mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES003/DOJ-OGR-00006251.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "40 of 41",
    "document_number": "424",
    "date": "11/08/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
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    "has_stamps": false
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  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 424 Filed 11/08/21 Page 40 of 41\ndoes not share the defense's view of the law, to the extent the Court accepts that view, Dr. Loftus and Dr. Dietz should be excluded as well.\n\nThis point is valid in a number of respects, but three in particular bear noting. First, the defense criticizes Dr. Rocchio in the strongest terms for opining about principles that “have no associated error rate.” (Def. Mot. 3 at 1, 7, 8, 12, 15; see Ex. A at 3-4). Neither Dr. Loftus nor Dr. Dietz identify an error rate for a single one of their opinions, much less all of them. Second, the defense argues that Dr. Rocchio’s opinions cannot be reliably applied by a jury because she describes phenomena that occur reliably in her practice and the literature, but she does not specify how often. (Def. Mot. 3 at 7–8, 10, 16 (“Rocchio claims grooming ‘often’ or ‘frequently occurs’ without providing the jury any explanation of how to decide whether grooming actually occurred in this case.”)). The same could be said for Dr. Loftus and Dr. Dietz. (See Ex. A at 1 (“[Dr. Loftus] will describe scientific research showing that false memories can be described with confidence, detail, and emotion, just like true memories.”) (emphasis added)); id. at 7 (“False allegations of sexual assault do occur . . . .”)). Third, the defense argues that Dr. Rocchio’s opinion that “memory and disclosure of traumatic and abusive events is impacted by a number of factors, including the circumstances surrounding the trauma,” is “so generic as to be meaningless.” (Def. Mot. 3 at 17). That opinion is no more generic than the opinion that false memories can be “created as a result of post-event information and occurrences, suggestion, influence, or the like.” (Ex. A at 2).\n\nIn the Government’s view, the defense’s view in its Daubert motion is unnecessarily cramped, and each expert opinion’s reliability can be tested individually. But given the defense’s view of Daubert and its progeny, if Dr. Rocchio’s opinions are excluded based on the defense’s arguments, Dr. Loftus and Dr. Dietz should be excluded as well.\n\n36\nDOJ-OGR-00006251",
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      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 424 Filed 11/08/21 Page 40 of 41",
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      "type": "printed",
      "content": "does not share the defense's view of the law, to the extent the Court accepts that view, Dr. Loftus and Dr. Dietz should be excluded as well.\n\nThis point is valid in a number of respects, but three in particular bear noting. First, the defense criticizes Dr. Rocchio in the strongest terms for opining about principles that “have no associated error rate.” (Def. Mot. 3 at 1, 7, 8, 12, 15; see Ex. A at 3-4). Neither Dr. Loftus nor Dr. Dietz identify an error rate for a single one of their opinions, much less all of them. Second, the defense argues that Dr. Rocchio’s opinions cannot be reliably applied by a jury because she describes phenomena that occur reliably in her practice and the literature, but she does not specify how often. (Def. Mot. 3 at 7–8, 10, 16 (“Rocchio claims grooming ‘often’ or ‘frequently occurs’ without providing the jury any explanation of how to decide whether grooming actually occurred in this case.”)). The same could be said for Dr. Loftus and Dr. Dietz. (See Ex. A at 1 (“[Dr. Loftus] will describe scientific research showing that false memories can be described with confidence, detail, and emotion, just like true memories.”) (emphasis added)); id. at 7 (“False allegations of sexual assault do occur . . . .”)). Third, the defense argues that Dr. Rocchio’s opinion that “memory and disclosure of traumatic and abusive events is impacted by a number of factors, including the circumstances surrounding the trauma,” is “so generic as to be meaningless.” (Def. Mot. 3 at 17). That opinion is no more generic than the opinion that false memories can be “created as a result of post-event information and occurrences, suggestion, influence, or the like.” (Ex. A at 2).\n\nIn the Government’s view, the defense’s view in its Daubert motion is unnecessarily cramped, and each expert opinion’s reliability can be tested individually. But given the defense’s view of Daubert and its progeny, if Dr. Rocchio’s opinions are excluded based on the defense’s arguments, Dr. Loftus and Dr. Dietz should be excluded as well.",
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      "content": "36",
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      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00006251",
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  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Dr. Loftus",
      "Dr. Dietz",
      "Dr. Rocchio"
    ],
    "organizations": [],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "11/08/21"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 424",
      "DOJ-OGR-00006251"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing discussing the admissibility of expert testimony in a criminal case. The text is well-formatted and legible, with no apparent redactions or damage."
}