mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES003/DOJ-OGR-00006411.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "51",
    "document_number": "438",
    "date": "11/12/21",
    "document_type": "Court Document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 438 Filed 11/12/21 Page 51 of 54\n\nAccordingly, the Court should require the defense to make an offer of proof before permitting any questioning or argument alleging that the defendant is a victim of abuse by Epstein—or anyone else, for that matter.\n\nEven if the defendant had a good-faith basis for such evidence or argument, the Court would still need to assess its relevance and conduct the balancing required by Federal Rule of Evidence 403. Evidence of this sort may well be irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. It is entirely possible for someone to be both a victim and co-conspirator of Epstein; indeed, it is not unusual for individuals who engage in sex trafficking to have co-conspirators who are also victims. To complete the offenses charged in the Indictment, the defendant needs to intend the transportation, enticement, or trafficking of Minor Victims, or agree to do so. Accordingly, any victimization—if it occurred—would not necessarily exculpate her or negate her mens rea. And only certain limited evidence would be sufficient to provide a foundation for a duress or coercion defense. See United States v. Zayac, 765 F.3d 112, 120 (2d Cir. 2014) (“The affirmative defense of duress excuses criminal conduct committed under circumstances from which a jury may infer that the defendant's hand was guided not by evil intent, but by the imminent threat of grievous bodily harm.”).\n\nEven if such alleged victimization were probative in some way on an issue at trial, there is significant risk that such evidence would be highly prejudicial to the Government and confusing to the jury. It would primarily serve to invite the jury to feel sympathy for the defendant, providing an unlawful basis for jury nullification. At best, it would confuse the jury\n\n50\n\nDOJ-OGR-00006411",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 438 Filed 11/12/21 Page 51 of 54",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Accordingly, the Court should require the defense to make an offer of proof before permitting any questioning or argument alleging that the defendant is a victim of abuse by Epstein—or anyone else, for that matter.",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Even if the defendant had a good-faith basis for such evidence or argument, the Court would still need to assess its relevance and conduct the balancing required by Federal Rule of Evidence 403. Evidence of this sort may well be irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. It is entirely possible for someone to be both a victim and co-conspirator of Epstein; indeed, it is not unusual for individuals who engage in sex trafficking to have co-conspirators who are also victims. To complete the offenses charged in the Indictment, the defendant needs to intend the transportation, enticement, or trafficking of Minor Victims, or agree to do so. Accordingly, any victimization—if it occurred—would not necessarily exculpate her or negate her mens rea. And only certain limited evidence would be sufficient to provide a foundation for a duress or coercion defense. See United States v. Zayac, 765 F.3d 112, 120 (2d Cir. 2014) (“The affirmative defense of duress excuses criminal conduct committed under circumstances from which a jury may infer that the defendant's hand was guided not by evil intent, but by the imminent threat of grievous bodily harm.”).",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Even if such alleged victimization were probative in some way on an issue at trial, there is significant risk that such evidence would be highly prejudicial to the Government and confusing to the jury. It would primarily serve to invite the jury to feel sympathy for the defendant, providing an unlawful basis for jury nullification. At best, it would confuse the jury",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "50",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00006411",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Epstein",
      "Zayac"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Government"
    ],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "11/12/21",
      "2014"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 438",
      "765 F.3d 112",
      "DOJ-OGR-00006411"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case involving sex trafficking and the defendant being a victim of abuse by Epstein. The text discusses the relevance and admissibility of evidence related to the defendant's alleged victimization."
}