mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES004/DOJ-OGR-00011428.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "5",
    "document_number": "732",
    "date": "07/14/22",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 732 Filed 07/14/22 Page 5 of 25 The Honorable Alison J. Nathan November 22, 2021 Page 5 A. The constitutional backdrop. \"Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause . . . , or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.\" Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)); see U.S. Const. amends. V, VI. A court violates a defendant's right to present a defense when it excludes competent and reliable evidence that is central to the defense. See Crane, 476 U.S. at 690. The exclusion of such evidence \"deprives a defendant of the basic right to have the prosecutor's case encounter and 'survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing.'\" Id. at 690-91 (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984)). The Constitution also affords Ms. Maxwell the right to confront her accusers. U.S. amend. VI; Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 231 (1988). \"[A] criminal defendant states a violation of the Confrontation Clause by showing that [she] was prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness, and thereby 'to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors . . . could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.'\" Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680 (1986) (quoting Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318 (1974)). \"Cross-examination is the principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of [her] testimony are tested.\" Davis, 415 U.S. at 316. The importance of cross-examination cannot be overstated where, as here, the government's proof depends almost entirely on the uncorroborated testimony of the accusers. Poventud v. City of New York, No. 07 CIV. 3998 DAB, 2015 WL 1062186, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2015) (\"Second Circuit case law . . . clearly establishes that DOJ-OGR-00011428",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 732 Filed 07/14/22 Page 5 of 25",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The Honorable Alison J. Nathan November 22, 2021 Page 5",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "A. The constitutional backdrop.",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "\"Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause . . . , or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.\" Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)); see U.S. Const. amends. V, VI. A court violates a defendant's right to present a defense when it excludes competent and reliable evidence that is central to the defense. See Crane, 476 U.S. at 690. The exclusion of such evidence \"deprives a defendant of the basic right to have the prosecutor's case encounter and 'survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing.'\" Id. at 690-91 (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984)).",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The Constitution also affords Ms. Maxwell the right to confront her accusers. U.S. amend. VI; Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 231 (1988). \"[A] criminal defendant states a violation of the Confrontation Clause by showing that [she] was prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness, and thereby 'to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors . . . could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.'\" Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680 (1986) (quoting Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318 (1974)). \"Cross-examination is the principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of [her] testimony are tested.\" Davis, 415 U.S. at 316. The importance of cross-examination cannot be overstated where, as here, the government's proof depends almost entirely on the uncorroborated testimony of the accusers. Poventud v. City of New York, No. 07 CIV. 3998 DAB, 2015 WL 1062186, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2015) (\"Second Circuit case law . . . clearly establishes that",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00011428",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Alison J. Nathan",
      "Ms. Maxwell"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "U.S. Supreme Court",
      "Second Circuit",
      "City of New York"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "Kentucky",
      "Alaska",
      "Delaware",
      "New York"
    ],
    "dates": [
      "November 22, 2021",
      "07/14/22",
      "1986",
      "1984",
      "1988",
      "1974",
      "Mar. 9, 2015"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 732",
      "07 CIV. 3998 DAB",
      "2015 WL 1062186"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing, likely a memorandum or brief, discussing constitutional rights related to presenting a defense and confronting accusers. The text includes citations to various court cases and constitutional amendments."
}