mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES003/DOJ-OGR-00007471.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "6 of 28",
    "document_number": "499",
    "date": "11/23/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 499 Filed 11/23/21 Page 6 of 28\nthe government's true objection is a question of fit, and because there is no dispute Dr. Dietz and Dr. Loftus are qualified, this Court should deny the government's motion.\n\nARGUMENT\n\"Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause . . . , or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants \"a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.\" Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)); see U.S. Const. amends. V, VI. A court violates a defendant's right to present a defense when it excludes competent and reliable evidence that is central to the defense. See Crane, 476 U.S. at 690. The exclusion of such evidence \"deprives a defendant of the basic right to have the prosecutor's case encounter and 'survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing.'\" Id. at 690-91 (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984)).\n\nThe Constitution also affords Ms. Maxwell the right to confront her accusers. U.S. amend. VI; Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 231 (1988). \"[A] criminal defendant states a violation of the Confrontation Clause by showing that [she] was prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness, and thereby 'to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors . . . could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.'\" Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680 (1986) (quoting Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318 (1974)).\n\nFederal Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admissibility of Dr. Deitz and Dr. Loftus's proposed testimony.\n\nA witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:\n(a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;\n2\nDOJ-OGR-00007471",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 499 Filed 11/23/21 Page 6 of 28",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "the government's true objection is a question of fit, and because there is no dispute Dr. Dietz and Dr. Loftus are qualified, this Court should deny the government's motion.",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "ARGUMENT",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "\"Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause . . . , or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants \"a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.\" Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)); see U.S. Const. amends. V, VI. A court violates a defendant's right to present a defense when it excludes competent and reliable evidence that is central to the defense. See Crane, 476 U.S. at 690. The exclusion of such evidence \"deprives a defendant of the basic right to have the prosecutor's case encounter and 'survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing.'\" Id. at 690-91 (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984)).",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The Constitution also affords Ms. Maxwell the right to confront her accusers. U.S. amend. VI; Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 231 (1988). \"[A] criminal defendant states a violation of the Confrontation Clause by showing that [she] was prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness, and thereby 'to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors . . . could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.'\" Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680 (1986) (quoting Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318 (1974)).",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admissibility of Dr. Deitz and Dr. Loftus's proposed testimony.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:\n(a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;",
      "position": "bottom"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "2",
      "position": "footer"
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00007471",
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  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Dr. Dietz",
      "Dr. Loftus",
      "Ms. Maxwell"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "U.S. Supreme Court"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "Kentucky",
      "Alaska",
      "Delaware"
    ],
    "dates": [
      "11/23/21",
      "1986",
      "1984",
      "1988",
      "1974"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 499",
      "DOJ-OGR-00007471"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text is mostly printed, with no handwritten content or stamps visible. The document is well-formatted and legible."
}