DOJ-OGR-00008240.json 5.4 KB

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  1. {
  2. "document_metadata": {
  3. "page_number": "4",
  4. "document_number": "528",
  5. "date": "12/06/21",
  6. "document_type": "court document",
  7. "has_handwriting": false,
  8. "has_stamps": false
  9. },
  10. "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 528 Filed 12/06/21 Page 4 of 8\n\nkept confidential because it was information the Government “would want to know” and “Jane would want the government to know,” (Def. Letter at 2); and (2) any privilege was waived when the statement was disclosed to the Government. These arguments lack merit. The first suggests a limitation on the privilege that would swallow its protections. The second errs because Glassman could not waive the privilege. And in any event, the probative value of this testimony is so slight that it should be excluded under Rule 403.\n\nFirst, the defense argues that the advice was not intended to be kept confidential because “Jane’s motive for cooperating with the government and testifying against Ms. Maxwell is essential to the government’s assessment of Jane’s credibility and its preparation for her cross-examination.” (Def. Letter at 3). This theory suggests that anything which would be essential to the Government’s assessment of a witness’ credibility and preparation for cross-examination cannot be kept confidential, and so is not privileged. Such a rule is not the law. If it were, it would effectuate a subject-matter waiver about innumerable topics, to the great detriment of the attorney-client relationship. The Government and the defense would be entitled to invade that relationship to learn about the client’s discussions on topics that go to bias, motive, or other items material to a case. For instance, the Government frequently calls witnesses testifying pursuant to a cooperation agreement. Once the cooperation agreement is signed, the Government could not—and would not—ask the cooperator for a proffer of their conversations with their counsel about their motives to testify. See 12/01/21 Tr. at 567 (“THE COURT: The attorney’s advice to the client about whether they should take a plea and what assistance that might get them and all of that obviously is privileged.”). Or, for instance, the Government sometimes immunizes witnesses and calls them to testify. The Government could not—and would not—ask the immunized witnesses",
  11. "text_blocks": [
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  13. "type": "printed",
  14. "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 528 Filed 12/06/21 Page 4 of 8",
  15. "position": "header"
  16. },
  17. {
  18. "type": "printed",
  19. "content": "kept confidential because it was information the Government “would want to know” and “Jane would want the government to know,” (Def. Letter at 2); and (2) any privilege was waived when the statement was disclosed to the Government. These arguments lack merit. The first suggests a limitation on the privilege that would swallow its protections. The second errs because Glassman could not waive the privilege. And in any event, the probative value of this testimony is so slight that it should be excluded under Rule 403.",
  20. "position": "body"
  21. },
  22. {
  23. "type": "printed",
  24. "content": "First, the defense argues that the advice was not intended to be kept confidential because “Jane’s motive for cooperating with the government and testifying against Ms. Maxwell is essential to the government’s assessment of Jane’s credibility and its preparation for her cross-examination.” (Def. Letter at 3). This theory suggests that anything which would be essential to the Government’s assessment of a witness’ credibility and preparation for cross-examination cannot be kept confidential, and so is not privileged. Such a rule is not the law. If it were, it would effectuate a subject-matter waiver about innumerable topics, to the great detriment of the attorney-client relationship. The Government and the defense would be entitled to invade that relationship to learn about the client’s discussions on topics that go to bias, motive, or other items material to a case. For instance, the Government frequently calls witnesses testifying pursuant to a cooperation agreement. Once the cooperation agreement is signed, the Government could not—and would not—ask the cooperator for a proffer of their conversations with their counsel about their motives to testify. See 12/01/21 Tr. at 567 (“THE COURT: The attorney’s advice to the client about whether they should take a plea and what assistance that might get them and all of that obviously is privileged.”). Or, for instance, the Government sometimes immunizes witnesses and calls them to testify. The Government could not—and would not—ask the immunized witnesses",
  25. "position": "body"
  26. },
  27. {
  28. "type": "printed",
  29. "content": "4",
  30. "position": "footer"
  31. },
  32. {
  33. "type": "printed",
  34. "content": "DOJ-OGR-00008240",
  35. "position": "footer"
  36. }
  37. ],
  38. "entities": {
  39. "people": [
  40. "Jane",
  41. "Ms. Maxwell",
  42. "Glassman"
  43. ],
  44. "organizations": [
  45. "Government"
  46. ],
  47. "locations": [],
  48. "dates": [
  49. "12/06/21",
  50. "12/01/21"
  51. ],
  52. "reference_numbers": [
  53. "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
  54. "Document 528",
  55. "Rule 403"
  56. ]
  57. },
  58. "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text discusses the attorney-client privilege and its application to a specific case. The document is well-formatted and free of significant damage or redactions."
  59. }