mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES003/DOJ-OGR-00006235.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "24",
    "document_number": "424",
    "date": "11/08/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
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    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 424 Filed 11/08/21 Page 24 of 41\n\n91, 101 (2d Cir. 2001) (\"[T]he district court should not admit testimony that is directed solely to lay matters which a jury is capable of understanding and deciding without the expert's help.\" (internal quotation marks omitted)).\n\nEven as to the opinions that involve psychological conditions, Dr. Dietz's opinions are not helpful to the jury. While Dr. Dietz's descriptions of antisocial personality disorder, borderline personality disorder, histrionic personality disorder, psychotic disorders, delirium, dissociation, and intellectual disability at least involve Dr. Dietz's psychiatric training in some way (unlike pathways such as \"lying\"), it is hardly beyond the ken of juries to know that mental disorders or altered mental states may at times motivate people to dissemble or to believe things that are not true. Attempting to put the imprimatur of an expert on a variety of ways in which mental disorders can lead to unreliable testimony is simply an attempt to invade the province of the jury by putting a thumb on the scale in their assessment of witness credibility.7 See, e.g., Nimely, 414 F.3d at 398 (\"[E]xpert opinions that constitute evaluations of witness credibility, even when such evaluations are rooted in scientific or technical expertise, are inadmissible under Rule 702\"); United States v. Lumpkin, 192 F.3d 280, 289 (2d Cir. 1999) (barring expert from testifying as to scientific principle related to the assessment of witness credibility as impinging on jury's role).\n\nTo the extent Dr. Dietz's opinions include something outside the ken of the average jury—specifically, that these \"pathways\" purportedly occur frequently in sexual assault cases—they are\n\n7 Dr. Dietz should in any event not offer his opinions on false memory, which are apparently derivative of Dr. Loftus's. Given that the defense has noticed Dr. Loftus as a witness, if any false memory testimony is appropriate, it should come from Dr. Loftus, whose research it is based on, not from Dr. Dietz summarizing Dr. Loftus's research. The admissibility of Dr. Loftus's testimony on false memory is discussed in Section II, infra.\n\n20\n\nDOJ-OGR-00006235",
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      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 424 Filed 11/08/21 Page 24 of 41",
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      "type": "printed",
      "content": "91, 101 (2d Cir. 2001) (\"[T]he district court should not admit testimony that is directed solely to lay matters which a jury is capable of understanding and deciding without the expert's help.\" (internal quotation marks omitted)).",
      "position": "top"
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      "content": "Even as to the opinions that involve psychological conditions, Dr. Dietz's opinions are not helpful to the jury. While Dr. Dietz's descriptions of antisocial personality disorder, borderline personality disorder, histrionic personality disorder, psychotic disorders, delirium, dissociation, and intellectual disability at least involve Dr. Dietz's psychiatric training in some way (unlike pathways such as \"lying\"), it is hardly beyond the ken of juries to know that mental disorders or altered mental states may at times motivate people to dissemble or to believe things that are not true. Attempting to put the imprimatur of an expert on a variety of ways in which mental disorders can lead to unreliable testimony is simply an attempt to invade the province of the jury by putting a thumb on the scale in their assessment of witness credibility.7 See, e.g., Nimely, 414 F.3d at 398 (\"[E]xpert opinions that constitute evaluations of witness credibility, even when such evaluations are rooted in scientific or technical expertise, are inadmissible under Rule 702\"); United States v. Lumpkin, 192 F.3d 280, 289 (2d Cir. 1999) (barring expert from testifying as to scientific principle related to the assessment of witness credibility as impinging on jury's role).",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "To the extent Dr. Dietz's opinions include something outside the ken of the average jury—specifically, that these \"pathways\" purportedly occur frequently in sexual assault cases—they are",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "7 Dr. Dietz should in any event not offer his opinions on false memory, which are apparently derivative of Dr. Loftus's. Given that the defense has noticed Dr. Loftus as a witness, if any false memory testimony is appropriate, it should come from Dr. Loftus, whose research it is based on, not from Dr. Dietz summarizing Dr. Loftus's research. The admissibility of Dr. Loftus's testimony on false memory is discussed in Section II, infra.",
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      "content": "20",
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      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00006235",
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  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Dr. Dietz",
      "Dr. Loftus"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "United States"
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    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "11/08/21"
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    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 424",
      "DOJ-OGR-00006235"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case, discussing the admissibility of expert testimony. The text is mostly printed, with no visible handwriting or stamps. The document is well-formatted and legible."
}