that the defendant took deliberate and conscious action to avoid learning the truth of that fact, you may find that the defendant acted knowingly with respect to that fact. However, if you find that the defendant actually believed the fact was not so, then you may not find that she acted knowingly with respect to that fact.\n\nAdapted from the charge of the Hon. Alison J. Nathan in United States v. Lebedev, 15 Cr. 769 (AJN); the charge of the Hon. P. Kevin Castel in United States v. William Walters, 16 Cr. 338 (PKC); and Sand et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions, Instr. 3A-2. See United States v. Lange, 834 F.3d 58, 76 (2d Cir. 2016) (\"Conscious avoidance may not be used to support a finding as to ... intent to participate in a conspiracy, but it may be used to support a finding with respect to ... knowledge of the conspiracy's unlawful goals.\" (internal quotation marks omitted)).\n\n71\n\nDOJ-OGR-00006137",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 410-1 Filed 11/04/21 Page 71 of 93",
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    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "may consider conscious avoidance in deciding whether the defendant knew the objective of a conspiracy, that is, whether she reasonably believed that there was a high probability that a goal of the conspiracy was to commit the crime charged as objects of the conspiracy and took deliberate and conscious action to avoid confirming that fact but participated in the conspiracy anyway. But conscious avoidance cannot be used as a substitute for finding that the defendant knowingly and intentionally joined the conspiracy in the first place. It is logically impossible for a defendant to intend and agree to join a conspiracy if she does not actually know it exists. However, if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly chose to participate in such a joint undertaking, you may consider whether the defendant took deliberate and conscious action to avoid confirming otherwise obvious facts about the purpose of that undertaking.",
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    {
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      "content": "In sum, if you find that a defendant believed there was a high probability that a fact was so and that the defendant took deliberate and conscious action to avoid learning the truth of that fact, you may find that the defendant acted knowingly with respect to that fact. However, if you find that the defendant actually believed the fact was not so, then you may not find that she acted knowingly with respect to that fact.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Adapted from the charge of the Hon. Alison J. Nathan in United States v. Lebedev, 15 Cr. 769 (AJN); the charge of the Hon. P. Kevin Castel in United States v. William Walters, 16 Cr. 338 (PKC); and Sand et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions, Instr. 3A-2. See United States v. Lange, 834 F.3d 58, 76 (2d Cir. 2016) (\"Conscious avoidance may not be used to support a finding as to ... intent to participate in a conspiracy, but it may be used to support a finding with respect to ... knowledge of the conspiracy's unlawful goals.\" (internal quotation marks omitted)).",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "71",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00006137",
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  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Alison J. Nathan",
      "P. Kevin Castel"
    ],
    "organizations": [],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "11/04/21"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "410-1",
      "15 Cr. 769",
      "16 Cr. 338",
      "834 F.3d 58",
      "DOJ-OGR-00006137"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a conspiracy case. The text discusses the concept of conscious avoidance and its application in determining a defendant's knowledge of a conspiracy. The document includes citations to relevant case law and jury instructions."
}