mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES003/DOJ-OGR-00008198.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "5",
    "document_number": "518",
    "date": "November 30, 2021",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 518 Filed 11/30/21 Page 5 of 8\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nNovember 30, 2021\nPage 5\nCriminal Procedure, and nothing in any of them suggests that impeachment evidence is discoverable.\nBecause Ms. Maxwell offered the photograph while cross-examining Jane during the government's case-in-chief and not as \"evidence in chief\" during her own \"case-in-chief,\" Moore, 208 F.3d at 579, she did not violate Rule 16, and there is no basis to preclude her from admitting the photograph into evidence.\nBut even if the government's reading of Rule 16(b)(1)(A) were right (which it isn't), and even if Ms. Maxwell had violated Rule 16 (which she didn't), exclusion would still not be the proper remedy. \"If a party fails to comply with [Rule 16], the court may: (A) order that party to permit the discovery or inspection; specify its time, place, and manner; and prescribe other just terms and conditions; (B) grant a continuance; (C) prohibit that party from introducing the undisclosed evidence; or (D) enter any other order that is just under the circumstances.\" Fed. R. 16(d)(2)(A)-(D). Prohibiting a party from introducing the evidence is the most extreme sanction available, and it requires proof that the belated disclosure prejudiced the government. See United States v. Monsanto Lopez, 798 F. App'x 688, 690 (2d Cir. 2020); see also Passlogix, Inc. v. 2FA Tech., LLC, 708 F. Supp. 2d 378, 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (\"Preclusion is a harsh sanction preserved for exceptional cases where a . . . party's failure to provide the requested discovery results in prejudice to the requesting party.\").2\n2 It is well-settled that \"[t]o exclude evidence on the grounds of a discovery violation, a criminal defendant must show prejudice resulting from the government's untimely disclosure of evidence. . . .\" United States v. Cantoni, No. 18-CR-562 (ENV), 2019 WL 1264899, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2019) (quotation omitted). Considering that the constitution imposes the burden of proof in a criminal trial on the government, surely the same rule applies when the shoe is (allegedly) on the other foot.\nDOJ-OGR-00008198",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 518 Filed 11/30/21 Page 5 of 8",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nNovember 30, 2021\nPage 5",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Criminal Procedure, and nothing in any of them suggests that impeachment evidence is discoverable.",
      "position": "body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Because Ms. Maxwell offered the photograph while cross-examining Jane during the government's case-in-chief and not as \"evidence in chief\" during her own \"case-in-chief,\" Moore, 208 F.3d at 579, she did not violate Rule 16, and there is no basis to preclude her from admitting the photograph into evidence.",
      "position": "body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "But even if the government's reading of Rule 16(b)(1)(A) were right (which it isn't), and even if Ms. Maxwell had violated Rule 16 (which she didn't), exclusion would still not be the proper remedy. \"If a party fails to comply with [Rule 16], the court may: (A) order that party to permit the discovery or inspection; specify its time, place, and manner; and prescribe other just terms and conditions; (B) grant a continuance; (C) prohibit that party from introducing the undisclosed evidence; or (D) enter any other order that is just under the circumstances.\" Fed. R. 16(d)(2)(A)-(D). Prohibiting a party from introducing the evidence is the most extreme sanction available, and it requires proof that the belated disclosure prejudiced the government. See United States v. Monsanto Lopez, 798 F. App'x 688, 690 (2d Cir. 2020); see also Passlogix, Inc. v. 2FA Tech., LLC, 708 F. Supp. 2d 378, 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (\"Preclusion is a harsh sanction preserved for exceptional cases where a . . . party's failure to provide the requested discovery results in prejudice to the requesting party.\").2",
      "position": "body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "2 It is well-settled that \"[t]o exclude evidence on the grounds of a discovery violation, a criminal defendant must show prejudice resulting from the government's untimely disclosure of evidence. . . .\" United States v. Cantoni, No. 18-CR-562 (ENV), 2019 WL 1264899, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2019) (quotation omitted). Considering that the constitution imposes the burden of proof in a criminal trial on the government, surely the same rule applies when the shoe is (allegedly) on the other foot.",
      "position": "footnote"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00008198",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Alison J. Nathan",
      "Ms. Maxwell",
      "Jane"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "DOJ"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "S.D.N.Y.",
      "E.D.N.Y."
    ],
    "dates": [
      "November 30, 2021",
      "Mar. 19, 2019"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 518",
      "Rule 16",
      "18-CR-562 (ENV)",
      "DOJ-OGR-00008198"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes. The document is page 5 of an 8-page document."
}