mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES003/DOJ-OGR-00008117.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "6",
    "document_number": "509-1",
    "date": "11/24/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 509-1 Filed 11/24/21 Page 6 of 10\n(10th Cir. 2009))). The issue in that case was not expert testimony, but rather whether the Government should have been required to disclose a confidential informant's mental health records, and whether the defendant should have been allowed to cross-examine the informant using those records. Robinson, 583 F.3d at 1269, 1274. Had the defendant's requests been granted, the cross-examination apparently would have revealed, among other things: hallucinations, heavy drug use during the relevant events—in contradiction of the informant's trial testimony and violation of his cooperation agreement—as well as shortly before and perhaps during trial, and prescription drug use during trial. Id. at 1257, 1274-76. The obvious relevance of cross-examination on those fact questions underscores the gap between Dr. Hall's proposed expert testimony and permissible evidence about a witness's mental health.\nThe Government does, however, join the defendant in urging the Court to \"adhere to DiPaolo.\" (Opp. 13). In that case, the Second Circuit affirmed a district court's refusal to allow inquiry into a female victim's addiction, absent any evidence that she was under the influence either during the relevant events or while testifying. United States v. DiPaolo, 804 F.2d 225, 229-30 (2d Cir. 1986).\nBecause those are the only relevant inquiries, and because Dr. Hall's opinion offers nothing on either, his testimony that should be excluded.\nIII. The Hearsay Bases of Dr. Hall's Opinions Are Inadmissible\nThe defendant does not deny that she hopes to use Dr. Hall as a vehicle to import hearsay about into the case, or that all of Dr. Hall's testimony on this subject would derive from out-of-court statements. (Compare Mot. 12 with Opp. 14-15). Instead she offers three different rules of evidence under which she hopes to admit the hearsay. None is valid:\nRule 703. The defendant does not engage with the plain text of the Rule 703—much less the cases cited in the Government's motion—showing that this rule allows the admission of\n5\nDOJ-OGR-00008117",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 509-1 Filed 11/24/21 Page 6 of 10",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "(10th Cir. 2009))). The issue in that case was not expert testimony, but rather whether the Government should have been required to disclose a confidential informant's mental health records, and whether the defendant should have been allowed to cross-examine the informant using those records. Robinson, 583 F.3d at 1269, 1274. Had the defendant's requests been granted, the cross-examination apparently would have revealed, among other things: hallucinations, heavy drug use during the relevant events—in contradiction of the informant's trial testimony and violation of his cooperation agreement—as well as shortly before and perhaps during trial, and prescription drug use during trial. Id. at 1257, 1274-76. The obvious relevance of cross-examination on those fact questions underscores the gap between Dr. Hall's proposed expert testimony and permissible evidence about a witness's mental health.",
      "position": "body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The Government does, however, join the defendant in urging the Court to \"adhere to DiPaolo.\" (Opp. 13). In that case, the Second Circuit affirmed a district court's refusal to allow inquiry into a female victim's addiction, absent any evidence that she was under the influence either during the relevant events or while testifying. United States v. DiPaolo, 804 F.2d 225, 229-30 (2d Cir. 1986).",
      "position": "body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Because those are the only relevant inquiries, and because Dr. Hall's opinion offers nothing on either, his testimony that should be excluded.",
      "position": "body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "III. The Hearsay Bases of Dr. Hall's Opinions Are Inadmissible",
      "position": "body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The defendant does not deny that she hopes to use Dr. Hall as a vehicle to import hearsay about into the case, or that all of Dr. Hall's testimony on this subject would derive from out-of-court statements. (Compare Mot. 12 with Opp. 14-15). Instead she offers three different rules of evidence under which she hopes to admit the hearsay. None is valid:",
      "position": "body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Rule 703. The defendant does not engage with the plain text of the Rule 703—much less the cases cited in the Government's motion—showing that this rule allows the admission of",
      "position": "body"
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "5",
      "position": "footer"
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00008117",
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  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Dr. Hall"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Government",
      "Second Circuit"
    ],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "11/24/21"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "509-1",
      "DOJ-OGR-00008117"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing with redactions. The text is mostly printed, with no handwritten content or stamps visible."
}