mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES003/DOJ-OGR-00006228.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "17",
    "document_number": "424",
    "date": "11/08/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
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    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 424 Filed 11/08/21 Page 17 of 41\n\nbenefit of hindsight with what was known at the time. But this commonplace truth does not need testimony from a psychiatric expert.\n\nThe concept of hindsight bias is well within the ken of the average juror. “Hindsight bias is a common-sense concept—everyone knows that ‘hindsight is 20/20.’” Adams v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 760 F.3d 1322, 1335 (11th Cir. 2014). The prevalence of this common saying shows that jurors plainly understand the ways in which hindsight can bias one’s perspective. As such, expert testimony on it is unnecessary and inappropriate. See id. (“[C]ommon-sense concepts are especially appropriate for consideration by a jury.”); see also, e.g., United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91, 101 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[T]he district court should not admit testimony that is directed solely to lay matters which a jury is capable of understanding and deciding without the expert’s help.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). To whatever extent the Court believes further emphasis on this point is helpful, it can give the jury appropriate and neutral instructions to guide its deliberations. What the defense cannot do is skew the jury’s deliberations by putting an expert imprimatur on testimony that states, in effect, that the jurors should second-guess their assessments of the evidence because they are subject to hindsight bias. This inversion of the courtroom roles—in which a party’s witness sits in judgment of the jurors—is prejudicial and usurps the function both of the jurors and of the Court in instructing the jury. See, e.g., Hygh, 961 F.2d at 364 (“Whereas an expert may be uniquely qualified by experience to assist the trier of fact, he is not qualified to compete with the judge in the function of instructing the jury.”).\n\nIf Dr. Dietz’s testimony on hindsight bias is helpful to the jury in this case, testimony of this sort would become central to the court system. Every single trial involves a retrospective adjudication. The bulk of trials—civil and criminal—involve an assessment of a party’s\n\n13\n\nDOJ-OGR-00006228",
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      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 424 Filed 11/08/21 Page 17 of 41",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "benefit of hindsight with what was known at the time. But this commonplace truth does not need testimony from a psychiatric expert.\n\nThe concept of hindsight bias is well within the ken of the average juror. “Hindsight bias is a common-sense concept—everyone knows that ‘hindsight is 20/20.’” Adams v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 760 F.3d 1322, 1335 (11th Cir. 2014). The prevalence of this common saying shows that jurors plainly understand the ways in which hindsight can bias one’s perspective. As such, expert testimony on it is unnecessary and inappropriate. See id. (“[C]ommon-sense concepts are especially appropriate for consideration by a jury.”); see also, e.g., United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91, 101 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[T]he district court should not admit testimony that is directed solely to lay matters which a jury is capable of understanding and deciding without the expert’s help.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). To whatever extent the Court believes further emphasis on this point is helpful, it can give the jury appropriate and neutral instructions to guide its deliberations. What the defense cannot do is skew the jury’s deliberations by putting an expert imprimatur on testimony that states, in effect, that the jurors should second-guess their assessments of the evidence because they are subject to hindsight bias. This inversion of the courtroom roles—in which a party’s witness sits in judgment of the jurors—is prejudicial and usurps the function both of the jurors and of the Court in instructing the jury. See, e.g., Hygh, 961 F.2d at 364 (“Whereas an expert may be uniquely qualified by experience to assist the trier of fact, he is not qualified to compete with the judge in the function of instructing the jury.”).\n\nIf Dr. Dietz’s testimony on hindsight bias is helpful to the jury in this case, testimony of this sort would become central to the court system. Every single trial involves a retrospective adjudication. The bulk of trials—civil and criminal—involve an assessment of a party’s",
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      "content": "13",
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      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00006228",
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  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Dr. Dietz"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Lab. Corp. of Am.",
      "United States"
    ],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "11/08/21"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 424",
      "760 F.3d 1322",
      "273 F.3d 91",
      "961 F.2d",
      "DOJ-OGR-00006228"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text discusses the concept of hindsight bias and its relevance to expert testimony in a trial. The document is well-formatted and free of significant damage or redactions."
}