mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES003/DOJ-OGR-00007483.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "18",
    "document_number": "499",
    "date": "11/23/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
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  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 499 Filed 11/23/21 Page 18 of 28\n\npatients were telling the truth without evaluating, for example, “the changes in the core details of the allegations” of her patients, which is something “professionals” in the field do. Ex. 1, p 10.\n\nIf, however, Dr. Rocchio testifies that she does not merely assume alleged victims are telling the truth (as when, for example, Dr. Rocchio is acting in a forensic rather than clinical capacity, see Ex. 2, p 39-40), and that her expert opinions are based on a rigorous inquiry into the veracity the claims, Dr. Dietz’s opinions are still reliable and admissible. He can testify, for example, that because the literature does not support the hypothesis that emotional distress (e.g., crying) is predictive of truthfulness, Ex. 1, p 11, Dr. Rocchio is wrong to base her opinions about her patients on such conduct.\n\nFor another thing, Dr. Dietz does not propose to tell the jury who is telling the truth and who is not telling the truth. Thus, to use this Court’s words,\n\nDr. [Dietz’s] testimony is appropriate because [ ]he does not testify as to any specific witness’s credibility. See, e.g., Torres, No. 20-CR-608 (DLC), 2021 WL 1947503, at *7; Johnson, 860 F.3d at 1140 (8th Cir. 2017) (explaining that an expert may testify “regarding the general characteristics that sexually abused children exhibit” but may not usurp the jury’s role of assessing the credibility of any specific victim); United States v. Telles, 6 F.4th 1086, 1097–98 (9th Cir. 2021) (same).\n\n(Dkt. 435, p 5).\n\nThe government is wrong to rely on United States v. Lumpkin (distinguishable on other grounds in any event), in which the Court affirmed the district court’s decision to exclude “testimony on witness confidence in identifications.” 192 F.3d 280, 289 (2d Cir. 1999). Mot. at 22. Not only did Lumpkin concern eyewitness identification (a concept far afield from the testimony at issue here), but the expert witness there proposed to evaluate the credibility of witnesses who made the identification of the defendant. Dr. Dietz does not propose to testify to the credibility of accusers in this case.\n\n14\n\nDOJ-OGR-00007483",
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      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 499 Filed 11/23/21 Page 18 of 28",
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      "content": "patients were telling the truth without evaluating, for example, “the changes in the core details of the allegations” of her patients, which is something “professionals” in the field do. Ex. 1, p 10.\n\nIf, however, Dr. Rocchio testifies that she does not merely assume alleged victims are telling the truth (as when, for example, Dr. Rocchio is acting in a forensic rather than clinical capacity, see Ex. 2, p 39-40), and that her expert opinions are based on a rigorous inquiry into the veracity the claims, Dr. Dietz’s opinions are still reliable and admissible. He can testify, for example, that because the literature does not support the hypothesis that emotional distress (e.g., crying) is predictive of truthfulness, Ex. 1, p 11, Dr. Rocchio is wrong to base her opinions about her patients on such conduct.\n\nFor another thing, Dr. Dietz does not propose to tell the jury who is telling the truth and who is not telling the truth. Thus, to use this Court’s words,\n\nDr. [Dietz’s] testimony is appropriate because [ ]he does not testify as to any specific witness’s credibility. See, e.g., Torres, No. 20-CR-608 (DLC), 2021 WL 1947503, at *7; Johnson, 860 F.3d at 1140 (8th Cir. 2017) (explaining that an expert may testify “regarding the general characteristics that sexually abused children exhibit” but may not usurp the jury’s role of assessing the credibility of any specific victim); United States v. Telles, 6 F.4th 1086, 1097–98 (9th Cir. 2021) (same).\n\n(Dkt. 435, p 5).\n\nThe government is wrong to rely on United States v. Lumpkin (distinguishable on other grounds in any event), in which the Court affirmed the district court’s decision to exclude “testimony on witness confidence in identifications.” 192 F.3d 280, 289 (2d Cir. 1999). Mot. at 22. Not only did Lumpkin concern eyewitness identification (a concept far afield from the testimony at issue here), but the expert witness there proposed to evaluate the credibility of witnesses who made the identification of the defendant. Dr. Dietz does not propose to testify to the credibility of accusers in this case.",
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      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00007483",
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  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Dr. Rocchio",
      "Dr. Dietz"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Court",
      "Department of Justice"
    ],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "11/23/21",
      "2021"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 499",
      "Ex. 1",
      "Ex. 2",
      "Dkt. 435",
      "No. 20-CR-608 (DLC)",
      "DOJ-OGR-00007483"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case, discussing the admissibility of expert testimony. The text is well-formatted and legible, with no apparent redactions or damage."
}