mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES004/DOJ-OGR-00008937.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "13",
    "document_number": "600",
    "date": "02/11/22",
    "document_type": "court document",
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  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 600 Filed 02/11/22 Page 13 of 37\n\nspecific showing of prejudice.\" Id. at *20 (quoting United States v. D'Amelio, 683 F.3d 412, 417 (2d Cir. 2012)).\n\nAlthough the Second Circuit has \"consistently permitted significant flexibility\" in how the government proves the crime alleged, the defendant must be \"given notice of the core of criminality to be proven at trial.\" Id. (cleaned up). Accordingly, the first step in evaluating whether a constructive amendment has occurred is for the Court to define the \"core of criminality\" of the crimes alleged. Id. (cleaned up). It is well settled that \"the object of a conspiracy constitutes an essential element of the conspiracy offense.\" Id. (quoting United States v. Roshko, 969 F.2d 1, 5 (2d Cir. 1992)). Moreover, \"although an indictment 'drawn in general terms' may articulate a broad core of criminality, an indictment that is drawn in specific terms may be read to specify a narrower set of facts—such that the proof of completely distinct facts at trial could lead to a constructive amendment.\" Id. (quoting United States v. Wozniak, 126 F.3d 105, 109-10 (2d Cir. 1997)). For example, specific overt acts alleged in the indictment may narrow the scope of the core of criminality because they \"effect the object of the [charged] conspiracy.\" United States v. Attanasio, 870 F.2d 809, 816-17 (2d Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). By contrast, general factual allegations in an indictment that are not part of the specific statutory allegations of a particular count may not limit the core of criminality of that offense. Id. Similarly, the \"essential elements\" do not include \"the specific means used by a defendant to effect his or her crime.\" D'Amelio, 683 F.3d at 422.\n\n\"After identifying the core of criminality, a court must then determine whether the evidence or jury instructions at trial created a substantial likelihood that the defendant was not convicted of the crime described in that core, but of a crime 'distinctly different' from the one alleged.\" Gross, 2017 WL 4685111, at *21 (citing D'Amelio, 683 F.3d at 419-21). It is not\n\n8\n\nDOJ-OGR-00008937",
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      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 600 Filed 02/11/22 Page 13 of 37",
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      "type": "printed",
      "content": "specific showing of prejudice.\" Id. at *20 (quoting United States v. D'Amelio, 683 F.3d 412, 417 (2d Cir. 2012)).\n\nAlthough the Second Circuit has \"consistently permitted significant flexibility\" in how the government proves the crime alleged, the defendant must be \"given notice of the core of criminality to be proven at trial.\" Id. (cleaned up). Accordingly, the first step in evaluating whether a constructive amendment has occurred is for the Court to define the \"core of criminality\" of the crimes alleged. Id. (cleaned up). It is well settled that \"the object of a conspiracy constitutes an essential element of the conspiracy offense.\" Id. (quoting United States v. Roshko, 969 F.2d 1, 5 (2d Cir. 1992)). Moreover, \"although an indictment 'drawn in general terms' may articulate a broad core of criminality, an indictment that is drawn in specific terms may be read to specify a narrower set of facts—such that the proof of completely distinct facts at trial could lead to a constructive amendment.\" Id. (quoting United States v. Wozniak, 126 F.3d 105, 109-10 (2d Cir. 1997)). For example, specific overt acts alleged in the indictment may narrow the scope of the core of criminality because they \"effect the object of the [charged] conspiracy.\" United States v. Attanasio, 870 F.2d 809, 816-17 (2d Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). By contrast, general factual allegations in an indictment that are not part of the specific statutory allegations of a particular count may not limit the core of criminality of that offense. Id. Similarly, the \"essential elements\" do not include \"the specific means used by a defendant to effect his or her crime.\" D'Amelio, 683 F.3d at 422.\n\n\"After identifying the core of criminality, a court must then determine whether the evidence or jury instructions at trial created a substantial likelihood that the defendant was not convicted of the crime described in that core, but of a crime 'distinctly different' from the one alleged.\" Gross, 2017 WL 4685111, at *21 (citing D'Amelio, 683 F.3d at 419-21). It is not",
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      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00008937",
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  "entities": {
    "people": [],
    "organizations": [
      "Second Circuit",
      "United States"
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    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "02/11/22",
      "2012",
      "1992",
      "1997",
      "1989",
      "2017"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "600",
      "683 F.3d 412",
      "969 F.2d 1",
      "126 F.3d 105",
      "870 F.2d 809",
      "2017 WL 4685111",
      "DOJ-OGR-00008937"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text is well-formatted and easy to read. There are no visible redactions or damage to the document."
}