mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES003/DOJ-OGR-00006231.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "20 of 41",
    "document_number": "424",
    "date": "11/08/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 424 Filed 11/08/21 Page 20 of 41\n\nsubject were disbelieved. Her knowledge and intent are no different if she participated in the conspiracy due to the Halo effect or for some other reason.4 Dr. Dietz's opinions on this topic simply do not tend to negate any element or establish any defense.\n\nInstead of serving any proper purpose, the apparent intent behind offering Dr. Dietz's opinion on the “Halo effect” is to engender sympathy for the defendant. But juries are not “to act based on their . . . sympathy.” United States v. Stroming, 838 F. App'x 624, 627 (2d Cir. 2021) (summary order); see, e.g., United States v. Mustaga, 753 F. App'x 22, 37 (2d Cir. 2018) (summary order) (“The district court correctly recognized that evidence of solitary confinement could be used for the improper purpose of provoking juror sympathy.”). Any attempt to encourage such sympathy is therefore an attempt at nullification, which is itself plainly improper. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 615 (2d Cir. 1997) (Jury nullification is “by no means a right or something that a judge should encourage or permit if it is within his authority to prevent.”); id. at 614 (“We categorically reject the idea that, in a society committed to the rule of law, jury nullification is desirable or that courts may permit it to occur when it is within their authority to prevent.”); see also United States v. Washington, 705 F.2d 489, 494 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (“A jury has no more ‘right’ to find a ‘guilty’ defendant ‘not guilty’ than it has to find a ‘not guilty’ defendant ‘guilty,’ and the fact that the former cannot be corrected by a court, while the latter can be, does not create a right out of the power to misapply the law. Such verdicts are lawless, a denial of due process and constitute an exercise of erroneously seized power.”) (emphasis in original).\n\n4 Evidence of the defendant's motive may be relevant evidence proving the offense, but evidence that a “Halo effect” gave the defendant a motive to commit the crime has no relevance as defense evidence at trial.\n\n16\nDOJ-OGR-00006231",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 424 Filed 11/08/21 Page 20 of 41",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "subject were disbelieved. Her knowledge and intent are no different if she participated in the conspiracy due to the Halo effect or for some other reason.4 Dr. Dietz's opinions on this topic simply do not tend to negate any element or establish any defense.",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Instead of serving any proper purpose, the apparent intent behind offering Dr. Dietz's opinion on the “Halo effect” is to engender sympathy for the defendant. But juries are not “to act based on their . . . sympathy.” United States v. Stroming, 838 F. App'x 624, 627 (2d Cir. 2021) (summary order); see, e.g., United States v. Mustaga, 753 F. App'x 22, 37 (2d Cir. 2018) (summary order) (“The district court correctly recognized that evidence of solitary confinement could be used for the improper purpose of provoking juror sympathy.”). Any attempt to encourage such sympathy is therefore an attempt at nullification, which is itself plainly improper. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 615 (2d Cir. 1997) (Jury nullification is “by no means a right or something that a judge should encourage or permit if it is within his authority to prevent.”); id. at 614 (“We categorically reject the idea that, in a society committed to the rule of law, jury nullification is desirable or that courts may permit it to occur when it is within their authority to prevent.”); see also United States v. Washington, 705 F.2d 489, 494 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (“A jury has no more ‘right’ to find a ‘guilty’ defendant ‘not guilty’ than it has to find a ‘not guilty’ defendant ‘guilty,’ and the fact that the former cannot be corrected by a court, while the latter can be, does not create a right out of the power to misapply the law. Such verdicts are lawless, a denial of due process and constitute an exercise of erroneously seized power.”) (emphasis in original).",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "4 Evidence of the defendant's motive may be relevant evidence proving the offense, but evidence that a “Halo effect” gave the defendant a motive to commit the crime has no relevance as defense evidence at trial.",
      "position": "bottom"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "16",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00006231",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Dr. Dietz"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "D.C. Cir.",
      "2d Cir."
    ],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "11/08/21"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 424",
      "DOJ-OGR-00006231"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text discusses the concept of 'Halo effect' and its relevance to the case, as well as the issue of jury nullification. The document includes citations to various court cases and legal precedents."
}