mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES003/DOJ-OGR-00008103.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "18 of 25",
    "document_number": "508",
    "date": "11/24/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 508 Filed 11/24/21 Page 18 of 25\n\n3. Dr. Hall's opinions are not unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403.\nThe government's Rule 403 argument is easily resolved. As the government well knows—and as it likes regularly to remind criminal defendants—just because evidence is prejudicial to a case or defense does not mean it is unfairly prejudicial. United States v. Schaffer, 851 F.3d 166, 182 (2d Cir. 2017) (“[T]he fact that evidence ‘may be highly prejudicial’ does not necessarily mean that it is ‘unfairly prejudicial.’”). There is significant probative value to Dr. Hall's opinions. And the risk of unfair prejudice is minimal, and certainly not enough to substantially outweigh the probative value of the opinions. Robinson, 583 F.3d at 1275 (“The probative value [of mental health condition evidence] was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.”). Dr. Hall will not engage in name-calling or shaming, and neither will Ms. Maxwell. “This is not a case in which a party attempts to unfairly malign a witness for distant and relatively minor mental health issues” or unrelated and irrelevant drug use. See id. If the Court is concerned about any unfair prejudice, that concern can be addressed with a limiting instruction.\n\n4. Rule 703 does not bar Dr. Hall from testifying.\nThe government makes a last-ditch effort to preclude Dr. Hall from testifying by invoking Rule 703. That Rule recognizes the reality that expert witnesses form their opinions in reliance on evidence that might not itself be independently admissible—e.g., hearsay. Here, however, Rule 703 poses no barrier to Dr. Hall's testimony, because the bases of his opinion are independently admissible and, even if they weren't, their probative value substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.\nFederal Rule of Evidence 703 says:\nAn expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has been made aware of or personally observed. If experts in the particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject,\n14\nDOJ-OGR-00008103",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 508 Filed 11/24/21 Page 18 of 25",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "3. Dr. Hall's opinions are not unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403.",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The government's Rule 403 argument is easily resolved. As the government well knows—and as it likes regularly to remind criminal defendants—just because evidence is prejudicial to a case or defense does not mean it is unfairly prejudicial. United States v. Schaffer, 851 F.3d 166, 182 (2d Cir. 2017) (“[T]he fact that evidence ‘may be highly prejudicial’ does not necessarily mean that it is ‘unfairly prejudicial.’”). There is significant probative value to Dr. Hall's opinions. And the risk of unfair prejudice is minimal, and certainly not enough to substantially outweigh the probative value of the opinions. Robinson, 583 F.3d at 1275 (“The probative value [of mental health condition evidence] was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.”). Dr. Hall will not engage in name-calling or shaming, and neither will Ms. Maxwell. “This is not a case in which a party attempts to unfairly malign a witness for distant and relatively minor mental health issues” or unrelated and irrelevant drug use. See id. If the Court is concerned about any unfair prejudice, that concern can be addressed with a limiting instruction.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "4. Rule 703 does not bar Dr. Hall from testifying.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The government makes a last-ditch effort to preclude Dr. Hall from testifying by invoking Rule 703. That Rule recognizes the reality that expert witnesses form their opinions in reliance on evidence that might not itself be independently admissible—e.g., hearsay. Here, however, Rule 703 poses no barrier to Dr. Hall's testimony, because the bases of his opinion are independently admissible and, even if they weren't, their probative value substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Federal Rule of Evidence 703 says:\nAn expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has been made aware of or personally observed. If experts in the particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject,",
      "position": "bottom"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "14",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00008103",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Dr. Hall",
      "Ms. Maxwell"
    ],
    "organizations": [],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "11/24/21"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 508",
      "DOJ-OGR-00008103"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case, discussing the admissibility of expert testimony under Rules 403 and 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence."
}