mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES003/DOJ-OGR-00007474.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "9",
    "document_number": "499",
    "date": "11/23/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 499 Filed 11/23/21 Page 9 of 28\n\nintent to Ms. Maxwell. Cf. Fed. R. Evid. 704 (“In a criminal case, an expert witness must not state an opinion about whether the defendant did or did not have a mental state or condition that constitutes an element of the crime charged or of a defense.”). Those are questions for the jury. Id. But the very purpose of Dr. Dietz’s testimony on this point is to caution the jury about improperly inferring motive and intent from Dr. Rocchio’s unreliable opinions because, as even Dr. Rocchio recognized in her testimony, behavior cannot be called “grooming” if it is not in furtherance of “attempted sexual abuse or actual sexual abuse or exploitation.” Ex. 2, p 118:22-14.\n\nAccordingly, if Dr. Dietz’s opinions about Dr. Rocchio’s conclusions are reliable—as the government does not dispute they are—“Daubert neither requires nor empowers trial courts to determine which of several competing scientific theories has the best provenance.” Fed. R. Evid. 702, Advisory Committee Notes, 2000 Amendments (quoting Ruiz-Troche v. Pepsi Cola, 161 F.3d 77, 85 (1st Cir. 1998)). A court must admit competing expert opinions that are reliable and relevant, and then it’s for the jury to decide which expert is correct. Id. (“[P]roponents ‘do not have to demonstrate to the judge by a preponderance of the evidence that the assessments of their experts are correct, they only have to demonstrate by a preponderance of evidence that their opinions are reliable. . . . The evidentiary requirement of reliability is lower than the merits standard of correctness’” (quoting In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation, 35 F.3d 717, 744 (3d Cir. 1994))).\n\nAs for informing the jury that “Dr. Rocchio’s proposed testimony is silent as to whether she is expected to impute a theory of ‘grooming-by-proxy’ to the defendant”2 and that “Ms.\n\n2 It’s not clear that Dr. Rocchio will be permitted to testify on this subject, as this Court has precluded her from opining that the presence of a third party can facilitate grooming. (Dkt.",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 499 Filed 11/23/21 Page 9 of 28",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "intent to Ms. Maxwell. Cf. Fed. R. Evid. 704 (“In a criminal case, an expert witness must not state an opinion about whether the defendant did or did not have a mental state or condition that constitutes an element of the crime charged or of a defense.”). Those are questions for the jury. Id. But the very purpose of Dr. Dietz’s testimony on this point is to caution the jury about improperly inferring motive and intent from Dr. Rocchio’s unreliable opinions because, as even Dr. Rocchio recognized in her testimony, behavior cannot be called “grooming” if it is not in furtherance of “attempted sexual abuse or actual sexual abuse or exploitation.” Ex. 2, p 118:22-14.",
      "position": "body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Accordingly, if Dr. Dietz’s opinions about Dr. Rocchio’s conclusions are reliable—as the government does not dispute they are—“Daubert neither requires nor empowers trial courts to determine which of several competing scientific theories has the best provenance.” Fed. R. Evid. 702, Advisory Committee Notes, 2000 Amendments (quoting Ruiz-Troche v. Pepsi Cola, 161 F.3d 77, 85 (1st Cir. 1998)). A court must admit competing expert opinions that are reliable and relevant, and then it’s for the jury to decide which expert is correct. Id. (“[P]roponents ‘do not have to demonstrate to the judge by a preponderance of the evidence that the assessments of their experts are correct, they only have to demonstrate by a preponderance of evidence that their opinions are reliable. . . . The evidentiary requirement of reliability is lower than the merits standard of correctness’” (quoting In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation, 35 F.3d 717, 744 (3d Cir. 1994))).",
      "position": "body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "As for informing the jury that “Dr. Rocchio’s proposed testimony is silent as to whether she is expected to impute a theory of ‘grooming-by-proxy’ to the defendant”2 and that “Ms.",
      "position": "body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "2 It’s not clear that Dr. Rocchio will be permitted to testify on this subject, as this Court has precluded her from opining that the presence of a third party can facilitate grooming. (Dkt.",
      "position": "footnote"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Ms. Maxwell",
      "Dr. Dietz",
      "Dr. Rocchio"
    ],
    "organizations": [],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "11/23/21"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 499",
      "Ex. 2",
      "Dkt."
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text discusses expert testimony and the admissibility of certain opinions. There are no visible stamps or handwritten text."
}