DOJ-OGR-00008274.json 5.2 KB

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  1. {
  2. "document_metadata": {
  3. "page_number": "2",
  4. "document_number": "533",
  5. "date": "12/09/21",
  6. "document_type": "court document",
  7. "has_handwriting": false,
  8. "has_stamps": false
  9. },
  10. "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 533 Filed 12/09/21 Page 2 of 8\nof Government Exhibit 52, under Rule 902. For the reasons set forth below, the record at trial establishes that Government Exhibit 52 is authentic. Accordingly, excerpts of Government Exhibit 52 should be admitted.\nI. Applicable Law\nThe Second Circuit has \"often commented that the bar for authentication of evidence is not particularly high.\" United States v. Al-Moyad, 545 F.3d 139, 172 (2d Cir. 2008) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). The \"proponent of the evidence is not required to rule out all possibilities inconsistent with authenticity, or to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the evidence is what it purports to be.\" United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 658 (2d Cir. 2001). All that is required is \"sufficient proof . . . so that a reasonable juror could find in favor of authenticity or identification.\" Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see Fed. R. Evid. 901(a). The \"standard for authentication is one of 'reasonable likelihood' and is 'minimal.' The testimony of a witness with knowledge that a matter is what it is claimed to be is sufficient to satisfy this standard.\" United States v. Gagliardi, 506 F.3d 140, 151 (2d Cir. 2007) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see United States v. Al Farek, 810 F. App'x 21, 24-25 (2d Cir. 2020) (authenticating \"handwritten letters\" based on their contents and \"considerable similarities between the handwriting\" and known exemplars). After this low bar is satisfied, \"the other party then remains free to challenge the reliability of the evidence, to minimize its importance, or to argue alternative interpretations of its meaning, but these and similar other challenges to go the weight of the evidence—not to its admissibility.\" United States v. Tan Yat Chin, 371 F.3d 31, 38 (2d Cir. 2004) (emphases in original).\n2\nDOJ-OGR-00008274",
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  14. "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 533 Filed 12/09/21 Page 2 of 8",
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  17. {
  18. "type": "printed",
  19. "content": "of Government Exhibit 52, under Rule 902. For the reasons set forth below, the record at trial establishes that Government Exhibit 52 is authentic. Accordingly, excerpts of Government Exhibit 52 should be admitted.",
  20. "position": "top"
  21. },
  22. {
  23. "type": "printed",
  24. "content": "I. Applicable Law",
  25. "position": "top"
  26. },
  27. {
  28. "type": "printed",
  29. "content": "The Second Circuit has \"often commented that the bar for authentication of evidence is not particularly high.\" United States v. Al-Moyad, 545 F.3d 139, 172 (2d Cir. 2008) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). The \"proponent of the evidence is not required to rule out all possibilities inconsistent with authenticity, or to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the evidence is what it purports to be.\" United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 658 (2d Cir. 2001). All that is required is \"sufficient proof . . . so that a reasonable juror could find in favor of authenticity or identification.\" Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see Fed. R. Evid. 901(a). The \"standard for authentication is one of 'reasonable likelihood' and is 'minimal.' The testimony of a witness with knowledge that a matter is what it is claimed to be is sufficient to satisfy this standard.\" United States v. Gagliardi, 506 F.3d 140, 151 (2d Cir. 2007) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see United States v. Al Farek, 810 F. App'x 21, 24-25 (2d Cir. 2020) (authenticating \"handwritten letters\" based on their contents and \"considerable similarities between the handwriting\" and known exemplars). After this low bar is satisfied, \"the other party then remains free to challenge the reliability of the evidence, to minimize its importance, or to argue alternative interpretations of its meaning, but these and similar other challenges to go the weight of the evidence—not to its admissibility.\" United States v. Tan Yat Chin, 371 F.3d 31, 38 (2d Cir. 2004) (emphases in original).",
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  31. },
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  33. "type": "printed",
  34. "content": "2",
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  39. "content": "DOJ-OGR-00008274",
  40. "position": "footer"
  41. }
  42. ],
  43. "entities": {
  44. "people": [],
  45. "organizations": [
  46. "Second Circuit",
  47. "United States"
  48. ],
  49. "locations": [],
  50. "dates": [
  51. "12/09/21",
  52. "2008",
  53. "2001",
  54. "2007",
  55. "2020",
  56. "2004"
  57. ],
  58. "reference_numbers": [
  59. "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
  60. "533",
  61. "52",
  62. "902",
  63. "545 F.3d 139",
  64. "243 F.3d 635",
  65. "506 F.3d 140",
  66. "810 F. App'x 21",
  67. "371 F.3d 31",
  68. "DOJ-OGR-00008274"
  69. ]
  70. },
  71. "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text is well-formatted and printed, with no visible handwriting or stamps. The content discusses the authentication of evidence under Rule 902 and cites various court cases."
  72. }