DOJ-OGR-00007432.json 5.3 KB

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  1. {
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  3. "page_number": "2",
  4. "document_number": "493",
  5. "date": "11/22/21",
  6. "document_type": "court document",
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  10. "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 493 Filed 11/22/21 Page 2 of 6\nPage 2\nof an offense.\" 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(2). That section also expressly includes, in conspiracy cases, \"any person directly harmed by the defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the . . . conspiracy . . . .\" Id.\nA person is \"directly and proximately harmed\" by a commission of an offense when the offense is a but-for and proximate cause of their harm. See, e.g., United States v. Goodrich, 12 F.4th 219, 229 (2d Cir. 2021) (describing the identical language in 18 U.S.C. § 3663A). The offense is a but-for cause if the defendant's conduct was \"a necessary factor in bringing about the victim's harm.\" Id. And the offense is a proximate cause if the \"harm was 'foreseeable' to a defendant.\" Id. While the loss must \"arise from the specific conduct that is the basis of the offense of conviction,\" id. at 228 (internal quotation marks omitted), in the case of a conspiracy where an individual is convicted for an \"overarching scheme,\" restitution is appropriate for \"actions that were within and necessary to that 'single scheme.'\" United States v. Seabrook, 968 F.3d 224, 236 n.8 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Archer, 671 F.3d 149, 171-72 (2d Cir. 2011)). That includes the \"reasonably foreseeable actions\" of co-conspirators, because \"the defendant's 'specific conduct' in a conspiracy includes his agreement to the 'common plan of the conspiracy.'\" Goodrich, 12 F.4th at 228.\nThese definitions of \"victims\" encompass a broader set of individuals than the set of people who are injured when all elements of an offense are met. In Goodrich, for instance, a securities broker-dealer \"pleaded guilty to a conspiracy to manipulate\" the share price of a sham company. 12 F.4th at 231. His co-defendants \"arranged the sale of [the company's] shares outside the public market in a private placement,\" and the broker-dealer challenged his order to pay restitution for losses in the private placement, because they were not victims of his offense. Id. at 223. The private placement was not mentioned in his indictment, plea agreement, or plea allocution, id. at\nDOJ-OGR-00007432",
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  14. "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 493 Filed 11/22/21 Page 2 of 6",
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  24. "content": "of an offense.\" 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(2). That section also expressly includes, in conspiracy cases, \"any person directly harmed by the defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the . . . conspiracy . . . .\" Id.\nA person is \"directly and proximately harmed\" by a commission of an offense when the offense is a but-for and proximate cause of their harm. See, e.g., United States v. Goodrich, 12 F.4th 219, 229 (2d Cir. 2021) (describing the identical language in 18 U.S.C. § 3663A). The offense is a but-for cause if the defendant's conduct was \"a necessary factor in bringing about the victim's harm.\" Id. And the offense is a proximate cause if the \"harm was 'foreseeable' to a defendant.\" Id. While the loss must \"arise from the specific conduct that is the basis of the offense of conviction,\" id. at 228 (internal quotation marks omitted), in the case of a conspiracy where an individual is convicted for an \"overarching scheme,\" restitution is appropriate for \"actions that were within and necessary to that 'single scheme.'\" United States v. Seabrook, 968 F.3d 224, 236 n.8 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Archer, 671 F.3d 149, 171-72 (2d Cir. 2011)). That includes the \"reasonably foreseeable actions\" of co-conspirators, because \"the defendant's 'specific conduct' in a conspiracy includes his agreement to the 'common plan of the conspiracy.'\" Goodrich, 12 F.4th at 228.\nThese definitions of \"victims\" encompass a broader set of individuals than the set of people who are injured when all elements of an offense are met. In Goodrich, for instance, a securities broker-dealer \"pleaded guilty to a conspiracy to manipulate\" the share price of a sham company. 12 F.4th at 231. His co-defendants \"arranged the sale of [the company's] shares outside the public market in a private placement,\" and the broker-dealer challenged his order to pay restitution for losses in the private placement, because they were not victims of his offense. Id. at 223. The private placement was not mentioned in his indictment, plea agreement, or plea allocution, id. at",
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  29. "content": "DOJ-OGR-00007432",
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  37. "dates": [
  38. "11/22/21"
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  40. "reference_numbers": [
  41. "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
  42. "493",
  43. "DOJ-OGR-00007432"
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  46. "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text is well-formatted and printed, with no visible handwriting or stamps. The content discusses legal definitions and precedents related to restitution in conspiracy cases."
  47. }