mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES003/DOJ-OGR-00008046.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "5",
    "document_number": "507",
    "date": "11/24/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
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  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 507 Filed 11/24/21 Page 5 of 28\nCr. 68 (KBF), 2015 WL 413318, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2015), aff'd, Ulbricht, 858 F.3d 71. A district court has \"broad discretion\" over the remedy for failure to comply with Rule 16, including \"ordering the exclusion of evidence.\" Ulbricht, 858 F.3d at 115 (internal quotation marks omitted).\nAs the Court is well aware, a properly noticed expert witness may then testify if such testimony complies with Federal Rule of Evidence 702. Accordingly, before admitting expert testimony, the Court must conclude that (1) the witness is qualified to be an expert, (2) the proposed expert testimony is reliable, and (3) the proposed testimony is relevant. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993); Nimely v. City of New York, 414 F.3d 381, 396 n.11 (2d Cir. 2005). \"Expert testimony which does not relate to any issue in the case is not relevant and, ergo, non-helpful.\" Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591 (internal quotation marks omitted). The party that proffers the testimony bears the burden of showing that it is admissible by a preponderance of the evidence. See id. at 592 & n.10 (citing Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175-76 (1987)).\nRules 401 and 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence state that relevant evidence is admissible when it tends to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence more or less probable than it would be without the evidence, but it may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by, among other things, the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, and misleading the jury. \"Expert evidence can be both powerful and quite misleading because of the difficulty in evaluating it. Because of this risk, the judge in weighing possible prejudice against probative force under Rule 403 . . . exercises more control over experts than over lay witnesses.\" Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595 (quoting authority omitted). Among other things, the\n3\nDOJ-OGR-00008046",
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      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 507 Filed 11/24/21 Page 5 of 28",
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      "content": "Cr. 68 (KBF), 2015 WL 413318, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2015), aff'd, Ulbricht, 858 F.3d 71. A district court has \"broad discretion\" over the remedy for failure to comply with Rule 16, including \"ordering the exclusion of evidence.\" Ulbricht, 858 F.3d at 115 (internal quotation marks omitted).\nAs the Court is well aware, a properly noticed expert witness may then testify if such testimony complies with Federal Rule of Evidence 702. Accordingly, before admitting expert testimony, the Court must conclude that (1) the witness is qualified to be an expert, (2) the proposed expert testimony is reliable, and (3) the proposed testimony is relevant. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993); Nimely v. City of New York, 414 F.3d 381, 396 n.11 (2d Cir. 2005). \"Expert testimony which does not relate to any issue in the case is not relevant and, ergo, non-helpful.\" Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591 (internal quotation marks omitted). The party that proffers the testimony bears the burden of showing that it is admissible by a preponderance of the evidence. See id. at 592 & n.10 (citing Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175-76 (1987)).\nRules 401 and 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence state that relevant evidence is admissible when it tends to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence more or less probable than it would be without the evidence, but it may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by, among other things, the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, and misleading the jury. \"Expert evidence can be both powerful and quite misleading because of the difficulty in evaluating it. Because of this risk, the judge in weighing possible prejudice against probative force under Rule 403 . . . exercises more control over experts than over lay witnesses.\" Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595 (quoting authority omitted). Among other things, the",
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  "entities": {
    "people": [],
    "organizations": [
      "Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.",
      "City of New York",
      "United States"
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    "locations": [
      "S.D.N.Y."
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    "dates": [
      "Feb. 1, 2015",
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      "11/24/21"
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    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 507",
      "Cr. 68 (KBF)",
      "2015 WL 413318",
      "858 F.3d 71",
      "858 F.3d at 115",
      "509 U.S. 579",
      "414 F.3d 381",
      "483 U.S. 171",
      "DOJ-OGR-00008046"
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  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text is well-formatted and printed, with no visible handwriting or stamps. The content discusses the rules of evidence and expert testimony."
}