mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES003/DOJ-OGR-00008241.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "5",
    "document_number": "528",
    "date": "12/06/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 528 Filed 12/06/21 Page 5 of 8\nto divulge their conversations with counsel about how significant their attorneys assess the benefits of immunity to be.\nIn such cases, it is not that these issues are irrelevant to the Government or to the defense. They are highly relevant. But the attorney-client communications are privileged, and the attorney's advice is not presumptively expected to be shared with the Government because the witness will testify for the Government. Instead, the client makes factual statements about the issue—not about the attorney-client communications—which the Government turns over to the defense. See, e.g., In re General Motors LLC Ignition Switch Litig., 80 F. Supp. 3d 521, 528 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“It is well established, however, that the attorney-client privilege protects communications rather than information.”). The fact that “certain information might later be disclosed to others does not, by itself, create the factual inference that the communications were not intended to be confidential at the time they were made.” Id. at 529 (emphasis in original, internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, it would have been improper for the Government to ask Jane how Glassman had advised her regarding her decision whether to assist the Government.2\nSecond, Glassman did not waive any privilege over Jane's communications with him through his comments to the Government. The reason is that Jane, not Glassman, was holder of the privilege, and it was not Glassman's to waive. See In re von Bulow, 828 F.2d at 100. And\n2 United States v. Bergonzi, 216 F.R.D. 487 (N.D. Cal. 2003), on which the defendant relies (Def. Letter at 3), is inapposite. In that case, a company agreed to turn over certain documents to the Government “before the documents had been prepared.” Id. at 493. Accordingly, the company could not assert privilege over the documents, because they were made “for the purpose of relaying communication to a third party.” Id. There is no reason to believe that Glassman's legal advice to Jane was made with the intent to turn over that legal advice to the Government.\n5\nDOJ-OGR-00008241",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 528 Filed 12/06/21 Page 5 of 8",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "to divulge their conversations with counsel about how significant their attorneys assess the benefits of immunity to be.\nIn such cases, it is not that these issues are irrelevant to the Government or to the defense. They are highly relevant. But the attorney-client communications are privileged, and the attorney's advice is not presumptively expected to be shared with the Government because the witness will testify for the Government. Instead, the client makes factual statements about the issue—not about the attorney-client communications—which the Government turns over to the defense. See, e.g., In re General Motors LLC Ignition Switch Litig., 80 F. Supp. 3d 521, 528 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“It is well established, however, that the attorney-client privilege protects communications rather than information.”). The fact that “certain information might later be disclosed to others does not, by itself, create the factual inference that the communications were not intended to be confidential at the time they were made.” Id. at 529 (emphasis in original, internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, it would have been improper for the Government to ask Jane how Glassman had advised her regarding her decision whether to assist the Government.2",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Second, Glassman did not waive any privilege over Jane's communications with him through his comments to the Government. The reason is that Jane, not Glassman, was holder of the privilege, and it was not Glassman's to waive. See In re von Bulow, 828 F.2d at 100. And",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "2 United States v. Bergonzi, 216 F.R.D. 487 (N.D. Cal. 2003), on which the defendant relies (Def. Letter at 3), is inapposite. In that case, a company agreed to turn over certain documents to the Government “before the documents had been prepared.” Id. at 493. Accordingly, the company could not assert privilege over the documents, because they were made “for the purpose of relaying communication to a third party.” Id. There is no reason to believe that Glassman's legal advice to Jane was made with the intent to turn over that legal advice to the Government.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "5",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00008241",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Jane",
      "Glassman"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Government"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "S.D.N.Y.",
      "N.D. Cal."
    ],
    "dates": [
      "12/06/21",
      "2015",
      "2003"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 528",
      "80 F. Supp. 3d 521",
      "216 F.R.D. 487",
      "828 F.2d",
      "DOJ-OGR-00008241"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text discusses attorney-client privilege and the waiver of privilege. The document is well-formatted and free of significant damage or redactions."
}